Process innovation : analysis and redesign of the California Army National Guard State Emergency Mobilization Process by McGuire, Patrick F. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998-09
Process innovation : analysis and redesign of the
California Army National Guard State Emergency
Mobilization Process
McGuire, Patrick F.














PROCESS INNOVATION: ANALYSIS AND REDESIGN OF
THE CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD STATE
EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PROCESS
by






Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average I hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to
Washington headquarters Services. Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
September 1998
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE : Process Innovation: Analysis and Redesign of the California
Army National Guard State Emergency Mobilization Process
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)
McGuire, Patrick F., Palan, Andrew J., and White, David A.












The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Process innovation can empower an organization to realize orders of magnitude improvement in its key business
processes. Through process redesign, information technology can be used as an enabler to support effective,
efficient, and cross-functional business processes. The area of research for this thesis is the analysis and redesign of
the State Emergency Mobilization Process of the California Army National Guard. This is accomplished through a
detailed study of the State Emergency Mobilization Process with an emphasis of the key business processes of the
California Army National Guard. The baseline process will be measured and diagnosed for inhibiting pathologies,
and redesigned processes will be proposed based on benchmarking best practices of other organizations and by
utilizing Process Innovation best practices. Critical process enablers such as people, culture and technology will be
examined and applied to redesign alternatives. Once completed, the best redesigned business process will be
recommended and an implementation plan drafted to integrate with the CA-ARNG Strategic Information Systems
Plan.
14. SUBJECT TERMS





















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
11
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
PROCESS INNOVATION: ANALYSIS AND REDESIGN OF THE CALIFORNIA
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD STATE EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PROCESS
Patrick F. McGuire
Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1992
Andrew J. Palan
Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1991
David A. White
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Jacksonville University, 1990
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of









Process innovation can empower an organization to realize orders of magnitude
improvement in its key business processes. Through process redesign, information
technology can be used as an enabler to support effective, efficient, and cross-functional
business processes. The area of research for this thesis is the analysis and redesign of the
State Emergency Mobilization Process of the California Army National Guard. This is
accomplished through a detailed study of the State Emergency Mobilization Process with
an emphasis of the key business processes of the California Army National Guard. The
baseline process will be measured and diagnosed for inhibiting pathologies, and
redesigned processes will be proposed based on benchmarking best practices of other
organizations and by utilizing Process Innovation best practices. Critical process
enablers such as people, culture and technology will be examined and applied to redesign
alternatives. Once completed, the best redesigned business process will be recommended
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The historical foundation upon which nearly all American businesses and
governmental organizations are built can be traced back to 1776, when Adam Smith
published The Wealth ofNations. This seminal publication revolutionized the notion of
how workers manufactured products, and more fundamentally, how work was
accomplished. Smith theorized that through the notion of job specialization, individuals
specifically trained to handle distinct parts of a production cycle could produce order-of-
magnitude increases in manufacturing output. Each person, or group of people, would be
responsible for only a particular facet of product manufacturing. The idea of dividing
labor into specialized functions had a profound impact on business, one that continues to
shape the manner in which most organizations deploy their workforce.
The 200-year reign of Smith's division of labor principle can be attributed to the
explosive population growth and the need to manufacture products to satisfy demand.
The division of labor methodology was proven to be the most effective method of mass
production as evidenced in America's success in manufacturing dating from the advent of
the industrial age in 1850.
As companies grew, so did their need for control of the organization. The
industrial age honed the organizational structure through the creation of bureaucracies,
which became the standard business management apparatus. The precipitation of the
management-separate-from-ownership model of the ' modern business enterprise
manifested with the massive management reorganization of the railroad and utility
industries primarily owned by J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and Andrew S.
Carnegie. Companies that emerged from this period "distinguished management from
ownership and established management as work and task." [Ref. 101, p. 11]
The development of the modern corporation is most noticeably associated with
Alfred P. Sloan's redesign of General Motors in the 1950's. Sloan's management
principle of "decentralization with coordinated control" is known as divisionalization.
[Ref. 2, p. 14] In essence, Sloan created smaller, divisionalized business units that
managers could oversee from a small corporate headquarters simply by monitoring
production and financial data [Ref. 3]. The work of Sloan is visible today in nearly all
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large American organizations. In particular. General Motors' Cadillac, Pontiac,
Chevrolet, Buick and Oldsmobile divisions are still alive and well today. Their
organizational structure has changed little since Sloan's time.
Sloan theorized that executives primarily needed financial knowledge to monitor
and control the decentralized business units. Management by numbers — profit, loss,
inventory and market share — became the primary means of command and control. The
command and control organization is characterized, according to Peter Drucker, by an
emphasis on decentralization, central service staffs, personnel management, the whole
apparatus of budgets and controls, and the important distinction between policy and
operations. [Ref. 6, p. 5] The GM redesign firmly established the division of professional
labor (management) in parallel with the division of manual workers that had already
taken place on the factory floor. [Ref. 3]
The culmination of this second evolutionary change in corporate structure,
heralded by the GM reorganization, was the reorganization of General Electric in the
early 1950's. Reginald Jones at General Electric perfected corporate management
techniques. Senior managers set corporate financial objectives, determined the amount of
capital investment required to reach the targets and then controlled the activities of line
managers to attain to the financial objectives. Large staffs of controllers, planners, and
auditors acted as the executive's eyes and ears, ferreting out data about divisional
performance, and intervening to adjust the plans and activities of operational managers.
[Ref. 3, p. 15]
The postwar economy and its insatiable need for products fueled the growth of
the American economy. The hierarchical structure of the modern business organization
was well suited to accommodate the growth in demand. Scalability could be obtained by
hiring additional laborers and filling in the middle management structure. The ability of
manufacturers to produce and satisfy market demand became the critical success factor of
the post-war American business environment. Over time, more intricate production
control, planning, and budgeting mechanisms continuously honed production. The
continued growth of industry further divided tasks into continuously smaller parts. Aided
by the introduction of commercially available office technology, management functions
were also divided into smaller tasks that could be done more quickly and accurately with
computers.
1. The Price of Efficiency
As the big business organizational model perfected its fiscal control of the
functionally organized labor force, managing work over the entire spectrum of business
activity became increasingly difficult. The divided labor tasks increased the level of
difficulty of managing a production process with so many steps. The number of middle
managers required to oversee production and communicate with executives swelled.
Corporate expenses resulting from the cost of large management ranks overseeing
production became on enormous problem. Hammer and Champy point toward the
distance that separates senior management from customers as another factor contributing
to the manifestation of new management problems. [Ref. 3, p. 16] Executives had little
to no contact with employees and customers; what they knew about the business was tied
to what they knew about the numbers.
In general, the Smith model grew cumbersome as work became too fragmented.
Coupled with the Sloan model of scientific management and command and control, the
management infrastructure became large enough that costs to support the modern
organization began to significantly impact the financial reports. The numerous small
tasks that once simplified complex manufacturing processes and management controls
developed into the root of the problem. The costs become evident as the business
environment changed beginning in the late 1970's.
2. The Change Environment
In the 30-year period following World War II, America's demand for goods and
services outpaced the ability of industry to satisfy it. Corporations flourished in this
sellers' market. Although the Smith and Sloan models of the corporation had many
benefits that helped make them successful in this period of massive growth, a
fundamental shift in the marketplace occurred in the mid-1970's. Hammer and Champy
characterize three primary forces that have caused companies to take notice of the new
business environment: customers, competition, and change. [Ref. 3, p. 17] These
concepts are hardly new factors in business, however the new characteristics of
competition, customers and change are shaping the business world as never seen before.
Customers are shaping the new business environment due to the availability of
product quality information and their ability to choose among many similar products. In
the past, lack of choice among products gave consumers few avenues for selection.
According to Hammer and Champy, American consumers were not necessarily
dissatisfied with available product choices; they simply had fewer choices. It was not
until the early 1980's, and the influx of Japanese products that the American consumer
expectations for higher quality at lower prices rose. [Ref. 3, p. 19] Consumer
expectations shifted away from products designed for a mass market to products that
were specifically tailored to meet their tastes. The concept of a market-of-one was
developing and American companies were slow to recognize this phenomenon.
The influx of global competition in markets where American hegemony reigned
has fundamentally shifted balance from a supplier to consumer dominated marketplace.
American companies are now competing with foreign companies on their own ground.
Products that were once successful in a particular market now face competition from
companies with new operating procedures that focus on quality, service and low price.
Caterpillar competes with Komatsu, DuPont with Hoechst, Chase Manhattan with
Barclays. Good performers drive out the inferior; because the lowest price, the highest
quality, and the best service available from any one of them soon becomes the standard
for all competitors. [Ref. 3, p. 21]
Product maturity obscures the lines that previously differentiated one product
from another, forcing companies to seek new ways to make their products more
applicable to more narrowly defined markets. Issues such as customer service, easy
access to purchasing, increased styles to fit particular markets and low prices now
become critical to corporate survival.
Perhaps most significant in Hammer and Champy "3C's" is the element of
change, particularly the rate of change. The unprecedented rate of change forces
companies to turn their corporate resources toward meeting consumer demands and
anticipating future demands, always with a close eye on the competition. Although the
customer and competition factors have always been key in operating a successful
business, the constant rate of change leaves little time to focus on managing internal
corporate activities. The sequential task driven manufacturing cycle and the traditionally
large middle management structure of previous corporate models now detract from
customer facing activities needed to keep up in the marketplace. Corporations slow to
recognize the new face of change were literally breaking at the seams. On one hand, they
were trying to maintain monolithic command and control organizations, yet on the other,
preaching the flexibility necessary for the constant change environment.
Competition, customers and change forced American companies to take notice
that the methodologies of the 30-year boon that had propelled them to economic success
were no longer relevant. Hammer and Champy view the consequences of the "3C's" and
their impact upon American corporations as based on 1) a lack of process understanding
and ownership and 2) the inevitability of errors with large and complex division of labor
cycles. [Ref. 3, p. 27] No one was responsible for understanding how the series of task
driven steps impacted the structure of the organization, its profit, and each customer. In
essence, the Smith model, designed for its task simplicity, had created complex series of
task driven activities that fractured the natural flow of work.
American companies needed to rethink how they accomplished their work, not the
amount of products they were producing. An examination of how work was done
demanded total visibility from customer order to delivery. American companies were in
need of an organizational overhaul.
B. DAWN OF THE INFORMATION AGE
The new realities of competition, customers and change placed enormous
transformational pressure on the modern organization. A new approach to business was
required. In the words of Hammer and Champy, "discontinuous thinking" implies the
relinquishing of traditional ideas about business operations and the formal questioning of
paradigms that once made them successful. [Ref. 3, p. 25] Executives and managers had
to begin deconstructing long-held beliefs in the practices that made the post-World War II
corporations successful, including their "Smith and Sloan" organizational structures.
Peter Drucker refers to the fundamental shift in organizational structure now required to
meet modern challenges as the "3 rd period of change":
The shift from the command-and-control organization, the organization of
departments and divisions, to the information-based organization, an
organization of knowledge specialists. [Ref. 1, p. 11]
Drucker called this new entity the "information-based organization." [Ref. 1, p.
1] In the information-based organization workers become self-guiding knowledge
specialists who have a significantly broader scope of work. [Ref 1, p. 2] Information
organizations often combine knowledge specialists in empowered teams who are
responsible for a wide variety of activities and decision-making once reserved for
management. [Ref. 1, p. 5] By collapsing multiple tasks performed by several people, the
underlying notion of the information-based organization is that knowledgeable workers
and managers can assume the responsibilities and actions once accomplished by many.
Information technologies provide new opportunities to combine multiple tasks, directed
by knowledge specialists, into more robust activities performed by fewer people.
1. New Assumptions
The information-based organization will operate in a different environment,
underscored by new set of basic assumptions. Robert Kaplan and David Norton offer
insight into the new set of assumptions based upon: "cross-functions, links to customers
and suppliers, customer segmentation, global scale, innovation, and knowledge workers."
[Ref. 4, p. 5]
Organizations of the industrial age did not fully understand the importance of
integrated relationships between themselves and their customers and suppliers.
Production schedules were preplanned and management science techniques were heavily
utilized to forecast supply needs. Today's information technology capabilities allow for
customer generated orders as the trigger for production. [Ref. 4, p. 4] Information age
organizations are capable of deploying an integrated supply and production system,
driven by customer orders, directly connected to the suppliers to provide on-time delivery
of supplies.
Customers are demanding products that are tailored to their needs. Gone are the
times when a few sizes, colors, or styles would suffice. Information age companies must
learn how to produce goods that increasingly target smaller segments of large markets.
To do this, internal processes must produce value and contribute directly to product
development, production and delivery. Successful companies will learn how to produce
market specific products/services without, "paying the usual cost penalty for high-variety,
low-volume operations." [Ref. 4, p. 5]
Information age companies now compete in a global market. Traditional borders
of the industrial age have been crossed. However, this can be viewed as an advantage.
As companies make large capital investments, they will often need to seek new
opportunities in world markets to achieve an acceptable return on investment. In essence,
information age companies must remain loyal and sensitive to their traditional local
customers while developing knowledge about new markets perhaps located elsewhere in
the world. [Ref. 4, p. 4]
Workers in the information age require more analytical skills than perhaps ever
before. In sharp distinction with industrial age thought, information age workers are
sought after for their knowledge and ability to contribute to the success of the
organization, not solely for the physical skills. In the words of Kaplan and Norton:
At the end of the twentieth century, automation and productivity have
reduced the percentage of people in the organization who perform
traditional work functions, while competitive demands have increased the
number of people performing analytic functions: engineering, marketing,
management, and administration. [Ref. 4, p. 5]
Information age workers are involved in all facets of the business. The need for
knowledge workers is present at all levels of the organization. Just as knowledge workers
involved in manufacturing would need to know production targets, customer order
deadlines, operating budgets and quality information, the same holds true for middle
management as their responsibilities expand into the levels once held closely by
executives. Everyone contributes to the success of the organization. New criteria for
hiring information workers and a new emphasis on education now present significant
challenges to organizations that understand their success depends on knowledgeable
people at all levels of the business.
Of critical importance to the success of information age businesses is the notion
that business is conducted across intra-organizational functional boundaries such as
departments and business units. In industrial age organizations, the highly specialized
functions performed by individual departments created well-honed functional
"machines". However, over time, these functions became islands of information and
skills. In effect, departments formed artificial boundaries that not only inaccurately
reflected the natural flow of work, but actually impeded it.
Handoffs (passing of information from one part of the process to the next) among
departments create non-value-added work that unnecessarily increases costs and slows
response time. Hammer and Champy observe that "information age organizations
operate with integrated business processes that cut across traditional business functions."
[Ref. 3, p. 15] Successful businesses in the information age will develop cross-functional
processes that map the true flow of work across the organization and develop systems to
support these processes.
Innovation is defined as the introduction of something new or creative.
Companies that wish to survive in the information age will develop innovative products
and services that not only meet current customer expectations, but plan on meeting them
in the future. Creating an organizational environment that allows innovation to develop
might perhaps be the strongest tool available to anticipate the impact of new customer
expectations, increasing competition and constant change.
Information age organizations are developing new ways of designing internal
processes that deliver meaningful information by harnessing knowledge across the
spectrum of activities critical to corporate survival. For example, business processes, and
their relative degree of "linkage" or relationship to strategic objectives, now determine
the success of the organization [Ref. 1, p. 117]. How the work is done (process) and how
that work performance contributes to the organization's strategic objectives (alignment)
are now no less important, if not more important, than which corporate divisions make
what products or how and by whom this managerial hierarchy is organized and
controlled. Leadership, management styles and organization structure remain critical
factors, but business processes describe how work is performed and represent more
accurate indicators of how the products and services of an organization are produced. For
instance, most business processes cut across multiple organizational departments and
management levels.
Davenport describes the methodology of Process Innovation which "combines the
adaptation of a process view of the business with the application of innovation to key
processes." [Ref. 1, p. 1] Process Innovation asks leaders to focus on how organizations
deliver value to their customers through its processes. However, viewing the
organization as a collection of processes is a difficult paradigm shift from a
predominately vertical "wire-diagram" notion of the organization.
Whereas an organization's hierarchical structure is typically a slice-in-time
view of responsibilities and report relationships, its process structure is a
dynamic view of how the organization delivers value. Furthermore, while
we cannot measure or improve hierarchical structure in any absolute sense,
processes have cost, time, output quality, and customer satisfaction. [Ref.
l,p.6].
Through an understanding of how existing processes succeed or fail to deliver
value to the customer, executives, managers and workers can see where their actions
directly contribute (or not) to the strategic objectives of the organization. This provides
focused information about process pathologies such as bottlenecks, duplications of effort
and non value-added steps, in addition to enabling technologies and other transformations
that can be employed to redesign processes and effect dramatic performance
improvements. Such dramatic or order-of-magnitude improvement in process
performance represents a fundamental objective of process innovation [Ref. 2, p. 2].
Information technology offers one of the most powerful means to redesign organizational
processes and enable processes to deliver information to all that contribute to the
organization's success. In the information age, that means everyone who is on the
payroll.
The California Army National Guard (CA-ARNG) pre-dates the industrial age by
a few years and now faces the challenges of bringing this organization into the
information era. These challenges are similar to those affecting most organizations born
in the industrial age, many of which are burdened by enormous bureaucracy such as the
federal government. An additional challenge is posed by the CA-ARNG' s role as a
combined federal and state government organization. The above challenges provide the
imperative for process innovation.
This thesis examines a process ~ the State Emergency Mobilization Process
(SEMP) - of critical importance to the CA-ARNG. The State Emergency Mobilization
Process is used to respond to a wide variety of emergencies. These consist of, but are not
limited to, large scale fires, floods, search and rescue and civil disorder and have earned
the Guard a world-wide reputation as the most effective organization in the business. We
examine its overall business process flow, diagnose its pathologies, and make redesign
recommendations on how to dramatically improve its performance. The key performance
dimensions of interest to CA-ARNG management include decision-making time and
solution quality. The goal of this study is to design a more responsive process that
delivers information required to make more timely decisions that provide the best
solution tailored to each emergency. This study has been authorized and sponsored in
part by CA-ARNG.
C. OBJECTIVES
The area of research for this thesis is the analysis and redesign of the CA-ARNG
SEMP. The research is organized into several distinct phases: baseline mapping, redesign
alternatives and change management. First, the baseline process is represented and its
corresponding pathologies are diagnosed and measured to provide a common
understanding of the SEMP and its shortcomings. Next, redesign alternatives are
generated based upon findings in the baseline as well as input received from members of
the CA-ARNG SEMP. The alternatives also reflect the consideration of benchmarking
best practices of other organizations. Critical process enablers such as people, culture and
technology are examined and applied to redesign alternatives to dramatically improve
process performance and its alignment with strategic objectives. Finally, the redesigned
business process judged to offer the greatest potential for improvement is recommended,
and a change management plan is drafted to edify the issues associated with managing
complex change in a large organization.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is how can the Guard's key business processes be
redesigned to dramatically improve performance?
The secondary questions are as follows:
How can the CA-ARNG align key business processes with the organization's
overall strategy?
D What processes of the CA-ARNG offer the best potential for performance
improvement?
D How is the State Emergency Mobilization Process system designed and what
are its strengths and weaknesses? Boundaries?
D How do the key processes support the State Emergency Mobilization Process
and what pathologies can be diagnosed for the process?
D What measures of effectiveness can be developed for the process?
D What re-design alternatives offer the best potential for dramatic process
improvement?
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D How can the CA-ARNG implement the new process?
What IT strategies can be applied to the organization as a whole?
D How can this research be generalized to other key processes and
organizations?t- 1-
E. SCOPE
The thesis addresses the California Army National Guard's role in the State
Emergency Mobilization Process. The scope of the thesis is limited to analysis and
redesign of the SEMP. The research utilizes the Davenport method of Process Innovation
and incorporates Camp's Business Process Benchmarking method of examining case
studies of similar organizations. We integrate the process innovation and benchmarking
techniques with a top down strategic emphasis. Our intent is to produce a robust
redesigned process that will yield a decreased cycle (response) time with the appropriate
response to state emergencies.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The authors embarked upon a pilot study commencing in August of 1997 to learn
about the customer. Three goals were established and prioritized concerning the
customer. These were to learn about the organization, investigate the technologies, and to
map the business processes. All goals were achieved in the course of the pilot study and
helped to lay the foundation for the themes of process innovation, benchmarking, and
redesign, which would be instrumental in formulating this thesis.
The research techniques used in this thesis include a thorough literature review,
both online and hardcopy, of topics consisting of Process Innovation, Business Process
Benchmarking, Business Process Reengineering and information technology strategy.
We also utilize a combination of deductive and inductive methods. Deductive Analysis
follows Davenport's process innovation framework, as it is employed to analyze and
redesign the CA-ARNG SEMP. Inductive analysis draws from Camp's benchmarking
method, as other, best-in-class emergency response processes are examined for
applicability to the CA-ARNG SEMP. This includes a detailed description of the
Emergency Mobilization Process as well as looking at a "best practices" organization
involved with mobilization in the generic sense. During the last 12 months, this team has
11
conducted numerous on-site formal and informal interviews (State Headquarters,
Sacramento/40 th Infantry Division HQ, Los Alamitos/, Governors Office of Emergency
Services, Sacramento/Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office Crisis Action Center, LA
County) with nearly all the senior military officers and civilians involved with managing
the high level business processes of the CA-ARNG. Additionally, the thesis team
enrolled in a directed study course on process innovation techniques and metrics.
Detailed accounts of this class and the pilot study are provided in Chapter II.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
The authors assume the reader has no formal education in Process Innovation,
Reengineering, Redesign, or Business Process Benchmarking techniques yet recognizes
that senior CA-ARNG officers are highly experienced leaders who understand the
significance of aligning the organizational practices toward fulfilling strategic goals and
objectives. Furthermore, the authors assume that many readers are not National
Guardsmen and as such, do not have an understanding of the SEMP of the CA-ARNG.
H. CHAPTER OUTLINE
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I discusses the overall goal of the
thesis, its scope, methodology, and outline of the chapters. Chapter II discusses the
history and organizational factors of the California Army National Guard, the initial Pilot
Study, and current, salient CA-ARNG issues. Chapter III provides an overview of
existing innovation doctrines consisting of Davenport's High Level Approach and
Camp's approach to Business Process Benchmarking. Chapter IV provides an overview
of Camp's business process benchmarking and illustrates this technique by benchmarking
a civilian rapid response emergency organization. Chapter V looks at the existing State
Emergency Mobilization Process of the CA-ARNG and develops process redesign
alternatives. Chapter VI uses the innovation and benchmarking theory from above to
propose a set of redesigned processes along with a change management strategy to guide
the CA-ARNG in understanding the complex human and technical aspects of
organization wide change management. Chapter VII includes a summary of the results,
recommendations, and topics for further research.
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II. BACKGROUND
This chapter introduces the California Army National Guard (CA-ARNG),
beginning with its history and role in the State of California as well as its federal
responsibilities. It also provides background information on the pilot study used to
develop thesis research questions.
A. THE CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
1. History
The California National Guard has been in existence for over a century now,
tracing its roots back to the first all-volunteer militia companies organized in 1854. It
began as an army of citizen-soldiers, men who lived and worked in the communities they
helped protect. When called upon, they also served the needs of their country by
supporting the United States Army in foreign wars and conflicts. These humble
beginnings led to the creation of California's modem National Guard forces in 1903, with
the enactment of the Dick Law for the Standardization and Federalization of State
Military Forces. Since that time, California's Army National Guard has participated in
every major war and conflict, from World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the
Vietnam War to Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Bosnia as a reserve component of the
United States Army. In addition, the Guard has participated in humanitarian relief
projects, peacekeeping missions, and other federally assigned tasks like counterdrug
operations and drug demand reduction missions. It also operates the National
Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI), supporting federal as well as state and local
forces in their counterdrug operations.
In addition to these federal missions, the Guard is also responsible for a wide
variety of missions for the State of California. Its most significant role is to provide
Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). Relief from forest fires, floods,
earthquakes, mudslides, and other natural disasters is one of the Guard's most frequent
responsibilities in California. The Loma Prieta and Northridge Earthquakes, 1 997 floods,
yearly wildfires and other natural disasters are just a few examples of the state
emergencies that the Guard deals with. They also provide search and rescue capabilities,
riot control (used during several infamous Los Angeles riots, including the most recent in
1992) and other law enforcement support, as well as a host of functions like youth and
community programs, veteran's assistance programs, shelters for homeless people,
parades, and others.
Due to the federal and state aspects of its missions, and as the only military force
specifically called for in the Constitution, the National Guard is a unique organization
within the Department of Defense. Organizational factors such as internal structure,
reward systems, command and control, personnel composition, and the resultant culture,
which have evolved over time in the California National Guard, separate it even further
from its DoD counterparts, such as the Army and Marine Corps Reserves. In order to
perform process innovation on a long-established, complex organization such as the
Guard, consideration must be given for these uncommon qualities and its history.
2. Organizational Structure
The California Army National Guard consists of five senior commands, with 127
different armories in 1 12 cities throughout California. The first and largest of these is the
40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), headquartered at the Los Alamitos Armed Forces
Reserve Center in Long Beach, California. The 40th ID comprises the vast majority of the
California Army National Guard's forces, with almost 14,000 personnel. The Division
has nearly 150 units in 80 different armories throughout the state of California, as well as
some located in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah. In its primary (federal) role, the Division's
mission is to close with and destroy the enemy with firepower, mobility and shock effect.
The 40th Division is the organization that actually commands the bulk of the soldiers
executing the state and federal missions. The Commanding General of the 40th Division,
a brigadier general appointed by the Adjutant General, is someone who traditionally has
risen through the ranks of the drilling reservists as an AGR (Active Guard and Reserve;
see below for description) soldier. Therefore, he or she is very familiar with the
operational environment, and has learned the formal and informal business of the
Division from the ground up.
Below the Division Headquarters level is what is referred to in the Guard
vernacular as the "unit level." This term refers to the actual operating forces of the
Guard, comprising the standard Army unit hierarchy from Battalion down to individual
companies and platoons. The type of employees at each unit fall into two categories:
14
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Figure 2.1 - California Army National Guard Echelon
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For small and medium sized state emergencies, operational unit personnel and
equipment are tasked and tracked through the various staff sections in coordination with
the OES, also headquartered in Sacramento. Natural disasters or other emergencies
requiring substantially increased Guard assets are handled differently. In these cases, the
OTAG mobilizes the 40th Division Headquarters, in Los Alamitos, California to task and
monitor its own assets directly. This procedure was used for the Los Angeles riots in
1992.
The OTAG also controls all funding and state-level budgeting for its supported
units. Both federal and state funding flow through the OTAG Finance Office (federal
funding actually goes through the USPFO (Unites States Property and Fiscal Office) in
Camp San Luis Obispo before being disbursed to the OTAG) down to the 40th Division
and other supported units. The National Guard Bureau, which divides up the federal
funds it receives among the National Guard forces in all fifty states, controls to some
extent the manner in which this money is spent through the USPFO. For its part, the
State of California Finance Office also provides some guidance on budget matters to the
OTAG. Even so, the OTAG still has a great deal of discretion as to which programs will
be included in its budget, as well as how much its supported units will receive for their
annual operating budgets in a variety of areas (training, hiring of new employees/Active
Duty Special Work (ADSW) members, automation and telecommunications issues, etc).
Additionally, the USPFO provides a large variety of fiscal, administrative, and
information system support to the California Guard. Although tightly intertwined with
the day-to-day functioning of the Guard, USPFO is fundamentally a locally administered
extension of the National Guard Bureau.
3. Personnel Components
The two primary classes of personnel that exist in the Guard structure are federal
employees and state employees, in keeping with the dual nature of the Guard's missions.
As roughly 90% of the CA-ARNG's funding comes from the federal government, the
vast majority of its personnel (about 18,700 out of 19,770, or 94%) are federal
employees. State Guard personnel consist of Active Duty members and State civil
servants. However, between the full-time portion of the Guard and the part-time
personnel exists a fundamental cultural division between the various components, even
more so than the split between federal and state employees.
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The typical image or conception held in the minds of most people when thinking
of a National Guard soldier is that of the part-time soldier, or "weekend warrior." This
image is quite valid close, considering that about 89% of the federal Guard forces in
California, approximately 16,630 soldiers, are part-time soldiers. The diverse
characteristics of each component, as well as the role it plays in the overall force structure
of the Guard, contribute significantly to the Guard's complex culture. Provided below
are descriptions of each type of component, including factors like selection
method/criteria, pay, benefits, and reward systems.
a. FederalArmy National Guard Soldiers and Employees
Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) . These are full time active duty
soldiers, according to Title 32 of the U.S. Code. They receive the same pay, privileges,
benefits, retirement, medical/dental coverage, and so on as active duty Army personnel.
Also, they are subject to the same selection criteria as other Department of the Army
(DA) personnel. Career progression in the AGR component also mirrors that of the
regular services, i.e., alternating staff and command billets, periodic rotation to new duty
stations, promotion schedule and path, etc. Compared to other components, notably
Military Technicians and State Active Duty members, this is a very dynamic, fast-paced
system with a great deal of independence required in many AGR billets.
As Active Duty soldiers, AGR members cannot be "fired", as can
personnel in several of the other components. AGR members must either be
involuntarily separated, or given early retirement if force structure downsizing requires
reduced personnel strength for this component. To enter the AGR component, an
applicant must already be a part-time National Guard member, or a reserve or active duty
member in another service; the program is not open to civilians. AGR recruitment and
selection are performed from within part-time Guard forces. A centralized monitoring
and management system is put in place in 1989, ten years after the program was begun,
and was administered by one officer and five assistants at the California Army National
Guard State Headquarters, in Sacramento, California. Prior to that time, applicants were
selected by local units, and the tracking and monitoring performed at the state level
consisted only of the application package screening. Because of the program's relative
immaturity, program management has varied according to the current billet holder and
the political atmosphere at the State Headquarters level.
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Even so, job motivation in this component is very high, and most of its
members are extremely committed to the Guard. Billets open to AGR soldiers offer a
wealth of opportunity for individual achievement, and are usually receptive to positive
innovation. There are approximately 920 Active Guard and Reserve members in the
CA-ARNG.
Military Technicians . This element of the Guard's federal forces is
composed of full-time civil servants, culled from part-time Guard personnel. Candidates
submit applications to and are screened at the OTAG, which then sends the selected
applications to the relevant units. From the applications received, the unit itself actually
selects the individuals desired. The individuals selected are then given a position as a
Military Technician; normal federal civil service rules and regulations apply. The
program is managed by a specific staff section at the State Headquarters level, according
to the relevant Office of Personnel Management (OPM) rules. This office handles all
hiring and firing, as well as other career progression issues.
Although they wear a uniform on the job, they are not regular active duty
soldiers. They are paid according to the federal government's General Service schedule,
and are subject to federal civil service codes concerning advancement of position,
conduct, benefits, medical and dental coverage, etc. The positions offered to part-time
Guard soldiers are influenced by their rank and training, and are normally long-term,
stable jobs. Typical jobs are not very dynamic in nature. In many respects, it is very
much like a factory line at a large manufacturer. There are approximately 1420 Military
Technicians in the CA-ARNG at present.
Active Duty Special Work . This category, called ADSW for short, is
basically a special assignment duty status given to part-time Guard soldiers. It allows
them to work at the requesting unit on active duty status, as if they were on an extended
drill period, for up to three months. While on ADSW status, soldiers are subject to the
normal active duty rules, regulations, and pay. The intent behind this strategy is to allow
part-time soldiers to fill in on short-term projects requiring a temporary personnel boost.
Part-time personnel are assigned ADSW status for the specified three month maximum
(although occasionally, after the three-month period has officially ended, they are hired
back to ADSW for another three months, if necessary).
National Guard Reservists . The vast majority of California's Army
National Guard forces are members of this category. Referred to as "M-dayers", where
the "M" refers to "Mobilization," these soldiers serve on active duty for two days per
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month. Drill periods, as they are known, are served at a specific unit, which may or may
not be the geographically closest unit to the soldier. Although civilians joining the Army
National Guard are normally assigned to the unit closest to them, as they grow more
experienced and are promoted over time, they can be asked to rotate to other units for
their drill mobilizations. This enables units to maintain designated personnel and
occupational billet strengths.
Soldiers are on a modified version of active duty status during drill periods
(the modification basically enables them to receive double pay for the two-day drill
period), and all normal rules and regulations apply. For the remainder of month, Army
National Guard members maintain jobs in the civilian workplace, and are legally in a
civilian status. Rank, promotion, and career path follow same path as AGR; in fact,
command billets are specifically left open for M-dayers, in order to provide the incentive
for these working professionals to stay involved with an Army National Guard career.
They also participate in one month of active duty training annually. There are
approximately 16,630 part-time soldiers in the CA-ARNG.
b. State Army National Guard Soldiers and Employees
State Active Duty . Similar in some ways to the federal AGR component,
these soldiers are full-time, uniformed members of the CA-ARNG under statutes enacted
by the California State Legislature. The California Military Veterans Code, which
essentially contains the state's version of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
among other regulations, allows for the creation of this position and its corresponding
rules and selection criteria. These members are paid by the same scale as AGR members,
but do not have the same benefits and privileges as do regular active duty soldiers, nor do
they have the same set of requirements for service, or the same protections. As
employees of the State Military Department of California, they can be fired for job
performance, or let go for budgetary reasons. In addition, they do not necessarily
alternate between staff and command billets, nor rotate to different units periodically.
They participate in monthly mobilizations as part-time Guard soldiers, as well as the two-
week Annual Training, during which time they are paid by the same rate table as part
time Guardsmen. To illustrate the differences between a State Active Duty Guardsman
and a federal AGR soldier, State Active Duty soldiers are not authorized to wear their
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uniforms outside the State of California - they are paid employees of the California State
Government, not soldiers in the federal government.
The Adjutant General (AG) of the Guard forces in California, a two-star
general appointed by the State legislature, has some authority to create and fill these
positions as he or she feels appropriate. Funding comes through the State Finance Office,
and allows for certain rank billets to be created and filled by the Adjutant General. There
are approximately 219 State Active Duty members in the CA-ARNG.
State Civil Service . As the component description suggests, these
members are civil service workers paid by the State of California, and are not uniformed
soldiers. They typically fill technical or clerical jobs, as well as a host of other support
staff positions. They are mainly concentrated at State Headquarters and subordinate
headquarters offices. Approximately 294 State Civil Servants work for the CA-ARNG.
State Military Reserve (volunteers) . Volunteers in the truest sense of the
word (i.e., they are not paid), these individuals comprise a small but useful segment (564
members) of the overall Guard personnel makeup.
B. PILOT STUDY
From the initial stages of thesis work begun in August 1997, the primary objective
of the thesis has been to produce a tangible product, one that would provide concrete
guidance on key information technology management issues facing the customer/sponsor.
The original direction of the thesis topic, ostensibly a continuation of "Garrison Based
Intranet Prototype For The 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized)" by Heckroth and Nelson
[Ref. 5], served as the baseline for the initiation of the pilot study. Throughout the study,
the overall goal was to identify thesis research questions. All work performed during the
pilot study was aimed at satisfying three objectives: 1) learn about the organization, 2)
investigate the technologies, and 3) map the business processes. In this section, we
outline these objectives, along with the corresponding research methods and approach,
and summarize the collective results of the pilot study.
1. Objectives
The decision to initiate a pilot study in order develop a useful set of thesis
research questions was influenced by several factors. First, the sheer size and complexity
of the CA-ARNG organization make it difficult to suggest a beneficial technological
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solution, such as an intranet, without first understanding the business processes of the
organization. Learning about the Guard itself, then, becomes one of the main priorities.
To this end, the study focused on developing a deeper understanding of the Guard's
organizational structure, missions, environment, and other characteristics necessary to
begin to map its primary business processes. Accurately determining and diagnosing
these processes would prove to be a time-consuming endeavor. Independent study into
business process reengineering, measures of effectiveness for processes and productivity,
as related to information systems, was essential in meeting this objective. Exploration
into these subjects was performed in parallel with the study of the Guard's processes.
Second, as the answer to these questions was yet to be determined, it was not
immediately clear what type of technological solution would be the most promising, if
indeed one was even required. Although the Guard sponsors were leaning heavily
towards implementing specific information technology solutions from the outset of the
study, a strong effort was made to focus their energies instead on first analyzing their
processes and information systems needs. As the study progressed, and more knowledge
was developed about the Guard, certain basic information systems architectures and
technologies emerged as possibilities. The intranet concept was initially explored as a
carryover project from the Heckroth and Nelson [Ref. 5] thesis. As further investigation
into the current state of information resources within the Guard was performed, however,
it became clear that an intranet would not address larger issues which were encountered.
For example, the underdeveloped state of the Guard's internal wide area network and low
percentage of desktop computers and trained users at the lowest unit levels, combined
with a lack of understanding (and consequently support) by users and senior leadership
concerning intranets, indicated that further intranet development projects were doomed to
become "shelfware", (i.e., disregarded). Other areas of information technology needed to
be researched and measured against the Guard's requirements. The pilot study approach
fulfilled this necessity by allowing concurrent research into the Guard itself and into
potential information technology solutions to its needs.
Third, the pilot study method provided enough time to successfully interact with
constituents of the Guard's bureaucracy. As the study progressed, some delays (although
infrequent) from sponsors in providing information or coordination occurred. Personnel
turnover within positions (such as the key Automation Chief position in the Information
Management Directorate), leave periods (e.g., vacations) and temporary duty assignments
as well as higher priority tasks all contributed to significant delays on various points.
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Changes in Guard policies affecting the study were occasionally made by the Guard
itself, as well. For instance, while researching virtual private network (VPN)
implementations as a potential solution to the Guard's internal connectivity issues, the
Department Of Information Management (DOIM) was informed that the Reserve
Automation Component System (RCAS) program had already addressed them. RCAS
specified a hub-and-spoke frame relay WAN architecture with dedicated lines between
the larger Guard armories and the State Headquarters, with smaller armories utilizing
dial-in hardware solutions to piggyback on these dedicated lines. The VPN information,
therefore, was no longer relevant.
Another beneficial facet of the pilot study was the level of rapport and close
interface established with the sponsor organization. Communication began at the 40th
Infantry Division staff level, utilizing the contacts made by the previous thesis team.
Through exploration of the Guard's hierarchy, contact was established at many levels
within the organization's leadership. The personal and professional ties engendered over
time were instrumental in capturing the interest of the California Army National Guard's
top leadership. The interest of the leaders at this level was crucial to moving the thesis
forward in the desired direction, and would be crucial to the successful implementation of
any recommendations put forth in it. Also, the insight into the political, cultural, and
organizational situation gained through these contacts was invaluable. For these three
central reasons, utilizing a pilot study as a means to develop thesis research questions was
selected as the best alternative. The objectives, methods, approach and results of this
pilot study are explained below.
a. Learn About the Organization
The first step in researching the Guard was to learn its organizational
structure, missions, customers and strategic partners. Specifically, the following areas
were of interest:
Organizational structure, personnel components, reward systems, missions,
strategic vision, customers, strategic partners, and relationship between federal
and state government responsibilities
Culture, political situation, vital signs of organizational health such as
organizational learning, morale, retention, and others
D Status of automation efforts - availability, usage, and level of integration of
information technology resources throughout organizational hierarchy
D Information technology resources - network infrastructure, end-user systems,
servers
D E-mail, Internet access, intranet status, Internet domain status
D User training & familiarity with all of the above
Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) - brief history, basic
architecture, software components involved
Status RCAS fielding effort - deployment schedule, approach
Developing contacts at higher headquarters in order to interface with this layer
of the organization for thesis development
Learn customer's areas of interest for thesis research
b. Investigate the Technologies
As learning about the customer progressed, key technology issues were
identified which required further study. These issues entailed both immediate concerns,
such as network operating system deployment, and long-range considerations, like
network management/remote administration and information systems strategies. The
specific areas identified were:
D Intranet development, implementation, usage strategies in supporting business
processes
Network infrastructure - topologies, transport protocols and technologies,
design architecture, remote access capability
D Network operating system implementation (Windows NT) and policies
E-mail and the Internet - usage, structure, connectivity options - WAN access
options (T-l, frame relay, ISDN, dial-up, etc)
Lotus Notes (Domino) GroupWare implementation
Strategic information systems plans and strategies
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_ c. Map the Business Processes
A fundamental theme, echoed again and again in both business and the
DoD, is the need to accurately map information technology resources to real business
needs before simply trying to integrate IT into existing processes. Simply automating
existing processes leads to faster, but not necessarily efficient or effective processes - an
effect referred to as "paving the cowpaths". [Ref. 9, p. 104] The processes must be
analyzed, validated, and improved if necessary through business process reengineering,
benchmarking, or other techniques before introducing information technology, where the
role of IT is to enable these processes. Process mapping and measuring techniques,
measures of effectiveness, and reengineering principles are key areas of interest in this
endeavor. The areas of interest are as follows:
D Business process reengineering concepts
Benchmarking techniques and examples
Systems analysis and design approach to project management
D Educating the customer on Business Process Reengineering (BPR) and
providing a process viewpoint
Investigating the Guard's business processes and information systems
D Orienting technical focus of thesis towards supporting the Guard's business
processes
2. Methods and Approach
The pilot study research was conducted through several traditional means,
including interviews, questionnaires, literature searches, graduate Information
Technology Management courses, e-mail and other written correspondence. The three
pilot study objectives were addressed concurrently, with research into one objective often
influencing the focus of study in the others as new material was synthesized. The specific
actions taken in achieving the objectives are as follows:
a. Learning About the Organization
Interviews were conducted with the following individuals:
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Maj Tom Heckroth, USMC and MAJ Tom Nelson, USA.
Authors of "Garrison Based Intranet Prototype For The 40 th Infantry Division
(Mechanized)", MAJ's Heckroth and Nelson provided the initial introduction to the
customer and information on the Guard's missions, state and federal organizational
structure, culture and political situation, as well as a brief description of RCAS over the
course of several meetings. They provided partial information on the state of the Guard's
e-mail capabilities and intranet status. They also explained the nature of their thesis
research and provided suggestions for further study topics. (Objectives 1, 2, 3b)
Key 40 th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Personnel:
COL James Combs, Chief of Staff. COL Combs provided
direction to the thesis research from a 40th ID senior leadership perspective, offering
possible areas of interest as well as the strategic vision and missions of the 40th ID.
(Objectives 4, 5)
LTC John Menter, CO, l/149th Tank Battalion. LTC Menter
provided an in-depth appraisal into the culture and organization of the 40th ID, as well as
a snapshot into the availability, level of integration, and other indicators of the Guard's
status of automation efforts. LTC Menter showed examples of how e-mail message
traffic was sent and received, how Internet access was gained, and gave a frank appraisal
of the inherent inefficiencies and difficulties of the methods available to his unit for
communicating with higher headquarters as well as subordinate units. There was a
significant lack of user training and familiarity with IT resources in his unit
(characteristic of conditions throughout the 40th ID). (Objectives 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 3c)
LTC Barham, CO, 240th Signal Battalion. LTC Barham helped
initiate the process of seeking assistance from thesis students from the Naval
Postgraduate School, and provided a great deal of background into the Guard's areas of
interest concerning IT. And by making MAJ Smith available to the thesis team for all
liaison activities, he indirectly helped the team gain contacts at other levels in the
organization. (Objectives 1, 4, 5)
MAJ Dan Smith, Information Management Officer. MAJ
Smith was the primary champion for the thesis team, and overall provided more
information than any other single source. As the primary point of contact for the sponsor,
dozens of interviews or meetings were conducted with MAJ Smith during the pilot study;
organizational information was the primary focus during initial meetings, and remained a
part of every interview held, to some extent. As a full-time career Guardsman, with a
26
large number of contacts and acquaintances throughout all levels of the organization,
MAJ Smith also helped introduce the team to key individuals at every step of the study.
He provided a wealth of information on the culture and political situation within the
Guard, as well as information on RCAS, automation efforts, federal and state missions
and roles, strategic visions, personnel components, organizational structure, strategic
partners and customers, current IT resources, e-mail and internet issues, user training and
familiarity, and network infrastructure status of representative units and armories.
(Objectives 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4, 5)
Key Headquarters, California Army National Guard (and where
noted, California National Guard) Personnel:
COL Richards, Chief of Staff (CNG)
COL Robinson, Chief of Staff (CA-ARNG)
LTC Chapman, Director of Information Management (CNG).
As the head of the DOIM, LTC Chapman provided further information on specifics of the
Guard's automation efforts, and enabled key individuals on his staff to be available for
interviews as well. (Objectives 3d, 3e, 5)
CW02 Dave Tollefson, Automation Chief. Chief Tollefson, as
the outgoing Automation Chief for the DOIM during the initial phase of the pilot study,
was instrumental in gaining a clear look at the current state of IT resources within the
Guard, especially in regards to the NT infrastructure plans, and RCAS background and
status. (Objectives 3a, 3d, 3e)
MAJ Steven Palumbo, Automation Chief. MAJ Palumbo took
over the position of Automation Chief and continued to provide the thesis team with
plenty of information concerning the status of automation efforts throughout the Guard,
as well as multiple areas of interest for the Guard in relation to possible thesis research.
He also helped bring top-level attention to the team's efforts. (Objectives 3a, 3b, 4, 5)
Troy Armstrong, Chief of State Operations, California State
Office of Emergency Services. Troy also remains in the California Army National
Guard Reserves as a Major, in addition to his full-time position as Operations Chief for
the OES. He was particularly helpful in illuminating the nature of the relationship the
CA-ARNG has with the OES, one of its primary strategic partners, as well as the Guard's
customers for state emergency response missions. (Objective 1)
The personnel listed in Table 2.1 were interviewed primarily for
help in mapping the business processes of the Guard, and in documenting their many
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information systems. In gathering this information, related data on the missions,
strategies, federal and state considerations, strategic partners and customers of the Guard
was also collected. (Objective 1, 2)
COL Kenneth Kleine Director Administration Services
COL Tarold Scott Director Military Personnel
LTC Nelan Director Aviation & Safety
COL Dan McCann Director Organizational Training & Mobilization
SGM Mike Donahe Directorate Sergeant Major Organizational Training
& Mobilization
COL William Wade Director Plans, Operations & Security
LTC Harrison Jack Special Projects/Strategic Planner
LTC Carolynn Takami Chief, Military Support Branch
MAJ Terry Edinboro Emergency Plans Officer
CPT Rick Rabe Assistant Military Support Officer
CPT Jon Siepmann Plans Officer
COL Greg Peck Director Facilities & Environment
LTC Balcao Facilities & Environment
COL Joseph Luis Director Surface Maintenance
LTC William Deason Assistant Surface Maintenance Officer
COL Dennis Heintz Director Logistics
CPT William Gotham Surface Maintenance Officer
Pvt Smith Software Developer
Table 2.1 - Personnel Interviewed
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b. Investigate the Technologies
Interviews were conducted with these key individuals:
Professor Barry Frew. Professor Frew's areas of interest and
research lie in information technology resource management, planning and strategy, new
technology introduction, workforce retooling (training, education, career planning), and
ITM executive issues. He is well-suited to providing information and guidance on
strategic information systems plans. Development, implementation, and future states of
ISP strategies were discussed. (Objective 6)
COL Greg Peck. Colonel Peck was able to provide a wealth of
experience and information on strategic information systems plans, due to his full time
position as the Chief Information Officer for Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. His insight
into the California Army National Guard, gained from over twenty years of service,
combined with his corporate experience and business-world perspective, furnished him
with unique insight into this area. (Objective 6)
Troy Armstrong, Chief of State Operations, California State
Office of Emergency Services. Troy provided detailed descriptions and live, interactive
demonstrations of the Lotus Notes GroupWare application, as implemented by the OES
in RIMS (Resource Information Management System) - their statewide workflow,
messaging, emergency response tracking and reporting database system. (Objective 5)
Ms. Ann Anderson, Regional Sales Representative, Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Ms. Anderson provided a CD-ROM copy of Silicon Junction, SGI's
internal corporate intranet. She provided a hands-on demonstration ofhow the intranet is
used every day (both by the bulk of the company's employees at SGI's corporate offices,
as well as by far-flung field sales representatives) to look up component prices,
availability, shipping status, and other critical real-time business information. (Objective
1)
A literature search of course textbooks, Internet websites, professional
magazines, books, and published thesis research was conducted in meeting this objective.
See Appendix B for a list of the sources used.
The following extracurricular courses were taken in order to target specific
areas of technical research:
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Secure Management of Systems. This course (CS 3670, 3-2)
was taught at the Naval Postgraduate School by Professor Dan Warren, and focused on
providing an understanding of management concerns associated with computer-based
information systems. The problems associated with transitions to new systems and
technology were covered in the context of Federal government, and especially DoD,
automated data processing (ADP) systems. Capt Palan and LT White attended this
course. (Objectives 1, 2, 3, and 6)
Introduction to ATM. This eight-hour course was taught by
3Com instructors at their training facility in San Jose, California. It covered fundamentals
of the Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology as well as information specific to
3Com ATM products. Capt Palan attended this course. (Objective 4)
c. Learning the Processes
Interviews were conducted with these key individuals:
The following individuals helped provide an overall process
perspective on the Guard. Discussions focused on a high-level, top-down view of the
Guard's missions, customers, strategic partners, and intra-organizational procedures.






Each of the Guard personnel below were interviewed at length
about the functional area they command at the CA-ARNG Headquarters, and can be
considered the primary stakeholders of these functions. Several were interviewed on
multiple occasions, with each meeting successively drilling down deeper into the day-to-
day operations of their respective sections. The team focused closely on critical processes
as possible subjects for reengineering during these interviews. Each person interviewed
provided a detailed process view of their staff section (as noted after each person's name)
and description of all section information systems, based on a standard set of questions
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developed by the thesis team (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Table 2.2 contains the names and
billets of each person interviewed. (Objective 5)
COL Kenneth Kleine Director Administration Services
COL Tarold Scott Director Military Personnel
LTC Nelan Director Aviation & Safety
COL Dan McCann Director Organizational Training & Mobilization
SGM Mike Donahe Directorate Sergeant Major Organizational Training &
Mobilization
COL William Wade Director Plans, Operations & Security
LTC Harrison Jack Special Projects/Strategic Planner
LTC Carolynn Takami Chief, Military Support Branch
MAJ Terry Edinboro Emergency Plans Officer
CPT Rick Rabe Assistant Military Support Officer
CPT Jon Siepmann Plans Officer
COL Greg Peck Director Facilities & Environment
LTC Balcao Facilities & Environment
COL Joseph Luis Director Surface Maintenance
LTC William Deason Assistant Surface Maintenance Officer
COL Dennis Heintz Director Logistics
CPT William Gotham Surface Maintenance Officer
Table 2.2 - Names and Billets of all Staff Interviewed
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What processes are you or your department responsible for maintaining':
Who is the customer?
What are the inputs to the process'
What are the outputs?
Where does the process begin?
Where does the process end";
What other organizations/entities do you interface with?
What problems or shortcomings are associated with the process*]
What information systems or technology is used to support the process?
How well do they support the process? (strengths and weaknesses)
Are there future changes to the system being planned?
Table 2.3 - Process Questions
What is the purpose of the system? (Give a basic description of what is does, some representative
fields/data inputs to the system, outputs and reports produced)
Who uses/has the ability to access the system? (In other words, who are its customers, and who actually
inputs the data)
What are the hardware/software components of the system? (Standalone PC, PC/Server attached to the
network, available/not available on the web, located on a mainframe)
How critical is the system to the function it supports? If it crashed, are there manual workarounds?
How often is it used? (Several times a day, weekly, etc.)
Any known Y2K issues?
Is it possible to make upgrades/modifications to the system? (At the CNG level)
How as the system obtained - pushed down from NGB/DA, RCAS II, homegrown, COTS?
Table 2.4 - Information Systems Questions
A literature search of course textbooks, Internet websites, professional
magazines, books, and published thesis research was conducted in meeting this objective.
See Appendix B for a list of the sources used.
The following extracurricular course was taken in order to develop and
enhance understanding of business process reengineering/process innovation and other
related concepts, including process measurement, benchmarking, and IT in process
redesign.
Directed Study in Re-Engineering and Process Innovation.
Taught at the Naval Postgraduate School by Professor Mark Nissen, this course (IS 4800,
2-0) provided a very effective introduction to the concepts of process innovation and
reengineering, as well as related subjects such as benchmarking. Process mapping,
measurement and diagnostic techniques, redesign alternatives and methods, and the role
of information technology as an enabler to these functions formed the core area of study.
Capt McGuire, Capt Palan, and LT White attended the course. (Objectives 1, 2, and 4)
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3. Results
After nine months of inquiry and exploration into the organizational
characteristics, missions, and processes of the California Army National Guard, the pilot
study proved itself to be a successful effort for the development of thesis research
questions. It fulfilled the three primary objectives explained above, allowing the team to
develop a specific area of study for thesis research. Given the amount of time and effort
put into the study, it can be observed that not all avenues of exploration were, in the end,
aligned with the final choice for the thesis topic. This is to be expected, and indeed a
normal part of research. Beginning an investigation into an organization as large and
complex as the Guard presents a very wide array of possibilities. What allowed the study
to be effective was the willingness to explore, without knowing exactly what to look for
or what would be found. The length of the pilot study (approximately nine months) also
contributed to its success. It allowed exposure to many of the processes performed by the
Guard, and provided a glimpse into the decisions made by the leadership and the
corresponding results over time. We discuss the key results in three stages: 1) initial
investigation, 2) problem discovery, and 3) BPR planning.
a. Stage I - Initial Investigation
As the context of the initial introduction to the Guard concerned intranet
development, this remained at the forefront of exploration for the first several months of
the study. Research into intranets was conducted concurrently with research into the
organization, with guidance from the 40th ID sponsors on their areas of interest. The need
for some sort of Guard-wide, easily accessible way to share information and workflow
applications had been identified prior to the start of the pilot study in thesis research
presented by Nelson and Heckroth [Ref. 5]. Much of the literature found on intranets
focused on using them to conduct critical business applications, such as checking real-
time customer order status, inventory levels/stocking status, shipping status, product
information updates, as well as handling workflow applications like Lotus Notes, and a
host of other uses. A basic scenario discovered through the research (suitable for a small
enterprise) entailed utilizing relational databases (from products such as Access, SQL
Server, or even Oracle databases) to store a wide variety of organizational data; readily
available Microsoft Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) software to read the database
files in response to user-generated queries; third-party middleware (such as Cold Fusion
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Application Server) to process both the request for and receipt of this data, create
dynamically-generated web pages to present it, and then pass them to a web server; and
finally a World Wide Web (WWW) Server, to send the information to the requesting
user's web browser. Other, similar schemes used various alternatives of this two-tiered
theme, relative to which software component performed which task; most were very close
in function to that described above. Silicon Graphics' corporate intranet, "Silicon
Junction", had all of these capabilities and many more. The architecture it used, as well
as several other arrangements, was evaluated as a potential solution for the
enterprise-level intranet implementation desired by the Guard.
Initially, the sponsors' sole focus lay in implementing one of these
technically-centered applications of intranet technology, without regard to analysis of
their business processes. Their specific areas of interest for intranet development were:
D Intranet Development/RCAS Integration (adding to the functionality of the
existing intranet shell developed by Nelson and Heckroth [Ref. 5], and then
integrating it with the RCAS desktop software suite)
Security Plan, Policies and Measures for Intranet Deployment (in garrison)
Tactical Computing Security Plan (for intranet usage while
operational/deployed - 'Warfighter' exercise)
The 40th ID sponsors were keenly interested in moving forward with these
projects immediately. However, even at this early stage, process innovation and a
systems analysis and design-oriented approach was deemed important by the thesis team.
Before implementing strictly technical fixes to perceived shortcomings, some analysis of
the underlying problems would be required to address the Guard's needs, and not just its
symptoms. Information technology would be an enabler to process innovation
techniques, allowing redesigned, and effective processes to be efficient as well. [Ref. 1]
This business process reengineering focus was central to the way the thesis team
approached the problem, and remained pivotal throughout the study and subsequent
thesis.
Convincing 40th ID sponsors of the importance of examining processes
first, however, was not accomplished quickly or easily. Numerous conferences and
continual dialogue with key individuals were held throughout the study, and especially
during the early months of the partnership. A few crucial readings were provided to
Major Smith in an effort to acquaint him, and through him the 40th ID leadership, with the
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primary principles espoused by the thesis team. The topics and corresponding sources are
listed below:
D Business process innovation/reengineering [Ref. 1 ]
D Modern systems analysis and design approach to developing potential IT
projects through use of a strategic information systems plan [See Appendix B]
D Government and business intranets [See Appendix B]
b. Stage 2 - Problem Discovery
Over a period of several months, as the Guard sponsors and the thesis team
developed a good rapport, the ongoing dialogue and other efforts at educating the
sponsors became more successful. Ultimately, the reengineering strategy endorsed by the
thesis team was adopted - at least by the immediate sponsors within the Guard. As it
would in any large organization, and especially within a strictly organized bureaucratic
hierarchy such as a military unit, it required significant time and effort to communicate
these ideas and strategic vision from the mid-level management (Major Smith,
Lieutenant Colonel Barham) who first embraced it to the senior leadership of the 40th ID
(Colonel Combs), who could make it reality. Concurrent with this effort was the pursuit
of knowledge on the technologies identified in Objective Two, the principles and
techniques of business process innovation/reengineering designated in Objective Three,
and the organization itself, as laid out under Objective One. The continual dialogue and
contact with Major Smith provided a great deal of information on the latter subject, as did
meetings with Lieutenant Colonel Menter. As overall team knowledge of the
organization, relevant technologies, and business process innovation/reengineering
increased, several important points became clear.
First, the organization was ill prepared, in several critical areas, for
deployment of an enterprise-wide intranet. The lack of an internal network
infrastructure, combined with the high cost of remote access through long distance
dial-in, made accessing any intranet difficult and expensive. Dial-in sessions by the
majority of the Guard's armories were made to transmit and receive e-mail only, in an
effort to minimize connection time and the subsequent charges (which were still over
$650,000 a year) they incurred. The availability of personal computers at most armories
was extremely limited (one or two PCs each), further restraining units' ability to utilize a
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potential intranet (of course, roughly 80% of a typical unit's personnel strength was
comprised of Reserve Soldiers (M-dayers), who only worked at the unit once a month
during drill weekends). A related consequence of the low density in IT resources was a
correspondingly low level of average user training and familiarity with software available
on Guard machines. Additionally, the existing intranet shell, developed by Nelson and
Heckroth [Ref. 5], had not received enough organizational buy-in to make it a significant
part of the IT infrastructure.
Second, and probably most important, it would be necessary to build a
high-level process map of the Guard's business processes in order to develop a sufficient
understanding of the Guard's many issues. This map would provide the team with a
framework for dealing with these issues, and for deciding which were within the scope of
the study and which were not. Continually throughout the pilot study, the thesis team
wrestled with defining and then keeping within the scope of the project. As significant
information was brought forth, the focus of effort shifted in a new direction based on the
most recent findings. The overall trajectory of the pilot study changed every few months,
as the team struggled to maintain its emphasis on exploration until sufficient data had
been gathered to make an explicit determination of thesis topic. A process map of the
organization would enable the team to define exactly where the Guard (and therefore the
team) should concentrate its efforts, as it would ascertain the business processes critical to
the Guard's missions. The extensive reading and research into business process
reengineering which had been conducted in parallel highlighted the techniques needed to
perform this analysis.
Third, it was clear from these conclusions that buy-in from higher levels
of organizational leadership would be necessary for the high-level process mapping, and
the subsequent proposed technology solutions if they were to be implemented throughout
the CA-ARNG. Until this point, the focus of effort had been solely on the 40th ID. It was
becoming clear that contacts within the higher headquarters needed to be established in
order to conduct the project at the right level in the organizational hierarchy to see it
achieve organization-wide acceptance. Establishing these contacts took a considerable
amount of time, for various political and logistical reasons. Major Smith was
instrumental in forging relationships with DOIM staff, especially Major Palumbo, the
newly appointed Automation Officer (the billet formerly held by Chief Tollefson). The
task of educating the new Guard sponsors on the need for a process innovation viewpoint
began anew, assisted this time by Major Smith and other 40th ID sponsors. Although not
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a 40th ID sponsor, Colonel Peck played a major role in helping the team acquire and
synthesize information about the organization's processes.
As the team began to conduct research into the organizational
characteristics present at the State Headquarters prior to beginning the mapping process,
new issues, concerns and sponsor agendas came to the forefront. The DOIM presented a
variety of ongoing or upcoming issues as potential project areas. For example, while the
RCAS program was pushing thousands of new computers down to the Guard, with a
complete desktop software suite for each one, how to deploy and manage these assets was
left up to the California Guard. Besides desktop PCs, there were also workgroup servers,
network equipment, and other IT assets. There were some very important questions
raised by this program. For instance:
D How should the Windows NT Server domain architecture be structured?
D How should the new e-mail servers (MS Exchange) be deployed, and how
should the old mail accounts be migrated?
D How could the network support staff of two manage the network operations
center for the entire state?
D How should remote network equipment be monitored and managed, and by
whom?
What would be the most cost-effective way to provide connectivity between
each and every armory and the State Headquarters?
Could commercial Internet Service Providers provide the level of service,
privacy and network access availability required by the Guard?
Would a Virtual Private Network solution from an Internet Service Provider
meet these requirements?
D How should the Guard's networks be structured - through the State as ".gov"
addresses, or through the National Guard Bureau as ".mil" addresses? How
could the two networks be tied together?
How should the Guard's emergency response process tie in with the Office of
Emergency Services? Should the Guard adopt the Lotus Notes workflow,
notification, tracking, etc. management system RIMS used by OES in order to
interface with them more tightly? Should they use it internally as well?
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c. Stage 3 - BPR Planning
Although these issues were top priority in the information technology
arena for the Guard, trying to solve them individually without relating them back to key
business processes was obviously undesirable in the team's eyes. However, the team saw
a way in which to tackle a few of these issues while still maintaining the process focus.
By developing a Strategic Information Systems Plan aligned with the Guard's strategic
business plan (if one existed), with both long-term strategic objectives as well as
short-term tactical targets, both requirements could be met.
The plan of execution was straightforward. The team could examine the
Guard's business processes, and then evaluate the degree to which their internal
information systems supported them. Next, the team would research a desired future
blueprint for the Guard's information systems based on research into available and
forthcoming technologies, architectures, and methods of doing business with IT support,
as well as the systems being deployed as part of RCAS. Then, a migration strategy to
move the Guard from its current state towards the future blueprint would be developed.
This migration strategy would be the Strategic Information Systems Plan.
As part of the plan, several of the short-term tactical projects identified as
"low-hanging fruit" (specifically, some of the issues mentioned above, if they were still
relevant) would be implemented in order to demonstrate the feasibility and validity of the
Strategic ISP. For instance, the team could provide the Guard with an NT
implementation strategy, or a recommendation on and working example of RIMS for
internal use, or a remote management policy for the network operations center. This
direction of research fit well into the areas already studied, and met the chief requirement
to provide a useful product to the Guard as a result of the research. Also, it clearly
addressed the three issues raised above, namely that 1) the Guard was not ready for
full-scale intranet deployment, but needed help in IT-related areas; 2) the high level
process mapping of the Guard would be conducted, and 3) any recommendations or
proposals would be addressed to the top level in the Guard's management hierarchy in
order to achieve organizational buy-in. This last point was satisfied by the close
proximity to the top-level leadership of the Guard forces (for the entire state of
California), as it resulted in an increased amount of official interaction and interest in the
project.
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During several extended visits to the State Headquarters in Sacramento,
the team carried out the process and information systems mapping. The team also
concentrated on learning the latest current events in the Guard, as significant
developments occasionally arose which affected the course of the pilot study. One such
instance was the previously mentioned ISP/VPN issue, which became moot after it was
announced that the RCAS program had already addressed that issue. Other issues before
the DOIM were already under discussion by appropriate committees within the Guard
when the pilot study turned its focus on them. Several of these issues had been settled,
and were no longer targets for possible thesis contributions.
Toward the latter months of the study, this circumstance occurred
increasingly often. The fundamental reason for this, as it happened, was the previously
sparse communications between the California National Guard DOIM and its counterpart
at the National Guard Bureau, in Washington, D.C. Prior to a trip initiated by the
Automation Chief, Major Palumbo, in April of 1998, the DOIM had had no contact with
the NGB for the past three years. Consequently, a flood of information on many of the
issues facing the DOIM (especially RCAS issues) was learned at the same time the thesis
team was midway through the mapping operation at the State Headquarters. Of the
remaining possibilities for actual implementation as part of the thesis, most were rendered
infeasible simply because they required resolution too quickly.
Faced with this dilemma, the team had to decide whether to continue with
a Strategic ISP in which the short-term, tactical objectives had all been overcome by
events, and therefore focus solely on the long-term, strategic objectives; or, shift the
thrust of the study and subsequent thesis to a topic which could still provide value to the
Guard, and was aligned with the current direction of research. Based on the work which
had already been performed in mapping the processes and information systems, and the
strong business process reengineering orientation favored by the team, it was decided to
shift the thesis toward more of a BPR focus by selecting one of the Guard's most basic
processes for analysis and redesign.
Based on input from Colonel Peck and other sponsors at the State
Headquarters such as Lieutenant Colonel Chapman, Major Palumbo, and Colonel Wade,
and the results of the process mapping, the state emergency response (mobilization)
process stood out as the most central process the Guard performs. Everything else the
Guard does, in some way, supports this primary function. Upon making this decision, the
pilot study effectively ended and the thesis proper began.
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C. SUMMARY
The wealth of information gathered during the pilot study process was of
tremendous value to thesis research efforts, and indeed much of this information is used
directly in the thesis. The information pertaining to background and organization of the
CA-ARNG, presented earlier in this chapter, were direct benefits of the pilot study,
following along with the outline for Objective One - Learning About the Organization.
Although significant research was performed during the study on the topics described by
Objective Two, Investigating the Technologies, most of this material is not presented in
the body of the thesis. The process innovation focus adopted at the conclusion of the
pilot study concentrates instead on businesses processes. Although the use of information
technology as a primary enabler for process innovation techniques is addressed heavily in
the following chapter, recommendations for specific technological implementations
remain a subject for future research with the CA-ARNG. Process innovation, addressed
by Objective Three in the pilot study, remains the chief focus of the thesis and is the
subject of the following chapter.
Three central lessons are learned from this pilot study. First, research represents
an uncertain an unpredictable endeavor, which is best approached as an exploration, as
opposed to a journey toward a specific destination. Second, process analysis must
necessarily precede IT analysis, as IT represents one enabler of innovation and must be
implemented within the context of (possibly redesigned) processes and strategies.
Finally, in-depth, field research takes a lot of time, particularly when the focus of study is
an organization of such size, complexity, and tradition as the Guard. For a thesis project
such as this, a pilot study may represent an indispensable requirement.
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III. PROCESS INNOVATION
An historical perspective of industrial age organizational development is required
to understand the imperative of change today. Smith and Sloan style organizations, the
organizational structure found in the majority of U.S. corporations and governmental
organizations, are struggling to meet the challenges presented by the rate of change,
global competition, and ever-increasing customer expectations to include their ability to
select numerous similar products and services. Organizations must have an
understanding of how work is performed and how they developed into their current state
in order to analyze and eventually improve collective performance.
Organizational survival will literally be determined by how well organizations
know themselves and how well they understand the environment in which they operate.
In other words, only through a thorough analysis of work structure, performance,
objectives, strategy, and a manner in which to transform these core principles, will
organizations be capable of sustained success in what has been called the age of the
information organization. [Ref. 1, p. 1] Therefore, an organization's survival is based
upon its ability to comprehend modern notions of customer, competition, change, and a
methodology to develop an enterprise based on information age organizational principles
(e.g., processes aligned to strategy, information technology, worker empowerment,
knowledge, and a mutually supportive culture that encourages innovation). Knowledge
of the industrial age roots of an organization and the challenges presented by the
information age will provide a solid theoretical foundation needed for charting the
organizations' course into the new millennium.
Process Innovation (PI) is a revolutionary technique developed by Thomas H.
Davenport that "fuses information technology and human resource management to
dramatically improve business performance." [Ref. 1, p. 2] Davenport outlines a
methodology that allows companies to make the monumental change from an industrial
age to information-based organization. In his book, Process Innovation: Reengineering
Work through Information Technology, Davenport describes the need for a new
framework for understanding business: a process orientation framework that
acknowledges the significance of technology and human factors in the information age
organization.
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The needed revolutionary approach to business performance improvement
must encompass both how a business is viewed and structured, and how it
is improved. Business must be viewed not in terms of functions,
divisions, or products, but of key processes. Achievement of order-of-
magnitude levels of improvement in these processes means redesigning
them from beginning to end, employing whatever innovative technologies
and organizational resources are available. [Ref. 1, p. 1]
Similarities exist between the Hammer and Champy definition of reengineering
and Davenport's interpretation of process innovation. Both are tools used to achieve
"radical" process change. However, process innovation focuses not only on
reengineering but on other factors critical to a successful process redesign. Davenport
defines the term process innovation as "encompassing the envisioning of new work
strategies, the actual process design activity, and the implementation of the change in all
its complex technological, human, and organizational dimensions." [Ref. 1, p. 2]
The business drivers of process innovation are the same factors described by
Hammer and Champy's "3C's" (Competition, Customer, Change). However,
Davenport's methodology describes a detailed, logical approach to undertaking and
successfully completing a process innovation initiative based on commonly recognized
business drivers of the "3C's". We have identified three key tenets of process innovation.
Each is described in turn in the first section that follows. We then discuss what process
innovation is not and describe change enablers in considerable detail. An overview of
Davenport's process innovation methodology is presented subsequently, after which we
summarize the key points of this chapter and transition to the discussion of benchmarking
that follows.
A. TENETS OF PROCESS INNOVATION
1. Process Before Technology
A process view of business is concerned with how work is accomplished as
opposed to what work is done. [Ref. 1, p. 5] Davenport defines a process orientation to
business as "involving elements of structure, focus, measurement, ownership and
customers." [Ref. 1, p. 5] Central to the understanding of a process orientation is
defining a process itself. A process is defined as a structured, measured set of activities
designed to produce a specified output..." [Ref. 1, p. 6] Figure 3.1 illustrates the core
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elements of a process through which various influences on the process activity actually
shape how work is accomplished. Each process has unique constraints (controls) and
enablers that shape it.
Controls (constraints)
Policy, regulation* fcme, money, technology, etc
Inputs




Product logic, deason, etc
Enabltrs
Technology, people, training, etc
Figure 3.1 - Process Components with Examples [Ref. 28]
As Davenport explains, a process is simply a "structure for action." [Ref. 1, p. 5].
The structural elements of the process (specific work activities, controls, enablers, inputs
and outputs) are what inevitably allows the process to be reshaped. Structures can also be
measured to produce quantitative and qualitative information on the health of a process.
Processes lend themselves well to being measured, unlike a hierarchical map, the latter of
which only shows functional areas of responsibility and reporting relationships.
Structure in the performance of work is desirable. Without structure, work
activity becomes uncoordinated and unpredictable. Therefore, the notion of viewing
work activity as a process is not a constraint on "getting work done." By viewing the
work activity as a process, workers and executives alike can develop a common
understanding of how work is being performed, thereby making decisions on how to
improve or redesign it. Ultimately, processes define how the organization delivers value
to the customer. Each process of the organization is examined to determine its relative
value to the end result: product delivery and customer satisfaction.
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It can be said that the process perspective used to view the Smith model was
entirely too narrow. [Ref. 1 , p. 7] Process perspective can be defined as the breadth and
depth at which a process is viewed. Narrowing the process perspective causes reduced
visibility of process from input to output. The converse is true if the process perspective
is too broad and not in sufficient depth. This can lead to an inability to understand the
relevance of internal processes and their key factors. Knowledge of breadth and depth is
critical to understanding the spectrum of activities that occur across the organization.
Although one need not have extensive experience with the process, a basic understanding
of activities (depth) and scope of activities (breadth) is desirable. A balanced process
perspective will allow people at various levels of responsibility to share a common
understanding of how the process delivers or fails to deliver value to the customer. The
process perspective will allow people responsible for various aspects of the process to
focus on how they can add value to the overall process.
A process perspective is inherently horizontal, or cross-functional. Information
age organizations deliver value to their customers through processes that often cut across
an organization's business unit and departmental boundaries. Usually, the order of work
from input to output in most organizations is sequential. Do this first, then take the next
step. Examining the input, it's flow across the organization, and the output will often
reveal the sequential nature in which work is structured. Work in sequential steps is time
consuming, inefficient and creates considerable overhead and friction. Handoffs among
functional departments are often unstructured and in need of coordination. By
understanding the cross-functional nature of processes, we can begin to see how
sequential steps can be redesigned to work in parallel, thereby reducing handoffs and
accomplishing work more quickly. A cross-functional emphasis therefore de-emphasizes
the traditional structure of the organization, making departments and business units less
important, while emphasizing the relevance of an organizational structure that better
enables the flow of work from input to output.
Successful processes have clearly defined process owners. The process owners
have a balanced process perspective and are responsible for all activities across a process.
An owner will ensure that each and every individual sub-process that encompasses the
overall process delivers value to the customer. The difficulty with implementing this
concept is that individual processes often cut across organizational boundaries, into
someone else's traditional power domain. Process ownership must not be viewed as an
encroachment upon traditional departmental ownership. Davenport believes that process
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ownership must be viewed as an "alternative dimension of the formal organization"
where delivering value to the customer is the target objective. [Ref. 1, p. 7] As
businesses begin to see how processes are cross-functional, new relationships among
process owners and business unit (functional) executives develop, which become
mutually supportive. The ultimate result of the new understanding of cross-functional
process owners and functional unit executives might lead to organizational restructuring
or at the very least, a process owner/functional executive relationship where each can
support the other.
Central to innovation is the notion of dramatically improving business
performance. Process innovation, as defined by Davenport, "...combines a structure for
doing work with an orientation to visible and dramatic results." [Ref. 1, p. 10]. In process
innovation, the sprit of creativity prevails over traditional thinking. Innovation implies a
fundamental rethinking of basic assumptions of how an organization does business.
Organizational cultures that value creativity are prone to discontinuous thinking which
often leads to innovative results. Therefore, innovation demands the flexibility to
question ideas and assumptions to develop and grow into mature frameworks for thinking
about process structure and performance.
In his seminal Harvard Business Review article, "Reengineering Work: Don't
Automate, Obliterate," Michael Hammer admonishes executives of the fallacy of placing
technology before process. Often referred to as the Productivity Paradox, corporations,
despite heavy investment in technology, have not achieved the level of productivity that
technology promised to deliver. Hammer describes the disappointment and offers
insight.
...heavy investments in information technology have delivered
disappointing results - largely because companies tend to use technology
to mechanize old ways of doing business. They leave existing processes
intact and use computers to simply speed them up... It is time to stop
paving the cowpaths. Instead of embedding outdated processes in silicon
and software, we should obliterate them and start over. [Ref. 3, p. 104]
Simply stated, Hammer started a corporate revolution. He called for companies to
harness the power of information technology to "radically redesign (their) business
processes in order to achieve dramatic improvement in their performance." [Ref. 3, p.
1 04] Companies that desire to see significant productivity improvements and break the
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productivity paradox need to first examine how work is performed. Utilizing technology
for existing processes is equivalent to "paving the cowpaths" (i.e., investing in outdated
business processes that have no more been examined than the routes of weathered cow
paths).
Davenport echoes these sentiments as a common thread prevalent throughout his
book. "We have found in many companies that key processes were last designed (to the
degree that they were designed at all) well before the rise of information technology."
[Ref. 1, p. 40] Organizations that develop or purchase software and systems with the goal
of improving productivity of existing processes are creating systems that are functionally
based and do not reflect a cross-functional view of business. According to Davenport,
"such stovepipe systems cannot support a business view of the organization; they
imprison data with functional barriers." [Ref. 1, p. 41] The tenet of process before
technology cannot be overstated. Technology, without the close examination of how
work adds or does not add value to the intended output, will assuredly lead to an
investment with minimal impact.
2. Strategic Alignment
Strategy is the high-level description of an organization's roadmap for success.
Strategy provides the necessary business focus on what is most important to the
organization. The intent of the strategy is to align the collective momentum of an
organization in a direction that propels it towards meeting its long-term goals.
Organizational momentum can be described as the technology, information, human and
organizational structure that collectively define the organizational capabilities needed to
meet its goals. Strategy forms the common language that binds these elements. Work,
from a different perspective, is the combined interaction of human, technology and
structure. Therefore, of critical importance to process innovation, is the strong linkage
between strategy (roadmap) and process (work). Business processes define how work is
done. Davenport articulates this relationship and the importance of process alignment to
strategy:
Process innovation is meaningful only if it improves a business in ways
that are consistent with its strategy. In fact, process innovation is
impossible
:
- or at least only accidental ~ unless the lens of process
analysis is focused on a particularly strategic part of the business, with
particular strategic objectives in mind. [Ref. 1, p. 117]
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Therefore, processes must have specific goals based on corporate strategy.
Processes are not self-serving. They exist solely to channel the momentum of the
organization into value-added work activities that serve to close the gap between where
the organization is now and where it needs to be. Alignment of process goals and
objectives to the strategy serves as the primary means by which an organization
accomplishes its goals. Furthermore, the analysis techniques described in process
innovation ask process owners to examine how their process goals and objectives align
with the strategy. This exercise provides much needed insight into the incongruities
between work performance and strategic objectives. Kaplan and Norton believe that
"when everyone understands the (organization's) long term goals, as well as the strategy
for achieving these goals, all organizational efforts and initiatives can become aligned to
the needed transformation processes." [Ref. 2, p. 200] Simply stated, creating a strong
linkage between process and strategy and identifying where and how they are mis-
aligned, triggers innovation in the form of a new perspective. This perspective is focused
on how well the process is contributing to the "gap closure" between process performance
of today and the business goals of the future.
3. Change Levers
Change levers refer to the techniques through which processes are transformed.
Also known as enablers, change levers are the "means" through which process
innovation is accomplished. They are the very tools of process innovation. Davenport
points to three change levers (information technology, information, and
organizational/human factors) that when utilized in varying degrees, together and
separately, have the power to significantly redesign a process.
The power of information technology is perhaps the most influential change lever
available to the process innovator. However, IT alone cannot produce the change required
for bold process redesign objectives. Human and organizational factors are often
overlooked, yet their importance is as critical as IT in processes innovation. Information,
more specifically the type of information we need to make decisions, is a topic whose
relevance to process performance is not clearly understood by many executives.
However, information management is taking on new importance, as more and more data
is generated, when what is actually needed is specific information tailored for decision
making.
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Combined, the human/organization, information, and technology change levers
can transform a process based on the degree to which they are applied. As a general rule,
the greater the combination of change levers, the more significant the change. The




Figure 3.2 - Change Levers [Ref. 28]
In this figure, configuration refers to the structure of the target process, while
performance refers to how well the process actually works. By applying various
combinations of the technology, information, and human/organization factors, new
process redesign alternatives will begin to form. Davenport observes that,
The architect brings to the design of a building the knowledge of the
technologies needed to operate it (e.g., elevators, air conditioning,
plumbing and so forth) and the types of people who will work in it. A
process designer must be cognizant of the technologies and people
involved in making a process work. [Ref. 1, p. 18]
Process innovators understand the transformational capabilities of the three
primary change enablers and their ability to realize bold performance objectives.
Successful innovators will use current and future techniques/tools associated with
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information, technology and human/organization to think about how the techniques can
be applied to solve problems that might not currently be apparent or manifest.
Additionally, process redesign should never be undertaken as a means to test new
organizational or human relations theory, and especially not for technology sake alone.
B. WHAT PROCESS INNOVATION IS NOT
Process innovation should not be confused with continuous process improvement
or any other, incremental performance improvement or quality management program.
Fundamentally, process innovation seeks order-of-magnitude changes in the way
organizations are performing, whereas continuous process improvement and quality
management imply performing the same activities with slightly increased efficiency and
effectiveness. [Ref. 1, p. 10] Process innovation has a broad focus and seeks significant
performance objectives while improvement and quality management have a more narrow
scope for performance gains. Quality programs such as Total Quality Management
(TQM), as described by Hammer and Champy:
... work within the framework of a company's existing processes and seek
to enhance them by means of continuous incremental improvement. The
aim is to do what we already do, only do it better. [Ref. 3, p. 49]
Process Innovation, continuous improvement, and quality management techniques
do share many common themes, nevertheless. Among them are a recognition of the
importance of the process in achieving performance results, and a customer focus as a
critical force that shapes the process. They are also similar in the recognition of the
cultural change required to increase performance. However, they are completely different
in the level of performance goals they seek to achieve and in the direction from which
change is driven — that is, top down (process innovation) vs. bottom up












Figure 3.3 - Continuous Process Improvement versus Process Innovation [Ref. 1, p. 11]
The direction from which change is driven deserves further clarification. Quality
and process improvement programs have a bottom-up focus where employees are
encouraged to define how the processes in which they participate can be changed.
Essentially, process improvement and quality programs are driven from the employee
level. Employees participate in programs that encourage them to focus on the quality of
work and voice their opinions on how to improve the process and its quality.
Alternatively, process innovation is a top-down change technique, with an emphasis on
strong executive and senior management participation. [Ref. 1, p. 12] Davenport cites
the following for the top-down nature of process innovation:
Because large firms' structure do not reflect their cross-functional
processes, only those in positions overlooking multiple functions may be
able to see opportunities for innovation. [Ref. 1
,
p. 12]
A production line assembler is unlikely to have the organizational perspective
required to view the cross-functional activities of a process in its entirety. This does not
mean that employee input is not essential to process innovation. In fact, all levels of the
organization must have "buy in" to the process innovation initiative. Their full support
and participation is a critical success factor. However, in top-down driven change (i.e.,
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process innovation), those ultimately responsible for the success of the organization have
the responsibility to define the objectives. Indeed, an outcome of process innovation may
be to empower the worker with the authority, process perspective and means to make
decisions about the activities in the process. Bottom-up techniques normally imply
narrow improvement objectives that lack broad perspective and the necessary emphasis
on technology, information and human/organizational tools to realize order-of-magnitude
change.
C. CHANGE ENABLERS
Each of the primary change enablers from above is discussed in detail.
1. Information Technology
The importance of information technology in process innovation cannot be
understated. As previously discussed, the productivity paradox developed due to
inaccurate assumptions that technology alone would dramatically improve business
performance. Without changing the process structure, the use of technology will likely
produce disappointing results. However, information technology can indeed produce
dramatic results when used to enable a redesigned process. Innovators must have an
understanding of the possibilities that technology presents to them. Describing
technology in solely technological terms will be a sure way to alienate process owners
and others participating in the innovation initiative. When technology can be presented
by describing how it can add value to or spark innovative thoughts about process
redesign, those participating in the innovation effort will be far more receptive. In Figure




Automational Eliminating human labor from a process
Informational Capturing process information for purposes of understanding
Sequential Changing process sequence, or enabling parallelism
Tracking Closely monitoring process status and objects
Analytical Improving analysis of information and decision making
Geographical Coordinating processes across distances
Integrative Coordination between tasks and processes
Intellectual Capturing and distributing intellectual assets
Dis intermediating Eliminating intermediaries from a process
Figure 3.4 - Impact of Information Technology on Process Innovation [Ref. 1, p. 51]
Each impact briefly describes a possible outcome of technology in process
innovation. Almost instantly, we can see many possibilities. For example, a tracking
system would provide military commanders with the ability to pinpoint the location of
their units.
In fact, the true power of technology in process innovation is how it can be used
to spark inductive thinking ~ the ability to first recognize a powerful solution
(technology) and then seek the problems it might solve. [Ref. 3, p. 84] However, this
can present a challenge to organizational leaders and managers who have primarily been
taught deductive reasoning techniques. Experienced decision makers are very skilled at
defining problems, then seeking potential solutions. According to Hammer and Champy
this leads to a commonly occurring error in the way corporate leaders think about
technology. Most leaders deductively reason how technology can be used to improve
existing processes. [Ref. 3, p. 85] Inductive thinking challenges leaders to consider how
technology can allow the organization to do things it's not already doing. Simply stated,
"It's about exploiting the latest capabilities of technology to achieve entirely new
goals... recognizing the new, unfamiliar capabilities of technology instead of familiar
ones." [Ref. 3, p. 85]
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History illustrates many examples of overlooking the latent possibilities resident
in technology. Hammer and Champy describe how a small company in the late 1950's
was performing work on its first commercially available copier. As cash became scarce
for the fledgling company it turned to IBM for investment in the idea. Based on
economic analysis, IBM concluded that although it replaced all known methods of
copying, it would not repay the investment required to fund the company. IBM decided
to not get into the copier business, so the company, Xerox, continued to work on the idea
in the hopes that it would one day find a market. The Xerox copier was technology
seeking a solution. At the time, the need for a technology that could create multiple
copies was deemed a business need. However, once it became available, companies
began to see a value in replicating documents in large quantities as a means to share
information across the organization. The rest is history.
Often, it is the hidden or latent power of technology that, when thought about
inductively, produces the most significant results. The opportunity resident in video
teleconferencing (VTC), for example, is not a massive reduction in travel costs as once
envisioned. It is in the manner in which teleconferencing improves communication
among geographically dispersed people. [Ref. 3, p. 89] Most organizations have not
realized serious reductions in travel costs since deploying VTC in their organizations.
This can be attributed to the realization that there can be no replacement for face-to-face
interaction among people. [Ref. 3, p. 89] Non-verbal communication and personal
interaction can not be replicated via video. However, progressive organizations have
demonstrated that utilizing VTC provides a medium for more frequent communication,
not a replacement of face to face meetings. The latent opportunity in VTC is that of
improving the lines of communication among geographically separated entities; an
invaluable means of increasing the quality of communication, and ultimately, the quality
of work produced by more frequent interactions. [Ref. 3, p. 90]
Technology can also be a process innovation constraint. Although process
innovation often focuses on a "clean slate" approach to process redesign (i.e., not being
constrained by existing processes), it is important to consider the constraints that existing
technology (e.g., "legacy" systems) places on the possibilities of potential redesigns.
Existing systems and lack of technical infrastructure should not be ignored when
designing new processes. The investment in the existing systems and infrastructure is too
expensive. Instead, process innovators must recognize the natural constraints IT places
on potential redesigns, so that informed decisions can be made about the feasibility of
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redesign. According to Davenport, '"rather than assuming a clean slate at the beginning of
a process and then later getting bogged down in existing systems, the analysis of
constraints tailors the process to a systems environment from the beginning." [Ref. 1, p.
65]
Technology represents the most powerful tool in the innovator's toolkit. Hammer
and Champy refer to the "disruptive power of technology' 1 as a critical success factor in
breaking traditional notions of work and organization. [Ref. 3, p. 91] Organizations that
strive to make technology exploitation a core competency demonstrate an understanding
of the importance of technology and a willingness to commit resources to capitalizing on
new solutions to yet unknown problems — indeed, "discontinuous thinking" at its finest.
2. Information
Of critical importance to process innovation is the manner in which information
supports business processes. Information can be described as data made meaningful.
Although overshadowed by its more flamboyant brother, technology, it is information
that workers, managers and executives require to make everyday decisions. Therefore,
management of information — the management of an organization's information
environment ~ is a key process enabler capable of dramatic process performance
improvement.
The management of information is not an easily understood concept nor is it
widely practiced. This might be attributed to affinity for technology as the "holy grail"
that somehow permits organizations to structure their information and make it useful.
However, by some estimates, 85% of corporate information is not manipulated by
information technology due to a lack of understanding of the information required by
decision makers and often by the unstructured nature in which some information is
communicated. [Ref. 1, p. 71] More often than not, organizations have a very vague
understanding of information requirements that are needed to make accurate and timely
decisions. Without a full understanding of information requirements, according to
Davenport, "vast amounts of information enters and leaves the organization without
anyone being fully aware of its impact, value or cost." [Ref. 1, p. 72] Process innovation
requires a full awareness of information requirements as a precursor to success. As such,
three issues (roles of information in processes, types of information oriented processes,
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and process information management) are addressed to provide background into the
relationship between process and information.
a. Primary Roles ofInformation
The three primary roles of information in processes are performance,
integration, and customization. [Ref. 1, p. 73] Critical information regarding the
performance of processes can be gathered throughout a process to provide the status of its
health. This is particularly true when the processes are aided by technology. Information
management expert Shoshana Zuboff explains, "The devices that automate by translating
information into action also register data about those automated activities, thus generating
new streams of information." [Ref. 10, p. 9] The new streams of information such as
cost, cycle time, responsiveness and quality can be used by all who support the process.
Real time process reporting systems that capture important process performance
information are invaluable tools providing employees with immediate feedback and
management through accurate information. Davenport cites the General Electric
manufacturing plant of Salisbury, Maryland as an example of how employees use real-
time heads-up-displays to provide them with a variety of process performance
information.
Often, information gathered on a customer or generated internally by a
department has relevance in other departments across the organization. Information can
be thought of as the thread that weaves various activities and business units into an
organization. Information itself is a powerful means to integrate processes. Therefore,
sharing of information across the organization is critical to its success. Through a study
of organizational information requirements, process innovators can be provided with an
important tool that illustrates how information can best be captured and disseminated to
all who require it, regardless of its origin. Many companies are using technology to aid
in information acquisition. Davenport describes how companies use toll-free 800
customer service numbers to acquire information reported by customers. [Ref. 1, p. 75]
The information is made available to all who require it providing a valuable tool to learn
about customer preferences, complaints and compliments. Other companies are using
"information specialists" to acquire unstructured information on customers and internal
corporate activities, as a means to provide the whole organization important information
regarding on-going projects, their status and other relevant activities. Information
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specialists acquire and synthesize all forms of information based on the information
requirements of the organization.
Davenport states that "Information can be utilized to better integrate
process activities both within a process and across multiple processes." [Ref. 1, p. 75] By
understanding information requirements, processes can use common information
acquired once, anywhere in the organization, stored in an information system, and reused
by all who require it.
One of the new assumptions of the information age, as defined by Norton
and Kaplan, is "customer segmentation" or the ability to customize the delivery of output
to each customer. [Ref. 2, p. 4] More commonly known as "mass customization", this
notion refers to the ability of an organization to acquire information regarding each
customer and their needs, and to tailor the product specifically for them without
increasing the cost of production. Technology makes the acquiring, storing, indexing and
retrieving of this information a reality. In fact, mass customization is now viewed as a
critical success factor by most information age organizations in order to compete for
business in mature market segments. The importance of delivering tailored solutions is
self-evident. Each customer and each situation, such as a military operation, has its own
set of unique requirements. A process that delivers a "one size fits all" product can no
longer succeed in the information age where customer expectations are on a continuously
increasing slope. According to Davenport's research,
Firms that have succeeded have mastered the basics of information
management. They are able to categorize, store, retrieve, and maintain
customer records with relative ease. These firms determined early what
information they needed to offer tailored products or services and gathered
that information. Because they recognized the value of process
customization, they recognized the importance of their information assets
and were willing to invest in them. [Ref. 1, p. 77]
Today's customers are demanding. Tomorrow's demands will be more
taxing. Organizations that wish to meet today's requirements and anticipate tomorrow's
must understand the importance of tailored solutions based on a complete understanding
of information requirements.
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b. Information Oriented Processes
The information oriented process produces information as its output.
Whereas a manufacturing process produces a physical product, the product in an
information-oriented process is information itself. Davenport describes two types of
information-oriented processes: those designed to aid management decisions and
activities and those with operational objectives. [Ref. 1, p. 77] The following paragraphs
describe the nature of these processes.
Management oriented information processes are designed to aid in
decision making. In most corporations, managers and executives focus on financials as
the primary source of information used for decision analysis. However, information age
wisdom dictates that non-financial information based on customer, cycle time,
competition and market knowledge play an increasingly critical role in the management
of successful modern organizations. Simply stated, few inroads have been forged in the
way of providing information needed for executive and management decision making.
[Ref. l,p. 79]
Several reasons may account for the knowledge gap. Most organizations
have not yet undertaken initiatives to identify the kind of information required for
managerial decisions. Missing are process oriented measurements that give managers
meaningful information on nearly all the non-financials. Information, for example, such
as the average time it takes to fill a customer's order or resolve disputes. Clearly, the
value of the information is in its timeliness and accuracy. In relation to a performance
measurement system, this become critical. According to authors Sharon McKinnon and
William Bruns, a study of executive information use found that top management does not
use computer stored information because it is generally obsolete. [Ref. 1 1, p. 12] Taken
another way, executives and managers require timely information delivered in any form
as opposed to obsolete, system delivered information.
Furthermore, executive information is often unstructured and difficult to
capture. [Ref. 1, p. 79] A great deal of organizational communication is interpersonal in
nature. High level executive briefs, discussions in the cafeteria and other locations make
the capturing of rich information communicated in such encounters difficult at best.
Typically, senior managers and executives are "briefed" by their staffs as means to fill the
information-oriented management process gaps. Face-to-face meetings are indeed
important to a healthy communication climate. However, briefings of the future, where
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executives have access to real-time performance measurements, might become more
action-oriented rather then informational in nature. Unstructured executive information
remains a perplexing area in information management research.
Strategic measurement and control is another type of information-focused
management process which could play a significant role in the performance of an
organization. Executives require the capability to examine how performance levels
measure against strategic goals and objectives. Davenport illustrates Imperial Chemical
Industries, one of Europe's largest firms, and how it focuses on a small number of
strategic milestones (financial and non-financial) to successfully hone the management
focus on critical information. [Ref. 1, p. 81] Information specialists might be used to
track performance information from across the organization relative to the few strategic
milestones. Hypothetically, once processes in the organization have identified their
information requirements, established performance measurements, and created systems to
monitor performance, information regarding the few strategic milestones could be
delivered to executives in the form of a strategic control system.
Many of today's processes produce information as their output. Examples
of such processes might produce customer service, a consulting report or a formal
briefing. Davenport points out that unless these information-oriented processes are
transactional in nature (repetitive, frequently occurring), they are unlikely to be viewed as
a true process. [Ref. 1, p. 82] However, this does not diminish the importance of
information production processes. It does serve as an important indicator as to the
maturity of the organization's information management understanding.
Information processes that more resemble transaction processing similar to
a production line, like pay processing, supply requests and insurance policy processing,
are likely to be more clearly recognizable. However, with both the less clearly defined
information processes like expert knowledge acquisition and distribution, and the more
clearly defined bank check processing, companies are placing a higher premium and
importance on them while attempting to build processes for management. For example,
Davenport describes IBM's "market information management" capture process which
encompasses the management of all information which might lead to a successful sale of
products and services. Many large companies have similar information acquisition
processes as their importance in information age success becomes more pronounced.
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c. Designing an Information Management Process
Designing an information management process is a difficult undertaking
that has a great deal of potential for meaningful returns. Firms that are attempting to
design an information processes should not initially be concerned with order of
magnitude of change. They should first "establish an information management processes
to provide a baseline upon which subsequent efforts can try to improve." [Ref. 1, p. 83]
Another key element in information process management is that the
processes can only be properly managed if the actual information requirements for a
process are clearly defined. Unfortunately, very few organizations understand the
importance of defining process information requirements. A process's information
requirement is defined as that information from both internal and external sources that is
needed for the process to work. According to Davenport:
Information management processes should include the entire information
"value chain", that is, the process should start with the definition of
information requirements, and move through collection, storage,
distribution, receipt, and use of the information.
With the proper process perspective, process owners can begin to define
their information needs and how that information impacts decision making. In essence,
an examination of information requirements amounts to the analysis of the relationship
between "information provided and decisions taken." [Ref. 1, p. 154] Information must
not be separated from the process. Executives, managers and workers perform process
activities (work) based on information. Can a process really be complete if it has vague











Figure 3.5 - A Process for Information Management [Ref. 1, p. 84]
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The information management process in Figure 3.5 provides a generic
example of how an organization might construct its own management process.
Organizations embarking on an information-management process-building initiative
should consider the nature of how information is received, categorized and stored. Once
that is determined, the lens should be focused on a single process whereby information
requirements can be analyzed. By referring to Figure 3.5 and asking "how" before each
of the processes beyond Requirements Determination, process owners can begin to
develop an understanding ofhow information impacts their processes.
Information technology can obviously play a critical role in enabling the
information management process. However, as previously discussed, a great deal of
information communicated to and within the organization is unstructured and
interpersonal in nature. The impact of current technology on collecting this information
is minimal. Therefore, the role of humans in acquiring and synthesizing unstructured
information in its various formats remains critical to a successful process. Technology,
such as knowledge based systems, are used to capture organizational process knowledge.
Human involvement in acquiring information for the knowledge based system is
essential. However, once it is acquired, cataloged and formatted, it could then be made
available to the organization through the use of computers.
Most organizations view information and technology together. As we
have discussed, a focus on information alone can provide enormous insight into
processes' information requirements. Many companies are organizing people to begin
capturing and cataloging information. According to Davenport, a number of Japanese
firms have organized "competitive information departments" that compile a wide variety
of information such as memos, trip reports, and briefings. They refine and distribute such
information to those who require it. [Ref. 1, p. 43] Closer to home, American Express
and AT&T are also taking information management seriously. Recognizing the need to
place an emphasis on information management, both companies have created senior
executive positions to plot and manage information and policy. For example, the vice
president for information services stands side by side with the vice president for
information technology. Davenport believes that companies should consider a "hybrid"
chief information officer (CIO) who has not only business and technology skills, but also
information management skills.
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3. Human Resources and Organizational Structure
The third key change lever applied in process innovation is human resource and
organizational structure. Senior managers and executives have an awareness of the
importance of human resources and the influence of organizational structure and culture
on the people who work there. Human resource and organization are well known factors
that contribute to the success of the enterprise. Policies that impact the organizational
structure and human resources are commonly applied tools utilized to produce corporate-
wide change. Process innovation also utilizes these powerful tools to enable redesigned
processes. It becomes critical to understand the relationship between structural change
and the impact that change has upon humans. Davenport explains:
If process innovation is to succeed, the human side of change cannot be
left to manage itself. Organization and human resource issues are more
central than technology issues to the behavioral changes that must occur
within a process. [Ref. 1
,
p. 96]
Too often the impact of structural change upon human resources is not fully
explored. The consequences of not properly managing people throughout the
organizational change process can be devastating. Successfully navigating people
through change is the subject more thoroughly examined in Chapter VI. However, one
issue remains clear: process innovation can only be successful if all aspects of change are




According to Davenport, "organizational enablers of process innovation
fall into two categories: structure and culture." [Ref. 1, p. 96] Team organization stands
out as the most powerful means of facilitating new process oriented behaviors. This can
primarily be attributed to the ability of a team structure to combine multiple skills and
knowledge into a coherent unit. Davenport believes that team organization allows for a
more rapid adaptation to changing environments. [Ref. 1, p. 97]
Organizations seeking a team structure do so based on the benefits of
cross-functionalism and improved quality of life. [Ref. 1, p. 98] Cross-functional teams
are designed to combine the diverse skills of many into a cohesive, self-directing unit.
Because the teams combine many skills and are comprised of workers from different
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functional units, they naturally lend themselves well to enabling cross-functional work.
Team structure has also been shown to increase the quality of work life. [Ref. 1
,
p. 97]
Most people prefer to interact with others while they work — to talk, share ideas and solve
problems. Team interaction has been shown to increase understanding among team
members having diverse functional backgrounds. This can be a particularly important
benefit for organizations seeking to diminish long-standing functional boundaries and
foster a more appreciative cultural environment based upon positive reinforcement, co-
inquiry (listening to one another) and better understanding of each team member's
functional background. [Ref. 10] However, team membership does not always foster
understanding and appreciation. Sometimes team members simply do not "get along."
Therefore, selection of team members, and their cultural compatibility, is critical to
building a successful team.
Davenport distinguishes between two types of teams: process design and
long-term teams that execute work. [Ref. 1
,
p. 99] Process design team composition will
be covered in Chapter VI. Long-term teams, such as the kind that might be established to
perform an entire process, face particular challenges that might not be associated with
short term team. In particular, "difficult issues that face long-term teams revolve around
the relationship between team members and the functional structure of the organization."
[Ref. 1, p. 99] To whom team members report and are evaluated is of critical importance
if the team is to operate in a cross-functional manner. If a team member is evaluated by
his functional manager, he or she is likely to have strong allegiance to that manager and
favor decisions that positively impact the team members functional connection, perhaps
to the detriment of process performance as a whole.
In cross-functional team building, managers and executives are forced to
divorce themselves of their functional association and select team members best suited
for the job. Davenport states that:
To function effectively as a cross-functional team, a senior management
group must be willing and able to look beyond functional allegiances, and
even beyond what may benefit their careers. [Ref. 1, p. 100]
This might prove to be particularly difficult. Many executives who have
been promoted to such positions arrived there by political and self-preservation motives
are often counter-productive. However, team selection and an understanding of the
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factors impacting selection remain critical issues that senior management groups must
overcome.
Team success is based on the following factors: [Ref. 1, p. 100]
D Composition of the team
Clear relationship to functional structure (reporting relationships, process vs.
functional activities)
D Logistical issues (team location and work space)
D Degree of "self-management" (amount of team control in making
management/resource decisions)
Boundary management (inter-group responsibilities and team/organization
relationship)
Clarity (mission, process boundaries, decision making authority, internal and
external group roles).
Prevalent among many successful process team stories is their ability to be
self-directing. "Self-managing" teams direct their own work and have no formal leader.
[Ref. 1 1 ] Often referred to as self-empowered, these teams have the ability to make
decisions, acquire resources, maintain operational budgets and a host of other activities,
even hiring additional employees in some cases. Teams, particularly empowered ones,
offer process innovators a powerful enabler, which through the clarity of its charter, an
appreciative intra-team culture, proper tools (skills, hardware, financials) and
organizational support, can produce dramatic performance results along with a positive
impact on the structure and culture.
Information technology is a powerful enabler of team communication.
Many products are now available that support group-oriented activities such as group
document preparation, communication, brainstorming and analysis. Collectively, these
tools are called groupware and can have a significant impact on productivity by reducing
the need for face-to-face meetings and document revision, to name a couple. Groupware
applications traditionally come packaged with scheduling programs that automatically de-
conflicts overlapping meetings in real-time and can also access databases where
information the group needs can be easily retrieved.
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Telecommunication tools such as automatic call distributors (ACDs) route
incoming calls from both internal and external customers to those best able to answer
questions. Another generic tool, workflow software, enables teams to edit, route, store and
retrieve documents. Workflow software can create digital versions of common
organization paper forms whereby documents can be revised by computer. Team enabling
technology tools should not be arbitrarily applied. Only when processes have been
optimized or redesigned should technology be applied, however. This includes internal
group processes that establish how information is utilized.
The trend in modern team development and deployment is to empower
teams with broad decision making powers inside less-hierarchical, initiative-fostering
organizations. If teams are to succeed, the culture must come to value more participation
and a flatter structure that complements the self-empowered team model. In general, a
process innovation culture produces an environment that rewards initiative and
encourages employees to provide input, without the fear of management reprisal.
Through proper guidance, culture can redefined to reflect the more nimble approach of
the team-based empowered process workers. As Davenport explains:
Although process innovation is not normally a bottom-up activity, a
culture that is receptive to innovation at all levels is likely to both identify
and implement process innovation at relatively high frequencies.
Furthermore, even after broad process designs have been implemented, an
innovative culture can inspire minor improvement that benefit day-to-day
process performance. [Ref. 1, p. 105]
Even before a formal process innovation effort is undertaken, cultural
changes can be set in motion that prepare the organization for future changes that
accompany process innovation. People generally want to work in a place where their
opinions can be heard and valued. However, an organizational structure and culture that
value empowerment may not always be appropriate. Organizations that experience high
employee turnover and/or involve repetitive basic tasks may wish to maintain tight
control of their processes. [Ref. 1, p. 105] Fast food restaurant chains undoubtedly have
control cultures that are viewed as necessary to ensure quality in a business with high
employee turnover.
Often, an organization's structure and culture do not adequately support
executive initiatives that encourage participation and empowerment. This "reality gap"
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can be a source of significant irritation among employees and managers alike who
recognize the incongruity. Cynicism can quickly develop among employees which can
take significant resources (time, effort) to rectify. Executives must closely examine how
their vision of culture reflects reality. Cultural change issues are more closely examined
in Chapter VI.
b. Human Resource Enablers
Organizational and human resource enablers are closely linked change
levers for process innovation. Here we focus on how human resource enablers directly
impact the way workers are "trained, motivated, paid and evaluated." [Ref. 1, p. 107]
New processes involve education and training in required skills.
Education implies a broad-based approach to learning that helps develop a more thorough
understanding of theories and cause and effect relationships. Training has an inherently
more narrow focus ~ usually concentrating on a particular type of technical or physical
skill development. If workers are expected to take on more responsibility or work in
teams, they will require education and training in both increasing the breadth of their
knowledge as well as the depth of specific skills.
A worker expected to be a generalist and participate on an autonomous
team, for example, must learn about the jobs of the other team members
(cross training) and, if new technologies are to be employed in the process,
must acquire skills in applying and using those technologies. [Ref. 1, p.
107]
New skills will be required across a wide range of topics. Chief among
those topics is specific business process training. Workers must posses the appropriate
skills to be effective process workers. Organizations must identify the particular skills
that are required and the most effective ways to educate employees. However,
organizational education requires significant planning to be of benefit. Not only does
education take more time than anticipated, but usually there are very few employees who
have the requisite knowledge to train others or perform process oriented work.
Davenport believes that "if the process is truly innovative, no one will be qualified to
train anyone else." [Ref. 1, p. 107] Executives and process workers alike will undergo
various forms of process education and training, utilizing different subject matter more
appropriate for their roles in the process. This can serve as a powerful signal that all are
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"sacrificing" with the goal of producing a better organization and, inevitably, a better
place to work.
Forward thinking companies considering organizational change will begin
educating executives, managers and workers on fundamental change related issues before
the change initiative begins. Educating and training in advance of change can help
counter organizational resistance and develop a more informed and better trained worker,
thereby increasing the chance of a successful implementation.
Motivation, and the relationship to performance, is a well known cause
and effect relationship. However, identifying what motivates people is a perennial
challenge for managers and executives. Work design experts Richard Hackman and Greg
Oldham offer five key aspects ofjob or process motivation: [Ref. 13]
D Skill Variety (the variety of skills necessary to complete the job)
D Task Identity (the degree to which a job involves completion of an entire
activity)
D Task Significance (the perceived importance and impact of the job)
D Autonomy (the freedom and discretion with which the job is performed)
Feedback (the extent to which information about the performance of the job is
provided to the worker)
These factors are commonly accepted drivers of job motivation and should be built into
new job descriptions of the information age worker.
Behavior is strongly influenced by how people are compensated. The
modem approach for compensation, known as "gainsharing", describes that worker
compensation based on quantifiable performance has shown to increase productivity.
[Ref. 1, p. Ill] Process work is well suited to measuring performance and lends itself
extremely well to the gainsharing model. Workers, managers and executives would be
compensated for different levels of performance based on their roles and responsibilities.
In a team concept, for example, workers could be rewarded for team productivity while
individual compensation might be tied how well they share knowledge with other group
members.
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Process oriented career paths are likely to be structured in a non-traditional
manner. According to Davenport, "career movement is likely to be more lateral than
upward; titles may no longer reflect the importance of the role." [Ref. 1, p. Ill] This
viewpoint represents a dramatic departure from normal organizational career paths.
Companies that can take advantage of this new structure "will have a long-term
advantage in process innovation over those that do not." [Ref. 1, p. Ill]
Versatility in work roles and responsibility is of great importance to
organizations that wish to increase their overall understanding of process activities. This
could be done in a variety of ways, namely establishing work rotation schedules among
process workers. Scheduling allows workers to begin learning about their next role well
in advance of the actual rotation. Work rotation is a key aspect ofjob motivation known
to produce a more enthusiastic and knowledgeable process worker.
Although a totally foreign concept to U.S. companies, lifetime
employment is widely practiced in Japan and has produced positive results. The thought
behind lifetime employment is that it allows workers to worry less about short term
performance and more about making a long term difference. Workers in the model might
also feel more valued and be less susceptible to "please the boss" actions not necessarily
aligned to overall process objectives. Perhaps U.S. companies can develop another form
of employment status that reduces the loss-of-job anxiety and replaces it with more
permanent feelings of belonging.
Training, compensation and other polices are important enablers of human
resources. However, they should be considered in a broader context as supporting
policies that accelerate depth and breadth of change. According to Davenport, "only the
most dramatic change in human resource policies could itself be viewed as a lever for
new process design." [Ref. 1, p. 112] If change is to be successful, both the human
(social) and technical dimensions must be given equal appreciation and equal
consideration. Management of human and organization change is addressed in Chapter
VI.
D. THE PROCESS INNOVATION METHODOLOGY
The process innovation methodology is divided into 5 step process known as "The
High-Level Approach to Process Innovation." [Ref. 1, p. 25] In the following
paragraphs, this intuitive and highly effective, step-by-step approach to process
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innovation is outlined and discussed. Herein referred to as the "methodology",
Davenport's high level approach translates the principles of the theory into a logical order
for action. Figure 3.6 shows the 5 steps of the methodology.








Designing and Prototyping the New Process
Figure 3.6 - A High Level Approach to Process Innovation [Ref. 1, p. 25]
1. Identifying Processes for Innovation
The process innovation journey begins with a "survey of the process landscape to
identify the processes that are candidates for innovation." [Ref. 1, p. 27] Determining the
processes that will be candidates for innovation is essential to a successful initiative. By
establishing boundaries, planners are able to concentrate the organization's resources on
the processes that meet the appropriate criteria for selection. Davenport describes five
key activities in identifying processes for innovation:
D Enumerate major processes
Determine process boundaries
D Assess strategic relevance of each process
Render high-level judgments of the "health" of each process
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D Qualify the culture and politics of each process.
The objective of surveying the process landscape is to complete a broad, high-
level examination of the key business processes of the organization. To achieve order-of-
magnitude performance improvements, the processes must be viewed from a high-level
process perspective. A perspective that is too narrow will fail to capture enterprise-wide
processes ~ the processes with the greatest potential impact the organization as a whole.
According to Davenport, "when the objective is radical process change, a process must be
defined as broadly as possible." [Ref. 1, p. 28]
Key processes identified by IBM, Xerox and British Telecom have enumerated
between 10 to 20 key processes. [Ref. 1, p.28] Accordingly, Davenport's rule of thumb
sets the appropriate number of high level processes at between 10 to 20.
Within this range ~ which leaves us with some cross-process activity, but
renders each process small enough to be understood ~ change
management is then only very difficult, rather than impossible.
Constricting the range also permits us to identify both operational and
management processes and to find different approaches to redesigning
each type. This does not mean that all of the identified processes will be of
the same importance, or even that innovation will be identified for all of
them. [Ref. l,p. 29]
International quality advisor H. J. Harrington describes a promising method to
assist process innovators in identifying key high level processes. [Ref. 15] In this
method, top executives describe the processes for which they are responsible and refine
their lists to arrive at a high-level description of the company's top-level processes.
Defining process boundaries is another import activity that will help flush-out high-level
processes. Davenport encourages managers to ask the following questions to determine
boundaries: [Ref. 1, p. 31]
D When should the process owner's concern with the process begin and end?
When should the process customers' involvement begin and end?
Where do sub-processes begin and end?
D Is the process fully embedded within another process?
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D Are performance benefits likely to result from combining the process with
other processes or sub-processes?
Answers to theses questions can provide a clarity in process enumeration activities.
Once the top-level processes are identified, assessing the strategic relevance of
each process will narrow the choices for innovation. Davenport has developed four
criteria that guide process selection: (1) the processes' centrality to the execution of the
firm's business strategy, (2) process health (i.e., how well is it performing), (3) process
qualification (i.e., cultural and political climate of the process), and (4) manageable
project scope. [Ref. 1, p. 32] All four criteria combined might point to particular process
innovation targets. However, innovators will likely select two or three key criteria as the
basis for selection.
Clearly, process innovation requires a significant amount of a company's
resources to effectively perform. Organizations must understand the level of significant
change that accompanies process innovation and the several years that it could endure.
The number of processes selected must be balanced with the organization's resources
before deciding how many, and which ones, will be transformed through innovation.
That number might be just one or it may encompass an organization's entire process map.
2. Identify Change Levers
Change levers are synonymous with the enablers of process innovation. As noted
above, Davenport identifies three classes of change enablers: human and organization,
technology, and information. Other researchers have since added to this list. For
example, Nissen [Ref. 28] also discusses workflow rearrangement (e.g., conducting
sequential activities in parallel, eliminating non-value-added activities, introducing a
process triage step), technologies beyond information technology (e.g., manufacturing,
transportation, construction), inter-organizational alliances (e.g., supply-chain networks,
vertical enterprises, platform organizations) and cultural change (e.g., employee stock
options, participative management, support for risk-taking). Here, we focus on the
Davenport set which identifies four key activities in identifying change enablers: [Ref. 1,
p. 48]
Identify potential technological and human opportunities for process change
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Identify potentially constraining technological and human factors
D Research opportunities in terms of application to specific processes
D Determine which constraints will be accepted
Also, we noted above that thinking inductively can assist with identifying
innovative applications of existing IT enablers (i.e., change levers). Current research has
employed artificial intelligence methods to match enabling technologies to process
pathologies. [Ref. 27] This offers potential to assist process innovators with their
inductive thinking.
Innovators should identify how the enablers could be applied to specific
processes. How can technology, for example, work in concert to bring about change in
process innovation? Asking questions will lend itself well to beginning the creative
thinking cycle required to identify potential opportunities.
Constraining enablers must also be considered in the initial stages of process
innovation to identify the feasibility of utilizing various alternative technologies or other
change levers based upon organizational limitations. Critical among such constraints for
information age organizations are the ubiquitous legacy information systems. Such
legacy systems often represent a huge investment in a rapidly-aging technology and
severely limit our ability to implement enterprise-wide IT enablers. We noted one
example of this in our pilot study discussed above, for example, as the CA-ARNG IT
infrastructure and technology decision limited the potential of its desired Intranet
"solution."
3. Developing Process Visions
Once the opportunities and constraints have been identified, they must be applied
to the processes under consideration. In other words, how might the opportunities and
constraints be employed in the process? [Ref. 1 , p. 48] The research at this stage in the
methodology is high level and rough. However, it serves to set-up a better understanding
of the processes, their potential enablers, and the impact of the enablers on the processes
themselves.
Business processes describe how work is done. The goal of work in general is to
accomplish some type of objective. Successful organizations derive these objectives
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based on strategy. Therefore, creating a link between how work is done (process) and the
long term strategy is perhaps the most critical factor in the success of any organization.
This represents the alignment factor discussed above. Strategy and process must
reinforce one another if process innovation is to be effective. Developing a process
vision refers to creating an idealized image (vision) of the state of future processes based
on the organization's strategy. There are five key activities in developing process
visions: [Ref. 1, p. 120]
D Assess existing business strategy for process directions
D Consult with process customers for performance objectives
D Benchmark for process performance targets and examples
D Formulate process performance objectives
Develop specific process attributes
Process innovation is "concerned with the implementation of a strategy as a
means to guide and inspire process innovation." [Ref. 1, p. 121] In essence, vision, in the
process innovation context, involves a detailed description of how the process will work
and how it will be measured. Process innovation assumes that an organization has
already formulated a clear strategy. A clearly articulated strategy will allow innovators to
examine it and derive high-level direction needed to guide its key processes.
The customer's perspective is critical in developing process vision. Since the
customers ultimately judge the quality of the "product", their input is essential. Processes
have both internal and external customers. Most companies concern themselves more
with external customers, often missing key insight. It is recommended that both sets of
customers provide input in developing process visions.
Customer input provides many advantages. It provides process innovators with
insight into different ideas and performance objectives based on what the customer wants
from the process output. By inviting customer participation, innovators send a clear
message that the process is designed with them in mind; this serves to build internal and
external commitment to the innovation program. Process innovators should seek
customer input that is "broad — encompassing desired process outputs, performance,
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flow, enablers, and other relevant factors." [Ref. 1, p. 124] Utilizing interview teams is
an effective way to structure the inquiry processes of gathering customer information.
Process benchmarking refers to a methodology used to collect "best practices" of
other organizations. Generally, the "best in class" organizations or key competitors are
selected for benchmarking. Information derived from "best practices" could be in the
form of performance objectives, measures of effectiveness, technological enablers,
workflow arrangements, and other important process attributes which could be
incorporated in new process designs. Results from benchmarking have been used by
organizations seeking to "not reinvent the wheel" thereby utilizing "best practices" of
other organizations as means to see how other successful organizations are doing
business. Benchmarking is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.
The relationship between strategy and process cannot be overstated. Davenport
states that, "process visions link strategy and action; they translate high-level strategies
into measurable targets for process performance and understandable characteristics of
process operations." [Ref. 1, p. 127] Figure 3.7 illustrates the relationship between













Figure 3.7 - Strategies, Visions, Objectives, and Attributes [Ref. 1, p. 127]
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Objectives include the overall process goals, specific types of desired
improvements, numeric targets for innovation and time frames for objective
accomplishment. [Ref. 1, p. 127] These objectives are created when innovators ask,
"What business objective is this process supposed to accomplish?" [Ref. 1, p. 127]
Analysis in this phase should be broad in nature and encompass the aspects deemed most
important by customers and executives. Objectives defined by the innovation team
should be stretch targets. As innovation strives to produce order-of-magnitude results,
attaining those results requires objectives that challenge the organization. Stretch
objectives must also be realistic and quantifiable, however. Examples of process
objectives might include the following:
Reduce cycle time plastic manufacturing process by 50% in 3 years
D Reduce processing cost of internal administrative requests by 75% in 1.5
years.
Attributes, on the other hand, are the "descriptive, non-quantitative adjunct to
process objectives and constitute a vision of process operation in a future state." [Ref. 1,
p. 129] They might also be thought of as basic principles or characteristics of process
operations, succinctly describing the future process in action. Examples of process
attributes might include:
D Link customer orders to an order tracking system available to customer via the
Internet
Develop empowered process teams that oversee key administrative functions
As discussed, process attributes and objectives are derived from multiple sources
such as corporate strategy, high-level overviews of the roles of technology and people,
customer interviews and benchmarking. [Ref. 1, p. 131] These activities are performed
and collected during multiple visioning sessions. Figure 3.8 depicts a logical framework
for conducting visioning sessions.
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Figure 3.8 - The Visioning Process [Ref. 1, p. 132]
75
Vision sessions progressively develop more refined answers to the questions
posed in the Figure 3.8. The sessions are also critical to building a common
understanding of the issues from a multidimensional perspective. Wide participation of
key stakeholders (executives, customers) should be viewed as essential. Defining the
high-level vision, objectives, and attributes is the first step in the actual vision process
(Figure 3.7). This will provide enough substance to allow the workshops to address the
questions posed in Figure 3.8.
4. Understanding Existing Processes
The fourth phase of the process innovation methodology is to understand existing
processes. There are six key activities in this phase: [Ref. 1, p. 139]
Describe the current process flow
Measure the process in terms of the new process objectives
Assess the process in terms of the new process attributes
D Identify problems with or shortcomings of the process
D Identify short-term improvements in the process
D Assess current information technology and organization
Although this phase conflicts with the notion of the "clean sheet of paper"
reengineering approach advocated by some (e.g., Hammer and Champy [Ref. 3]),
developing an understanding of current, or baseline, processes is necessary for the
following reasons: [Ref. l,p. 139]
Understanding existing processes facilitates communication among
participants in the innovation initiative.
D There is no way to migrate to a new process without understanding the old
Recognizing problems in an existing process can help ensure that they are not
repeated in the new process.
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D Understanding the current process provides a measure of the value of the
proposed innovation.
Understanding baseline processes is an important phase within a broader process
innovation context. Baseline process mapping is an exercise that produces a high-level
snapshot of how processes in the organization currently operate. Davenport recognizes
the value of describing and measuring existing processes as means to gauge the degree of
innovation new process designs achieve based upon a baseline analysis. A measurement
technique is described in Chapter V.
During this phase, process problems and accomplishments are identified. The
purpose of this exercise is to target areas for elimination, transformation or emulation.
When comparing the faults/accomplishments to new process attributes (determined
through the previous step), ideas are generated that help guide innovators in more specific
directions. Technology and the human/organizational factors should also be examined in
this phase to determine how such change levers can impact the current process. This will
ensure that the future process is designed with the full knowledge of how the baseline is
shaped by these factors. Fashioning the baseline is critical in deciding what new process
designs are innovative as opposed to improved.
Identifying short term improvements will allow innovators to establish milestones
along the journey to the new process end-state. Although process innovation is a long-
term endeavor, it will often be politically critical to demonstrate tangible improvements
in order to maintain commitment to the initiative. Short term improvements will greatly
assist in demonstrating that the process innovation initiative is "working" and can serve
as a morale booster during a time of significant change. This implies a practical sequence
to effecting multiple redesign transformations and projects.
5. Designing and Prototyping the New Process
The five key activities in designing and prototyping a new process are: [Ref. 1, p.
154]
D Brainstorm design alternatives
D Assess feasibility, risk, and benefit of design alternatives and select the
preferred process design
D Prototype the new process design
77
Develop a migration strategy
D Implement new organizational structures and systems
The design activity is largely based on the spirit of innovation and "out of the
box" thinking. The group culture must be one that is accepting of any and all ideas as a
means to brainstorm the best design. Any group facilitation technique that encourages
members to voice their ideas and allow the ideas to grow is acceptable. Brainstorming, in
general, is highly iterative. The goal of brainstorming sessions is to develop a creative,
but realistic, description of the new process utilizing input from the new process vision,
change enablers, and baseline knowledge gathered earlier in the innovation
methodology. [Ref. l,p. 155]
Graphically depicting the design alternative by drawing process flows will greatly
aid in the communication of the ideas. High level process flows should be described
first. As the process takes shape, sub-processes should be identified and described.
Finally, the low-level activities of the process should be articulated. Figure 3.9 illustrates






























Figure 3.9 - Levels of Process Design [Ref. 1, p. 155]
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Brainstorming sessions will produce process designs that must be assessed for
feasibility. Factors such as cost, time, and benefits must be compared to the ability of the
organization to undertake the redesign. To make these determinations, members must be
versed in the high-level vision for the process, including performance objectives and
attributes, yet have an awareness of organizational, technological and process constraints.
[Ref. l,p. 156]
Prototyping the new process refers the need to test the new designs in a benign
manner to determine whether the redesigned process is viable. One way is to test and
simulate the operation of the new process. Davenport envisions this phase as a small
scale laboratory-like experiment,
Prototyping can itself be viewed as a series of phases that yield increasing
degrees of tangibility. Computer simulation is a kind of limited process
prototyping, beyond which it may be reasonable to create a paper-based
information test of the process. In subsequent phases, the prototype might
be taken to a stand-alone process test, using personal computers for
information support, and interfaces to other processes where existing
information systems might then be added to it. The ultimate prototype
would include all enabling technologies, skills, and organizational
structures. Each phase helps refine the process design and the information
required to support it; taken together, these phases help reduce
implementation risk. [Ref. 1, p. 157]
The findings reported in prototyping activities would be used to modify elements
of the process to hone its potential for success. Although there can be no guarantees that
the process will perform as tested, it will serve as important step in gaining the support of
all effected by the process implementation and prototyping can provide initial insight into
bottlenecks, constraints and problems that are not visible during brainstorming sessions
and earlier stages. Changing a new process while still in the prototype phase is an order-
of-magnitude less expensive than after organization-wide implementation.
A migration strategy will need to be formulated to implement the new process.
As with prototyping, it is recommended that a limited pilot implementation be undertaken
before full process roll-out. This will serve to limit the impact of the process until all the
potential "hidden aspects" are flushed out and addressed. Issues such as time, funding
and other constraints must be thoroughly researched prior to developing a migration plan.
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A phased implementation based on realistic assessment of the risk factors, including the
organization's ability to absorb the new process, remains a critical success factor.
The implementation of new organizational structure is the final step in this phase.
According to Davenport, "although the problem of rigid functional organizations is
widely recognized, the proposed solution - to abandon any form of structure beyond the
self-managing team - is frequently worse than the problem... [Ref. 1, p. 158] It is not
recommended that a process structure be the only structure of the organization. In fact,
hierarchies define reporting relationships and provide order in large organizations.
Davenport believes that, [Ref. 1
, p. 1 60]
An organization that wishes to benefit from a process perspective must be
prepared to tolerate the well-known problems with matrix structures,
including diffusion of responsibility, unclear reporting relationships, and
excessive time spent in coordination activities and meetings.
A combined orientation toward a process structure together with the traditional
functional perspective can help prevent key activities from falling in-between the cracks.
The new organization structure must take into account, and indeed integrate, the often
overlapping responsibilities between processes owner and workers, and between
functional department owners and workers.
E. SUMMARY
Process innovation is a methodology that permits industrial age organizations to
successfully complete the monumental leap into the information age. New information
age assumption (e.g., cross functions, links to customers and suppliers, market-of-one,
global market, innovation, knowledge workers) are based on the new realities of old
business drivers (change, competition and customer). Function-based organizations are
now faced with a new set of challenges that only 10 years ago were beyond our
comprehension. Today, survival is a function of understanding information age realities
and developing an organization that can flourish in the era of permanent and accelerated
change.
Successful information age organizations recognize the need to systematically
examine their business practices and address the realities of how (and how well) they
actually perform work. As a result, many businesses are undertaking process innovation
initiatives in top-down effort to transform their existing work structures into high
80
performance processes. Process innovation is designed to achieve order-of-magnitude
performance improvements through identifying key business processes and applying the
process innovation methodology. In contrast, quality management and continuous
process improvement programs are focused on narrow processes and set moderate
performance improvement objectives. Their "bottom-up" nature inherently constrains the
ability of the organization to focus on high-level processes which ultimately can produce
the most significant performance improvement.
Information age organizations are inherently process focused. Functional
business unit and departmental structures used to manage the organization are losing
relevance, supplanted by a structure that reflects the true nature of cross-functional work.
Output is focused on meeting individual customer needs. Processes have ownership
whereby work can be measured and optimized based on feedback from internal and
external customers. In essence, the hierarchical structure of industrial age organizations
is giving way to cross-functional process orientation where process owners are
responsible for the entirety of work performance, including the product.
The application of powerful change levers is being applied to both enable and
implement process innovation. Information technology is a change lever that allows
organizations to realize order-of-magnitude performance improvement. According to
Davenport,
The relationship between IT and process-based structures is reciprocal;
processes require information technology to achieve radical change, and to
harness the capabilities of information technology in a cross-functional,
performance-driven manner requires a process view. [Ref. 1, p. 301]
Information technology presents both opportunities and constraints.
Opportunities take a variety of forms including automational (eliminating human labor
from a process), sequential (changing the sequence of a process or performing the task in
parallel), geographical (enabling a process to operate effectively over great distances),
and disintermediational (eliminating process intermediaries). [Ref. 1, p. 302] The
primary constraints to IT are those imposed the by the existing technical infrastructure,
namely the existence of legacy systems. These constraints are commonplace and a
careful examination must be undertaken to assess the feasibility of implementing IT
enablers within the existing infrastructure.
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The application of various human resource and organizational structure enablers
also allows organizations to achieve radical change. Worker and team empowerment
provides process workers the means to meet organizational objectives by providing them
with autonomy and the necessary resources to execute cross-functional work.
Progressive companies are examining their culture and organization to determine how to
support process innovation initiatives.
Assessing information requirements and developing a management structure to
deliver that information to the people who need it represents another innovative change
lever. Many companies are undertaking initiatives to identify, acquire, synthesize, and
present information in a manner easily rendered useful by process workers (information
consumers). New skills and positions are being created such as information specialists
(people who acquire and synthesize structured and unstructured information) and
executive information "czars" (executives responsible for information acquisition,
synthesis, and quality) who focus on bringing order to this critically important yet
misunderstood element of process success.
Processes are only meaningful if they are aligned with organizational strategy.
Process innovation focuses on distilling organizational strategy into specific process
objectives. The alignment of work activities (process) to process objectives that are
directly linked to the organizational strategy forms a powerful check and balance that
ensures work is structured in a meaningful manner. The output of an aligned process is
designed to close the gap between today and the organizations vision of the future.
An organized approach to process innovation is required to a achieve desired
results. Our discussion above has outlined a high-level approach to process innovation:
Identifying Processes for Innovation- Enumerating top-level processes and
assessing them for their ability to be innovated. [Ref. 1, p. 25]
Identifying Change Levers- Examining the technical, informational, human,
and organizational enablers of process innovation and their applicability to
processes under consideration for innovation.
D Developing Process Visions- Developing process objectives and attributes of
the to-be process.
D Understanding Existing Processes- Analyzing the existing (baseline)
processes and diagnosis their pathologies and faults.
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Designing and Prototyping the New Process- Based on the current process
and the new process vision, design the new process and test it.
Although a variation of these principle can be applied to achieve desired results, a
successful process innovation initiative will include the aforementioned activities in some
form. An organization must be committed at all levels to undertake a process innovation
initiative. Chief among the key ingredients for success is education on process
innovation and cooperation among all key stakeholders. The long-term nature of process
innovation demands a strong understanding of the concepts, a shared vision of the desired
future state, a viable strategy and a culture that identifies with the need to change and a
willingness make it happen.
The California Army National Guard is an organization that shares many of the
same issues confronting nearly all governmental organizations and large corporations.
Fundamentally, it is an industrial age organization facing the demanding issues of rapid
change, rising customer expectations, and competition to justify its existence and acquire
funding to support its initiatives. It has an executive-level awareness of these issues and
has undertaken quality programs and strategic planning initiatives in an effort to chart its
course in the information age.
Beginning with the identification of processes for innovation and concluding the
design of a new process, the Davenport Process Innovation methodology will be applied
to a specific Guard process as a means to demonstrate the methodology itself and to
generate process redesign alternatives of a specific process. The approach and finding are
discussed in detail in Chapter V. We first outline the key aspects of benchmarking in the
next chapter. Benchmarking represents a powerful approach to performance
improvement that is complementary to process innovation.
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IV. BUSINESS PROCESS BENCHMARKING
Benchmarking is an effective, forward-looking process that can help an
organization make decisions and prioritize the use of resources. Most companies have
formal measures to gauge performance, and often the operating staff members have
informal measures to monitor productivity. The benchmarking process integrates
company improvement activities in a process that allows an enterprise to better organize
and match the effort (people, time, and funds) to achieve key measures and strategic
goals.
Woodrow Wilson once said "We should not only use all the brains we have, but
all we can borrow." Nothing could be closer to the truth concerning benchmarking.
Benchmarking is a conscious effort to gain insight into the knowledge pool of another
organization. It provides an outside point of reference that informs improvement efforts,
and is usually gained from another's experience [Ref. 16]. It gathers the tacit
knowledge—the know-how, judgments, and enablers—that explicit knowledge often
misses [Ref. 17].
A. BENCHMARKING OVERVIEW
The previous chapter discussed Process Innovation and a deductive approach to
achieving results. This chapter explores business process benchmarking, a topic that is
closely related to process innovation, which uses an inductive approach to process
redesign. This chapter begins with an overview of Business Process Benchmarking,
explains the relationship between benchmarks, performance measures, and
benchmarking, and provides several definitions of benchmarking. The types of
benchmarking, the processes of the benchmarking model, and the "Camp" approach that
was initially developed and used at Xerox are also discussed. Additionally, a case study
of the SEMP process performed by a world-class civilian enterprise is presented.
1. The History of Benchmarking
Although only popularly used in the past twelve years, the concept of
benchmarking is not new. Corporations discovered that they could improve both
qualitatively and quantitatively by establishing "internal" best practice benchmarks.
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Soon, this extended to inter-company benchmarking. Today, benchmarking has become
a sophisticated, readily available guide that crosses all industries and lines of business.
Benchmarking became "revolutionized" with the introduction of two major
events. These events changed the way people perceived benchmarking and allowed them
to open their minds and companies to this new subject. One of these significant events
was the introduction of the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award. This award was
signed into law by an Act of the same name by President Ronald Reagan on August 20,
1987 and later established an annual U.S. National Quality Award [Ref. 4, p. 5]. The
other significant event was the benchmarking of the Xerox Corporation by Robert Camp,
a logistics expert and engineer at Xerox. Camp spent approximately seven years
benchmarking the processes at Xerox. Although this event had happened two years prior
to the initiation of the Baldridge award, both peaked their interest in the opportunities
derived from a benchmarking study [Ref. 4, p. 5].
Benchmarking complements Total Quality Management (TQM) and
reengineering alike. Both the concepts of TQM and reengineering have excited many
business and military leaders, as they are considered effective approaches to enhancing
the quality of an organization's response to its customers' needs while strengthening the
character of its internal culture. Benchmarking is seen as a major component of the
"improvement initiatives," [Ref. 20] as it enables an organization to identify its strengths
and weaknesses in comparison to other organizations, particularly those deemed "best in
class." When combined with benchmarking, TQM and reengineering can provide a
methodology for organizational excellence both internally (staff and operational
efficiencies) and externally (by providing goods and services that anticipate a customer's
expectations).
2. Benchmarking Definition, Purpose, and Best Practices
a. Definitions
Benchmarking has come to signify numerous definitions. Among the
more widely accepted are:
"The continuous process of measuring products, services and practices
against the toughest competitors or those companies recognized as
industry leaders"
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David T. Kearns, CEO Xerox
"A systematic process to search for and introduce best practice into an
organization"
Sylvie Trosa
"The search for and implementation of best practices"
Robert Camp
Notice that these definitions contain the words continuous, systematic, and search,
respectively. These words imply that benchmarking is going to be a long term process,
and not something that can be completed immediately. Spendolini has provided us with a
more vibrant and energizing definition than those mentioned above—"a continuous,
systematic, process for evaluating the products, services, and work processes of
organizations that are recognized as representing best practices for the purpose of
organizational improvement" [Ref. 4, p. 9]. He maintains that there is not an exact
definition and organizations should tailor their own definition using a benchmarking
menu (See Figure 4.1). The only requirement to using the benchmarking menu is that at
least one word from each box must be present in the definition. Flow is from top left to
bottom right.
Box 1 suggests that benchmarking is something that takes place over an extended
period of time [Ref. 4, p. 11], as opposed to a short-term or singular activity. In order for
benchmarking information to be meaningful, it must often be considered in a context that
acknowledges organizational activity over time. To benchmark the present state of an
organization on a one-time basis denies the basic assumption that organizations will
change over time.
Box 2 suggests that there is indeed a method to benchmarking [Ref. 4, p. 12].
This is usually demonstrated in most companies by the existence of a flowchart that
recommends a certain set of actions in a particular order. These models represent a
consistent and expected sequence that can be repeated by any member of the
organization.
Box 3 clearly defines the idea that benchmarking is itself a process [Ref. 4, p. 13].
Virtually every definition of benchmarking involves a series of actions that define issues,
problems or opportunities, measure performance, draws conclusions, and finally
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stimulates an organization's change and improvement. Regardless of which method is
invoked, a fundamental precept is that the focus is on the process of benchmarking.
Box 4 suggests that benchmarking is an investigative process [Ref. 4, p. 13],
denoting an active versus a passive approach. Benchmarking does not provide answers.
Instead, it provides us with information to make informed decisions and helps us to better
learn about other organizations and ourselves.
Box 5 suggests that benchmarking is not limited to any one particular facet
of an organization [Ref. 4, p. 13]. Several definitions focus on benchmarking as
providing the ability to understand work processes as well as the finished products or
services these processes produce. The idea of considering business practices or processes
that focus on how work is performed, rather than on what is produced, represents a
difficult transition for many.
Box 6 suggests that the focus of benchmarking is not limited to
competitive products, services, or practices [Ref. 4, pp. 13-14]. In using the generic
definition of benchmarking, one can see how this concept can be applied to any
organization that produces similar output or engages in similar business practices.
Box 7 suggests benchmarking involves an initial investigation to discover
the names of companies that are known to excel in the area of interest [Ref. 4, p. 14].
This is usually facilitated through contact with other benchmarking professionals,
industry analysts, or consultants. Printed materials such as periodicals, newspapers, and
magazines can also provide guidance and information. The key is to expand the list of
potential benchmark partners from those known solely through personal experience.
Box 8 suggests that organizations chosen for investigation and analysis
should represent as close to the state of the art as possible in the area being benchmarked
[Ref. 4, p. 14]. Why benchmark another company or organization with mediocre
performance?
Box 9 suggests that the purpose of benchmarking usually includes some
reference to comparisons and change [Ref. 4, p. 15]. Once a benchmarking activity is
concluded, there may be a call to action with the purpose of turning benchmarking






















































• Establishing priorities, targets, goals
Figure 4.1 - Spendolini's Benchmarking Menu [Ref. 4, p. 10]
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b. Purpose
Simply put, the purpose of benchmarking is to break the paradigm
preventing people from being able to learn from one another [Ref. 21, p. 14]. Its primary
objective is to understand those practices that will provide competitive advantages to
business. Benchmarking is an integral part of the planning and ongoing review process
designed to ensure a focus on the external environment and to strengthen the use of
factual information in developing plans.
In the private sector, the primary rationale for benchmarking is the
requirement to maintain or regain a competitive market position. While many public
departments and agencies do not actively compete in economic markets, other reasons to
consider benchmarking as a management improvement technique [Ref. 22] include aids
in strategic planning and forecasting, stimulation and performance improvements, and
improving information and goal setting.
First, benchmarking can help aid companies in the design and
implementation of their strategic plan. Thorough knowledge of the marketplace
including trends, competitor information, the customer base, and financial requirements
are all key in the quest to develop a sound and robust strategic plan [Ref. 4, p. 26].
Benchmarking is a useful tool for gathering such information during the inception of a
strategic plan. The practice of benchmarking can help make management aware of the
potential pitfalls associated with pursuing various courses of action and can literally help
shape the strategic planning process. Recall the importance of strategy from our
discussion of process innovation above.
With regards to forecasting, benchmarking takes the same information
gathered above and helps managers extrapolate it to determine possible future outcomes.
By observing the business direction and trends of some of the larger corporations, such as
IBM and McDonald's, managers can project how these same trends have a direct impact
on their company [Ref. 4, p. 26].
Second, benchmarking is about comparison, which can be a driving force
that ignites organizational or individual performance [Ref. 22]. Benchmarking activities
or functions can help senior managers and staffs ascertain how their organization and its
programs are performing in relation to other leading corporations. The technique can
bring to the foreground new and creative ideas, which can be used to improve
performance. Comparisons, whether they are between different parts of an organization
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or with practices in different business units or regions, may generate a rich source of
innovative ideas. While assessing variations in performance between different parts of
the same organization may lead to incremental changes in efficiency or effectiveness,
some suggest that the greatest performance gains from benchmarking are likely to be
realized from external comparisons [Ref. 22]. Benchmarking performance information
often adds an important comparative perspective to organizational outputs. Specifically,
some data may only be valuable when compared over time or with other organizations.
Benchmarking also helps to elicit new ideas. One of the formal precepts
of benchmarking is that of establishing external contacts [Ref. 4, p. 26]. Many of these
meetings take place within the host organizations. The very nature of this encounter
predisposes managers to look and see how this other enterprise is performing a similar
process. It causes them to raise questions and think about their own processes. This
represents the inductive approach to process innovation noted above in learning to
improve performance through examination of internal process activities. However, not
all of the ideas and processes uncovered during benchmarking are instantly useful to an
organization. Benchmarking causes people to think about new ways to do business and
encourages employees to think "out of the box," to consider alternative paradigms and to
engage in "what if thinking [Ref. 4, p. 27]. This approach is oriented towards long-term
payoffs.
Third, all levels of government need reliable ways of assessing the relative
performance of public programs in order to be able to set overall priorities and strategies
[Ref. 22]. Benchmarking can assist managers in improving the quality of their
performance information. Such improvements can, in turn, help organizations better
meet both external and internal accountability requirements.
c. Best Practices
Benchmarking is used as a means to identify best practices. Although
many smaller companies cannot compete with the "best practice" companies on the basis
of economies of scale, benchmarking allows these companies to make a significant
contribution to their own company based on the best practice, independent of
organizational resources [Ref. 4, p. 28].
Many people equate benchmarking with benchmarks. However, a clear
distinction exists between the two. Benchmarks are performance measures dealing with
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the questions such as how much? how quickly? how high? Or how low? Benchmarking
is action—discovering the specific practices responsible for high performance,
understanding how these practices work, and adapting and applying them to your
organization [Ref. 17]. Benchmarks are facts; benchmarking is a process.
Richard Quinn may have known what he was talking about when in 1 996
he stated, "You simply can't manage anything you can't measure." However, today it
takes both qualitative and quantitative measures to determine the performance of your
company. Organizations are easily seduced by the "myth of objectivity," [Ref. 18]
deluding themselves into believing that only readily quantifiable information is legitimate
for performance measurement. "If it can't be counted, it doesn't exist" is often the
prevailing frame of mind. This mindset leads managers to measure only what is visible
and tangible. For an organization to be capable of reflecting its collective contributions, a
healthy blend of both qualitative and quantitative factors throughout the scope and scale
of the enterprise must be achieved.
Danny Lyonnais contends that performance measurement is the backbone
of any organization [Ref. 19]. Using his analogy, it is easy to illustrate the importance of
performance measurement and its role in benchmarking.
Performance measurement can be compared to the spinal column of
organizations. As in the body, a performance measurement system carries
information to and from the decision-actioning center or "brain" of the
organization. Therefore, it is a critical component of any organization.
Carrying the analogy a bit farther, a properly functioning spine allows the
brain to be in touch with all the sensory inputs that are at its disposal. The
same with an organization.
However, judging from research and experience, most organizations do
not yet have fully developed spines. While the "brain" - the decision-
making center of the organization, functions and does its job, the changing
environment is forcing it to look for better and more complete sensory
input. Growing these extensions is an evolutionary process. And like any
change experience, there are growing pains.
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There is much pondering about what is best to measure, whether measures
are adequate, are the right thing to do. Some go so far as to say that there
are too many things that are non-measurable and that measuring is a waste
of time. All these are part of this growth process. As with evolution, there
is no right answer or magic bullet. The answers will evolve from
organizations' ability to develop the performance measures that they know
will relay reliable decision-making information. Also, as with evolution,
those who fail to adapt will not survive long.
Some organizations are starting to see and feel that performance
measurement is more than quarterly or annual number crunching. They are
beginning to understand that performance standards are not about past
performance but about tomorrow's survival; that measuring performance is
actually organizational development with technical and human
dimensions.
Their success in finding ways to develop "the spine" will be founded on a
structured, inclusive approach anchored in an attitude of continuous
learning . Performance measurement, not unlike physiotherapy in this
analogy, may hurt, but the results are quick, positive and long lasting.
Working with people to extend their own and their organization's brain
power is what it's all about: investment in human capital and in human
collaborative processes. It's time to let the performance measurement
skeletons out of the closet once and for all! [Ref. 19]
Best practices are defined as "superior performance within a function
independent of industry, leadership, management, or operational methods or approaches
that lead to exceptional performance" [Ref. 17]. It should be stipulated that there is no
one "best practice." What is good for one company is not necessarily good for another.
Every organization is different in some way. What is meant by "best" are those practices
that have been shown to produce superior results; selected by a systematic process; and
judged as exemplary, good, or successfully demonstrated [Ref. 17]. Best practices are
adapted to fit into a particular organization.
Camp contends that searching for a source (of best practices) of similar
processes in the same function, but outside the industry, is probably the most intense of
all searches [Ref. 21, p. 83]. However, this is where the most innovative practices are
likely to be found. A classic example of this is the comparison of Xerox's practices to
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those of L. L. Bean, which is still an enduring representation of the potential for
uncovering best practices [Ref. 21, p. 83].
Xerox initially sought companies providing like services and goods. They
were looking at the functionality of the companies and not the process. When Xerox
began to look at the process of fulfilling customer requests, it became clear that L. L.
Bean was a prime candidate to benchmark. Bean's process for placing customer orders
was three times faster than that of Xerox. Both companies fulfilled customer requests
based on size, shape, and handling characteristics and both realized that this was being
done manually [Ref. 21, p. 84].
A characteristic of all Best Practice companies observed, large or small, is
an emphasis on Competitive Benchmarking: comparing performance of
their products and services with those of world leaders in order to achieve
improvement and measurement progress. Show me yours and I'll show
you mine.
Author Unknown
3. Benchmarking Types and the Process
a. Types
According to Camp, there are four types of benchmarking: Internal,
Competitive, Functional, and Generic [Ref. 21, p. 16]. Each of the four types is based
upon the products and services, business processes, and performance measures that it
supports.
Internal Benchmarking is defined as the comparison among similar
operations within one's own organization [Ref. 21, p. 16]. The old adage that learning
begins at home certainly applies. Most organizations will begin within the confines of
their own companies in hopes that they will be able to identify internal best practices
before proceeding outward. Additionally, internal benchmarking assumes that there are
differences in work processes based on geographical location, organizational history, and
the nature of managers and workers in that location. If a best practice can be found
internally, the company can often apply these same techniques to other similar processes
within the company to realize a productivity gain. This internal knowledge becomes the
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new baseline for all subsequent investigations and measurements external to the company
[Ref. 4, pp. 16, 18].
Competitive Benchmarking is defined as the comparison to the best of the
direct competitors [Ref. 21, p. 16]. It involves identification of the products, services,
and work processes of the organization's direct competitors. The objective is to identify
specific information about a competitor's products, processes, and businesses results and
then make comparisons to one's own organization. Competitive benchmarking is useful
in positioning one's organization through its product services, and processes relative to
the marketplace [Ref. 4, p. 18].
Another advantage that competitive benchmarking provides is that lessons
learned from other companies can be applied to your own with little or no "translation"
[Ref. 4, p. 19]. In some cases, competitors may have already benchmarked their process
and would be willing to trade information. Competitors may have also joined forces to
participate in joint benchmarking projects in non-proprietary areas. An example of such a
consortium is SEMATECH. This group consists of fourteen American semiconductor
manufacturers including such companies as IBM, DEC, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard,
Texas Instruments, and Intel [Ref. 4, p. 19].
This can be one of the most difficult types of benchmarking to implement,
however. Companies have to distance themselves from the belief that all competitors are
their enemies, and refrain from viewing the effort only as an information security risk.
Companies and their employees must realize the fundamental difference between
benchmarking and a traditional competitive analysis [Ref. 4, p. 20]. By approaching your
competitor with an honest, open approach, you significantly increase the likelihood that
you will illicit the same response from him.
Functional Benchmarking is defined as the comparison of methods to
companies with similar processes in the same function outside one's industry [Ref. 21, p.
16]. It involves the identification of products, services and work processes of an
organization's direct competitors. The objective of functional benchmarking is to
identify best practices in any type of organization that has established a reputation for
excellence in the specific area being benchmarked [Ref. 4, p. 21].
The word functional is used here because at this level most benchmarking
involves specific business activities such as finance, marketing, sales, or engineering.
Hence, most functional experts limit their benchmarking investigation to areas of
functional expertise.
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Generic Process Benchmarking is defined as the comparison of work
processes to other organizations that have innovative, exemplary work processes [Ref. 21,
p. 16]. The word generic is used here to suggest "without a brand." This is consistent
with the idea that this type of benchmarking focuses on excellent work processes rather
than on the business practices of a particular organization or industry [Ref. 4, p. 21].
b. Process
Robert Camp has meticulously incorporated his knowledge of
benchmarking at Xerox into the ten-step process listed in Figure 4.2. This diagram
illustrates how these steps of the benchmarking process fit into distinctive phases. It
should be noted that there are actually five phases of benchmarking in this model. The
last phase, Maturity, is a systematic endeavor where the aforementioned steps will have
to be continually achieved and reworked. Once this has been done, only then can the
company realize maturity.
The first of the benchmarking phases declare that a decision on what to
benchmark must be made. Careful consideration should yield the largest opportunity to
improve the performance of the organization. This requires identifying the key work
processes, prioritizing and selecting the vital few, and then flowcharting them for analysis
and comparison of practice [Ref. 21, p. 19]. The decision on what to benchmark may
also mean evaluating products and services, support functions, organizational
performance, or strategy. Whatever the case, people are often surprised at the quality and
quantity of information that is available to those who make a serious effort to find it [Ref.
4, p. 28].
Second, the benchmarking target must be chosen. This is accomplished by
determining which other companies employ superior work practices that can be adapted
or adopted [Ref. 21, p. 19]. However, this does not necessarily mean looking within your
own industry. It has been said that Remington Firearms benchmarked a popular
cosmetics company to discover their process for manufacturing lipstick applicators.
Remington later applied the newly acquired information to their process for
manufacturing shell casings resulting in more accurate bullets when fired.
Third, plan and conduct the investigation. Determine what data is needed
and how to conduct the benchmarking investigation. Observe the superior practices
firsthand and document the best practices found [Ref. 21, p. 19]. Investigation can be
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conducted in many different fashions with interviews being one of the more useful
methods. Probably the best utilization of time and effort would be a telephone interview.
Spendolini asserts that the telephone is the benchmarker's most valuable tool [Ref. 4, p.
153]. This is due largely in part of the economics of the situation. It is far less expensive
to conduct a telephone interview than it is to conduct on-site visits and is particularly
useful when a large number of contacts must be made to collect information. Another
advantage to conducting telephone interviews is the fact that they can increase your
workday by a few hours. This due largely to different time zones. By conducting a
benchmarking interview from the East Coast to benchmark a company on the West Coast,
you have effectively gained a three hour window in the afternoon in which to conduct
interviews at the end of your work day. Lastly, telephone benchmarking also provides
flexibility regarding place and attire [Ref. 4, p. 154]. One can make a benchmarking
interview from just about anywhere in any attire to the person of company they wish to
contact.
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Figure 4.2 - The Formal, 10-Step Benchmarking Process [Ref. 21, p. 20]
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Figure 4.3 - The Five Phases of the Benchmarking Process [Ref. 21, p. 21]
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Difficulties can often arise from conducting telephone interviews. The most
notable of these are when the interviewee does not return a call or when the caller is
unprepared. Either of these situations make it difficult to collect the proper information,
if any at all. In the case of the later, Spendolini makes the following recommendations
regarding telephone interviews. [Ref. 4, pp. 153-157]
D Prepare ahead of time. Have a list of questions and put them in a logical
sequence. This helps keep the conversation on relevant subjects. In this thesis
research, we put together a list of about ten to fifteen questions to ask the
customer. These were based mostly on our understanding of the SEMP
process, which gave us further insight into the emergency response process of
the civilian agencies we studied.
D Develop a list of preferred contacts. Organizing a list of preferred contacts
reduces the time spent in navigating through the organization.
D Coordinate your calling with other team members. Ensuring that only one
benchmarking team member calls a particular source (person) help to alleviate
repeatedly polling the same person for answers to similar questions.
Contact a specific individual. Knowing the names and titles of knowledgeable
sources helps to avoid wasting time by talking with people who don't
necessarily understand what information you are looking for. When in doubt,
ask for the public relations department; they usually have organizational charts
and information handy to aid in benchmarking.
D Explain who you are and why you are calling. This step helps to establish
credibility and puts the contact at ease. Explain the purpose of the
benchmarking activity, your background or the teams, and a brief outline of
the subjects you wish to cover.
D Feed information. To help orient the person you are contacting toward the
information you desire, it often helps to feed information to them. For
example, a brief description of the information previously gathered on the
company can be used to introduce areas where more data is needed.
Mention the source of your referral. This technique is a door opener,
especially if the source of the referral is a close, personal friend of the contact.
Make sure that you make exact reference to the person and companies that
have previously assisted you in your benchmarking effort if they are available.
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D Exchange information. Offer to exchange information or send a brief
summary of the results. This is an especially effective technique when
soliciting information from management consultants who make their living
dispensing advice. Many organizations will not give you information unless
you can provide them something in return.
D Give the other party a realistic estimate of the amount of time you require.
Avoid underestimating the time needed for the interview. Acknowledge the
time requirement and suggest multiple interviews as a way of coping with the
time constraints.
Follow up. Make sure to follow up with a thank you letter or email to those
individuals that made the benchmarking possible with their time and
interviews. Include a brief summary of your progress to date and offer to send
them the results of the finished product. Mention that you will be conducting
benchmarking projects in the future. This is one way to begin to develop your
own information network.
Fourth, an analysis of the performance gap must be performed. After completing
the benchmarking investigation and observation, develop a comparison between the best
practices and current work methods [Ref. 21, p. 19]. While the tendency in developing
the comparison is to focus on the negative gap (where performance, products
,
or services
are operating at a level below that of the organization being benchmarked), Spendolini
postulates that companies should focus on the positive gaps (areas where your company
has an advantage or is clearly superior to that being benchmarked) as well [Ref. 4, p.
176]. Companies performing this analysis need to consider factors influencing the
comparison results before attempting to draw a conclusion [Ref. 4, p. 178].
Fifth, project future performance levels. Decide how much the performance gap
will narrow or widen in the near future, and list possible repercussions for the
organization [Ref. 21, p. 19]. The gap analysis is the ultimate benefit statement for the
benchmarking effort, and, as such, will provide a source of energy and insight into the
potential for continuous improvement [Ref. 21, p. 136].
Sixth, communicate benchmarking findings and gain acceptance. Communicate
the findings to all those who have a need to know in order to gain acceptance and
commitment [Ref. 21, p. 19]. The final phase of the gap analysis is to prepare a report on
the best practice process and recommendations for its implementation. The purpose of
this report is to share the findings with the process owners and operators, upstream
customers, downstream suppliers and the benchmarking project's customer [Ref. 21,
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p. 158]. This report not only details the best practice process but also discusses the new
goals and objectives that would be set by adopting the new process.
Seventh, revise performance goals. Convert findings into operational statements
describing areas for improvement based on implementation of best practices in the
business process [Ref. 21, p. 22]. Thus, key business processes must be prioritized to the
most critical few, and the remaining processes scheduled for benchmarking and
improvement over an extended horizon [Ref. 21, p. 47].
Eighth, develop action plans. Create specific implementation plans,
measurements, assignments, and timetables for taking action on the best practices [Ref.
21, p. 22]. Ask if the action plan clearly shows the performance gap or if the action plan
was implemented. Ask on what basis the best practices to benchmark were prioritized.
Ninth, implement specific actions and monitor progress. Implement the plan and
report progress to key process owners and management [Ref. 21, p. 22]. Sustaining a
benchmarking process over an extended period of time includes securing external
assistance, developing a handbook for managers, showcasing success, and role modeling.
Additionally, benchmarking excellence should be recognized and rewarded [Ref. 21, p.
182].
Tenth, recalibrate the benchmarks. Continue to benchmark and update work
practices to stay current with ongoing industry changes. Determine where the
organization's status in its pursuit of quality and the implications for benchmarking [Ref.
21, p. 22].
4. Benchmarking Summary
Benchmarking is an ongoing systematic process to search for and introduce best
practices into an organization [Ref. 4, p. 9]. While the concept originated in the private
sector as a means to enhance or regain market share, the technique also has notable
benefits for government organizations.
One of the main benefits of benchmarking is that it allows organizations to
develop a better understanding of their key processes. Benchmarking highlights the link
between these processes and the outcomes they are designed to achieve. It allows
organizations to recognize the potential sources for performance improvement ideas,
including organizations that appear to be very different.
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Benchmarking has traditionally been used by managers to compare organizational
or program performance with market or field leaders. This comparative element of the
technique has been found to act as a driver for better performance, encouraging
experimentation and innovation in work practices. Benchmarking has also contributed to
improving departmental or agency performance information as well.
Additional incentives for government/military organizations is a strategic issue
presently being investigated by a number of governmental agencies [Ref. 22]. One of the
most powerful incentives may be introducing greater competition into the workplace.
Competition could be a strong incentive for managers to compare organizational or
program performance against other service providers. Financial incentives may also
prove useful in encouraging managers to further consider the technique.
Whether in the public or private sectors, benchmarking requires a culture that is
comfortable with the notion of comparison and creativity. Benchmarking calls for a
culture where managers are at ease with the notion that their organization may not be the
sole source of good ideas or so unique that they can not be compared with others [Ref.
22]. Ultimately, however, benchmarking is useless unless management can use it to
improve performance of its own processes.
B. BENCHMARKING CASE STUDY
In the previous section, we learn about the theoretical aspects of business process
benchmarking, its history, and how it is related to an organization's strategic objectives.
The following case study helps illustrate these concepts through an examination of the
SEMP as performed by a world-class civilian agency emergency mobilization process.
The CA-ARNG is, inherently, a very heterogeneous organization with a
hierarchically and geographically distributed process structure. The relatively large
number of processes being executed simultaneously make it necessary to categorize these
processes into one much larger process. We decided, with the help of the Guard's senior
leadership, that this all-encompassing process was to be that of emergency response
mobilization.
This process can be broken down into both state and federal mobilization.
Occasionally, the state and federal functions may be in support of the same mission. This
study focuses on the state side of the mobilization process, and in particular, the State
Emergency Mobilization Process of the Crisis Action Center (CAC). Specifically, this
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process has been compared to those of other "rapid response" centers in the civilian
private sector.
The following material details the process of benchmarking the organization,
using the model developed by Camp (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Only the first two phases
of the model. Planning and Analysis, will be presented here. The results of this
benchmarking will be combined with analysis and redesign of the CA-ARNG SEMP in
the next chapter.
1. Phase One: Planning
From the Camp model above, first, a decision must be made on what to
benchmark. With the help of the senior Guard leadership, it became clear that the one
process that would have the most impact would be the SEMP. All other processes within
the confines of the Office of the Adjutant General (OTAG) headquarters command
support this one process in some way. Considering that this process has already
generated a very positive reaction from similar organizations throughout the country and
the world, the team felt compelled to gain senior leadership buy-in and support. This was
deemed crucial prior to any diagramming, benchmarking, or redesign.
The search for an appropriate organization to benchmark was more difficult.
National guard units from other states were suggested, but none had the reputation for
being able to mobilize for an emergency as quickly as the CA-ARNG. Following some
preliminary research, it was decided that a civilian rapid response company would be
chosen solely on the basis of how it performed the mission. This was done with the full
understanding that this company would most probably be orders of magnitude smaller
than the Guard. However, research has shown that a benchmarking target is not
necessarily a larger organization. Smaller companies may be benchmarked to learn
process methods, a technique which often helps larger companies consolidate processes
and become more efficient. The company selected for benchmarking is the world-
renowned Red Adair Enterprise based in Houston, Texas, which operates in a broad class
of emergency response service providers. During the Persian Gulf War, his team of rapid
response firefighters was instrumental in extinguishing out-of-control fires in the oil
fields of Kuwait. Adair received high accolades from both the Royal Kuwaiti Family and
President Bush for a job well done.
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When the decision had been made on which company to contact, a preliminary list
of questions was developed to help chart the course of the interview. This list of
questions proved useful in facilitating the interview and helped to keep both the
interviewer and interviewee on track. The list of questions is as follows:
D Have you benchmarked your organization against peer groups or against
organizations from institutions competing in your market?
D What has been your experience in finding comparable organizations to
benchmark with?
D What or who has been your most successful source of benchmarking
information?
D What has worked well (or not well) in terms of benchmarking changes in your
organization's performance?
What is one example where you were particularly effective in dramatically
improving performance?
D In what area(s) would you like to see your organization benchmark itself in
the future?
If you agreed that your main process was mobilization, what would your sub-
processes be?
D Do you have a current diagram of functional flows and/or processes?
D What are your performance measurements?
What is your use of information technology as an enabler?
D Could you take me through your process flow?
D May we call on you again?
Although Adair Enterprises has since disbanded, one of its most successful spin-
off businesses, Boots & Coots International Well Control Inc. (B&C/IWC), home-based
in Houston, Texas, met the criteria for a benchmarking target. We also contacted a like
company called Wild Well Control to obtain multiple sources of benchmarking
information [Ref. 25]. Wild Well Control performs a service similar to that of Boots and
Coots.
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a. Boots and Coots International Well Control Inc.
The point of contact with Boots and Coots is Mr. Larry Flack [Ref. 24].
We were given this name by Mr. Dor'e [Ref. 23] of the former Red Adair Enterprises,
now called Global Industries. The initial topic of discussion was an exchange of
backgrounds. Mr. Flack stated that "Global emergency response companies specialize,
through their respective well control units, in responding to and controlling oil and gas
well emergencies, including oil and gas well blowouts, well fires, and marine oil spills, as
well as providing a complete menu of non-critical well control services." Without further
hesitation, the highpoints of benchmarking were discussed. Furthermore, we explained
that while the California Army National Guard does not entertain oil fires as one of its
state-related tasks, there is a strong correlation to methods used in fighting a forest fire.
Both require preliminary information, immediate mobilization of assets, and rapid
feedback as to the status of the emergency. The authors hope to show how the business
process of mobilization of these civilian companies can be applied to the Guard to reduce
cycle time.
The interview continued with a description of the B&C/IWC mobilization
process Referring to the process diagram (see Figure 4.4), the first process activity node
in the B&C/IWC mobilization process is customer validation. This activity is primarily
responsible for acknowledging the request for assistance/service and gathering the
preliminary data from the customer. Mission tasking is received from the customer via
phone or fax and the necessary prerequisite information is gathered and recorded on a
standard questionnaire. Information needs essential to successful mission tasking are
mission related information consisting of location and nature of event, time and type of
emergency, and a point of contact with phone number. Other essential details concerning
the situation may be prompted for after the initial viewing of the information. Customer
validation is important because it is the essential "go/no-go" step in the process for
commercial companies in the emergency response industry. Considering that the primary
motivator for these companies is financial gain, a quick determination of the customer's
ability to pay for services rendered must be made. The speed of this step depends on the
customer and his credit rating. If the customer happens to be one of the huge oil
conglomerates, like Exxon or Shell, then the process of customer validation and
verification becomes rather transparent. Under agreement, when these customers call, no
expense is spared to arrive on-scene in the most expeditious manner. If the customer
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happens to be less affluent, then a background credit check is done to ensure that the
customer possesses sufficient funds or assets to pay B&C/IWC. In atypical cases, letters
of credit can be drafted; in others where the customer cannot be expected to pay, service
is refused.
Organization and deployment is the second process activity. It consists of
alerting the members of the situation and orchestrating their efforts to arrive on-scene in
the most expeditious manner possible with the correct equipment at hand. Again, the
critical mission data that was received in the first process activity step is used again here.
Members of the team are informed via cellular phone or pager, as these are the most
direct means available and are recalled to the headquarters. Once there, a preliminary
plan of action is formulated and the team is then dispatched to the airport to charter an
aircraft that will be able to get them and their equipment to the emergency. At the
airport, specialized equipment is loaded onto the aircraft. Meanwhile, back at the
headquarters, the administrative staff is preparing visas to allow the team to enter a
foreign country should the need result and contacts the customer to dictate what
equipment will be needed upon arrival of the team. The organization process is two-part,
happening in two locations simultaneously: the team brings the specialized equipment to
the incident and the customer is expected to provide equipment that cannot possibly be
transported aboard helicopter, truck, or aircraft such as cranes or Caterpillar earthmovers.
The deployment component of this process activity takes less than 1 2 hours to arrive on-
station after notification of the emergency. Oftentimes, the emergencies take place on
off-shore oilrigs. Organization such as these have a letter of agreement with the Houston
airport to obtain aircraft in the performance of their duties.
Mission execution, the third and most important process activity, is
facilitated through the experience possessed by seasoned veterans that comprise the team
and the use of tested procedures that are constantly honed. It is the most critical step and
brings about the fruition of all the experience and training that these professionals have.
It is here where the initial assessment of the situation onsite will dictate a course of
action. Information needs in this step compare what was initially presented by the
customer, to what the emergency is now. By doing this preliminary investigation and
hedging their performance with the use of technology, more input can be provided to the
on-scene commander to make a decision. The team will send pictures back to the
headquarters, facilitated through the use of laptop computers and digital cameras.
107
Mission completion, the last step of the process activity nodes, is the
culmination of three sub-processes consisting of demobilization, feedback, and plan
revision. The most important piece of information that the team depends on is the final
word from the customer. The mission is complete only when the customer says it is.
This is facilitated via phone or personal visit. Upon word that the job is completed and
satisfactory to the customer, mission completion becomes three sub-process. The first of
these is the demobilization process and deals with cleaning and maintaining the
equipment so that it may be used for the next emergency. Although this is done as a
preparatory practice onsite, most of the work happens when the team returns home where
the equipment is actually cleaned and prepared for the next use. Feedback is the second
sub-process and consists of gaining customer comments on the service performed. These
are usually done by phone call, letter, or may be done onsite. Plan revision is the third
sub-process and is similar to the military's after action reports. It analyzes what went
well, what did not, and incorporates new, innovative procedures to use on the next similar
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Figure 4.4 - Mobilization Process for Boots and Coots [Ref. 24]
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b. Wild Well Control Inc.
Pat Campbell of Wild Well Control [Ref. 25] was interviewed as an
additional source of comparative information. This interview was structurally identical to
the previous one, and was used to validate the procedures stated by Mr. Flack. Mr.
Campbell seemed very apprehensive about the whole interview process and chose not to
answer certain questions. This is indicative of the stigma that is often associated with
benchmarking. There can be considerable resistance to benchmarking as many people
see it as a ploy to gain proprietary information or corporate secrets [Ref. 4, p. 20]. As a
result, we are unable to describe the emergency process employed by Wild Well Control.
Results such as these are to be expected in any benchmarking study.
2. Phase Two: Analysis
In the analysis phase, a determination of the current performance gap must be
assessed. This involves a comparison between the organization's products, services,
work processes, or results and those of the competitors or best-practice organizations
[Ref. 4, p. 176]. The objective of this analysis is to identify any type of performance gap
that exists. Most often, the focus is on the negative (i.e., where the internal process is
inferior in some respects to the external process being benchmarked). This is especially
true where performance, products, or services operate at less than the level achieved by
other organizations that have been benchmarked [Ref. 4, p. 176].
Special attention should be given when analyzing and evaluating benchmarking
data. Many factors have to be considered including trends, the efficiency of the process
when compared to competitors, the relative size of organizations and their revenue, and
how these statistics correlate with other bottom-line measures such as market share,
profitability and growth [Ref. 4, p. 178], Spendolini states that the message here is
simple: "Before attempting to draw conclusions from the results of benchmarking data,
consider the various factors that might affect the interpretation of the numbers [Ref. 4, p.
178].
Gap analysis, as Camp labels it, is missing what could be termed as a follow up
activity [Ref. 21, p. 134]. He asserts that this "activity" is what really yields results and
includes tracing the gap back to the business processes. However, this usually involves
mapping the processes and making the comparison on a process-to-process basis. As
such, this is where the Boots and Coots case analysis continues.
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Boots and Coots continues to be recognized as one of the front-runners in the
rapid response emergency mobilization process. Throughout the years, the skills they
possess, their method for arriving on-scene, and techniques that have been tested under
fire have proven the worth of this company. The success of this company can be
attributed to several traits.
First, this size of this company. B&C/IWC consists of about 20 members. Their
company is smaller than most others in the same industry. Being smaller allows this
company several advantages such as rapid dissemination of information, the ability to
mobilize quickly, and the ability to act more like a cohesive unit. With regards to rapid
dissemination of information, it has always been easier to pass information to a few
people than it has been to a much larger group. This is mainly due to how the company
expects communications to be carried out. B&C/IWC greatly endorses the use of cellular
phones and pagers for their employees, so that they may be contacted or apprised of a
situation on a moment's notice. Therefore, all members of the organization have the same
information at roughly the same time, thus reducing the time for "trickle-down"
dissemination of information that is inherent in hierarchical structures. Doing the same
with a large group would be expensive and extremely time consuming. Smaller
organizations also enjoy the benefits of being able to mobilize more quickly than larger
ones. Again, it is much easier to organize and deploy small units than large ones based
simply on the group dynamics present. Regarding cohesiveness, we feel that the word
team does this organization an injustice. They do not act like a team, but more like a
"collective entity." What transpires when an emergency is initiated is a swift and
seamless chain of events to get the team to where the emergency is.
Second, empowerment is used. B&C/IWC empowers its front-line employees to
a much greater extent than most organizations that have traditionally used a hierarchical
structure to dictate policy and performance. B&C/IWC relies instead on the cumulative
years of experience that the company possesses and empowers its employees to think for
themselves, take charge, and quell the emergency. Empowerment allows the front-line
employees to provide the company with positive performance effects in terms of cost and
cycle time. Since cycle time is a big performance measure for rapid response emergency
companies, it makes good sense to allow the employees to be empowered. By allowing
the employees to make decisions autonomously, cycle time can generally be reduced due
to the lack of handoffs inherently included with a hierarchical structure.
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Third, the process of mobilization is short. By having several letters of agreement
with various oil refinery companies, B&C/IWC can shave time off to responding to an
emergency. When these customers call, the team departs. Additionally, by being a
relatively "flat" organization (i.e., everyone is an equal), time is not lost in tasking
subordinates. Everyone knows their job, and when called, they are up to the task.
Fourth, is the use of technology. B&C/IWC may not be fully automated, but for a
small company, they leverage their use of technology well. For instance, this company
uses digital cameras to provide the customer and headquarters with a real-time
assessment of the condition of the emergency. Team members back at the headquarters
may also make suggestions if warranted. Portable laptop computers facilitate the transfer
of data via the internet by satellite or cellular phone when out in the filed.
Fifth, B&C/IWC de-emphasizes their traditionally reactive mode of operation.
They offer their customers an increased level of service that reinforces and enhances their
attention to safety while ultimately saving time, money, and most importantly, lives. At
the core of this approach is a harsh regimen of training. Their engineers work with
customers to identify potentially volatile situations and efficiently conduct pre-event
troubleshooting.
Lastly, the core competency of B&C/IWC is service. It remains the central focus
of what they do, why they do it, and who it is provided to. The diverse experiences and
depth of resources that this company possesses allows them to expand the business to
utilize the lessons they have learned from the many thousands of fires they have
extinguished.
C. SUMMARY
The search for proven strategies and practices that will result in quality
improvement, cost efficiencies, and customer satisfaction has never been more critical in
today's world of shrinking budgets. Benchmarking can provide the key to balancing
quality, performance, and cost. It is a powerful measurement process for examining
current operational functions and targeting these processes for performance
improvements.
Using benchmarking in planning allows your organization to make adjustments
and respond more quickly to change. Benchmarking of your organization and studying
the data can help you determine where performance deficiencies exist and help you find
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innovative and cost-effective approaches to making breakthrough improvements. Once
done, the organization may realize a new understanding of how benchmarking can help to
refocus resources for better results. As such, this overview of Benchmarking has been
provided to prime the members of the Guard to examine their own processes, canvass
other organizations for like processes, and apply that which has been learned as a possible
best practice. By benchmarking a world-class organization such as Boots and Coots, we
have seen how effectively a small company can respond to emergencies that would tax
organizations many times larger. Many of the innovative techniques and gains identified
by examining the B&C/IWC emergency mobilization process will be reintroduced in
Chapter V, as the authors attempt to integrate the best practices learned in this case study




The impetus for redesign is to align business processes with the overall strategic
plan of an enterprise. The previous two chapters provide the reader with the requisite
knowledge and tools needed to facilitate this change. While process innovation
encompasses envisioning new work strategies, designing process activities and
implementing change [Ref. 1, p. 2], benchmarking is used to help an organization
understand their own processes, so that members of the organization will be able to
canvass other organizations for like processes and apply best practices into their own
enterprise. Both process innovation and benchmarking are powerful performance
improvement techniques used in this chapter to propose redesign alternatives that offer
good potential to improve business processes of the organization.
Business Process Reengineering has become a crucial strategy for success in
today's increasingly competitive and changing environment. As reengineering has
evolved alongside the Information Age, the utility of information maxim [Ref. 26] has
driven industries to better exploit the growing amount of, and need for universal access
to, critical corporate information and data. As a result, information technology is shown
to be a key driver to reengineering success. Given the diverse set of information systems
present in the workplace today, distributed computing is noted to be the strategic tool for
supporting reengineering efforts.
The key to achieving reengineering success is making the firm's technology,
business, and organization components congruent with each other [Ref. 26]. With the
given set of business and organizational challenges, leveraging information technology to
transform today's heterogeneous, proprietary systems into an enterprise-wide, standards-
based open network is a critical initiative: the open information technology initiative.
Based on popular reengineering models, this initiative can be considered to be an
imperative.
This chapter integrates redesign tools developed by Davenport—Process
Innovation Methodology—as discussed above and Nissen—Knowledge-Based
Organizational Process Redesign (KOPeR) [Ref. 27]. A baseline process flow diagram of
the SEMP is presented and process measurements are defined for use with KOPeR.
Several redesign alternatives are developed through this analysis that offer good potential
to effect order of magnitude improvement in process performance.
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A. REDESIGN METHODS AND TOOLS
1. Hybrid Davenport - Nisscn Methodology
The integration of Davenport's process innovation methodology with
reengineering methods, tools, and techniques developed by Nissen [Ref. 28] represents a
hybrid methodology that we employ to analyze and redesign the California Army
National Guard SEMP. The methodology utilized is as follows:
D Conduct high-level process analysis
D Select high-level process for redesign
Describe current process flow
Measure baseline process
D Diagnose process pathologies and faults
D Identify enablers and transformations
Generate redesign alternatives
D Prototype and test redesigns
Our principal objectives for this chapter are to: 1) provide a theoretical
background that highlights the need for process thinking, 2) describe a methodology to
transform functional organizations to information age organizations, 3) provide the CA-
ARNG redesign alternatives for its key, high-level process (i.e., the SEMP), and 4)
demonstrate how process innovation principles can be applied to other processes beyond
the SEMP. Our intent is to educate key stakeholders of the importance of process
thinking, the need to redesign key processes, and the many elements of organization's
structure and culture to prepare it for the challenges it faces in the 21 st century.
2. Koper
KOPeR (pronounced "cope-er") is a proof of concept system for Knowledge-
Based Organizational Process Redesign. It captures process redesign knowledge from the
reengineering literature and practice through the use of twin taxonomies and production
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rules, and it supports a measurement-driven redesign method by employing measurement
to drive the diagnosis of process pathologies. The high-level redesign method is


















Figure 5.1 - KOPER Approach
KOPeR's graph-based measurement scheme utilizes attributed digraph
information from a represented process to drive its diagnostic inference. The steps
highlighted in bold text—measure configuration, diagnose pathologies and match
transformations—are accomplished automatically by the system. This graph-based,
measurement-driven method is unique among contemporary redesign approaches.
Indeed, the intelligent automation of key redesign activities such as process diagnosis and
transformation represents a unique capability of KOPeR. [Ref. 27]
A representative sample of heuristically useful measures and their graph-based
definitions are summarized below.
D Process size: number of process activities (count task nodes)
Process length: length of longest path (count task nodes in longest path)
D Process depth: number of hierarchical levels (count process levels)
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D Handoffs: number of inter-agent transfers of work (count number of traverses
of process work across different agent roles, departments and organizations)
D Feedback: number of quality/feedback loops (count number of cycles in
process graph)
IT-Support: number of process tasks supported by information technology
(count task nodes with IT-S attributes)
D IT-Communication: number of process communications supported by
information technology (count task nodes with IT-C attributes)
IT-Automated: number of process tasks automated by information technology
(count task nodes with IT-A attributes) [Ref. 27]
As noted above, KOPeR builds on the Davenport framework and is employed to
support process analysis and redesign of the CA-ARNG SEMP. Each principle step of
the hybrid Davenport-Nissen methodology is discussed in the following section. For
more information on KOPeR, see Nissen's dissertation [Ref. 29].
B. SEMP ANALYSIS AND REDESIGN
The following paragraphs describe our high-level approach to SEMP analysis and
redesign. Through a series of meetings at the 40 th Infantry Division (ID) Headquarters in
Los Alamitos, CA and the California Army National Guard Headquarters in Sacramento,
CA, the team conducted interviews with senior officers and staff non-commissioned
officers of the California Army National Guard. As described in Chapter II, the early
meetings provided the thesis team with insight into the direction that the thesis would
eventually follow: this study of the high-level SEMP process with analysis and
development of redesign alternatives. Once the reengineering direction is determined and
validated by key CA-ARNG stakeholders, a more focused approach is applied to gather
information. The following techniques are utilized: 1) focused interviews designed to
learn and understand the processes and how they relate to the organizational structure,
culture and other existing processes, 2) recovery of organizational documentation relating
to the Guard's strategy, current quality initiatives, process improvement activities and
technical infrastructure, and 3) first-hand observation of the organization at work during
both normal and crisis conditions.
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In general, all efforts are made to examine the CA-ARNG from a top-level
process perspective. First-hand observation, historical research, and current doctrine and
policy research have provided this team with a unique, outsider's perspective of the
California Army National Guard in operation. Specifically, the hybrid approach
described above is followed to obtain process-based information that forms the backbone
of this research. The principle analysis and redesign steps are described in turn.
1. Conduct High-Level Process Analysis
We begin by determining the key top-level processes of the CA-ARNG. This is
accomplished through a series of interviews with the leaders (or process owners) of each
top-level department of the CA-ARNG. Leaders are asked a series of questions (Table
2.3) designed to extract information relating to key activities that each of their respective
departments performs. In essence, we apply a "discussion facilitated" approach to
Harrington's method of having top executives identify the activities for which they are
responsible. [Ref. 1, p. 30] Table 2.2 describes the departments and key stakeholders
interviewed. The outcome of this first phase is an understanding of the top-level
activities of the CA-ARNG, who is responsible, and which activities provide the best
opportunities for dramatic performance improvement through process innovation.
2. Select High-Level Process for Redesign
The study of the high-level process analysis concludes with selection of the
California State Emergency Mobilization Process (SEMP) as the target process for
redesign. SEMP is chosen primarily due to its central importance to the Guard, its
mission, and how this process interfaces with the State and citizens of California. This
process alone, defines the one of the primary missions of the CA-ARNG:
Protect the public safety of the citizens of California by providing military
support to civil authority during natural disasters and other emergencies.
[Ref. 37]
Our intent is to select a process of great interest to the Guard and central to the
services they provide to the citizens of California. SEMP activities cut across nearly all
functional departments of the CA-ARNG Headquarters and the 40th Infantry Division.
The generic product of this process, disaster relief, is perhaps the most publicly well-
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known function of the Guard. The California SEMP is a well organized, highly effective
process that attracts the attention not only of citizens who benefit from its services, but
also other countries who study the process and people with the intent of emulating its
success in their own countries.
Based on interviews with key personnel responsible for the SEMP, we are
encouraged to conduct a study on exactly how they perform business and to recommend
how the process could deliver more value to its internal and external customers. Although
the current process can be considered "healthy," it is clear that through the use of
enablers, process performance could be significantly improved. We reason that even if
the results of the study produce no more than incremental improvements, its value-added
contribution to the Guard will be a more clearly understood process and an outsider's
perspective of the internal workings of the process.
3. Describe Current Process Flow
The baseline transformation approach described by Davenport requires us to
define the current configuration of the process. The details of these findings are
discussed in Section C of this chapter. In general, this process information is obtained
through focused interviews, group workshops, briefings and first-hand observations of
key SEMP personnel, primarily those in the Plans and Operations Section. During the
research, findings are documented continuously and fed-back to key stakeholders for
validation. The continuous feedback from stakeholders on our assumptions and findings
proves to be an invaluable source of guidance and education.
4. Measure Baseline Process
Measurement is of critical importance to understanding the baseline process
configuration. Once the baseline process is described and graphically depicted, we apply
KOPeR to measure the process. These measurements provide us with facts that allow
comparing baseline measurements to those of future redesign alternatives. Such baseline
versus redesign comparison is an invaluable tool that determines whether or not the
redesigned process provides improvement above the baseline process' performance, or,
merely a "warmed-over" version of the original.
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5. Diagnose Process Pathologies and Faults
This phase involves more detailed examination of the baseline process. Process
pathologies are diagnosed through the study of process flows, the information currently
used to make them work, and the technological enablers currently employed in the
process. Research pertinent to this phase is conducted using the information gathered in
the previous steps. The research team conducts a series of workshops to examine the
process work. Findings such as specific information utilized, technology employed, and
perceived pathology faults (issues that negatively impact the process' performance) are
listed by each process activity of the SEMP and are detailed in Appendix C. General
findings of the SEMP baseline process are described in Section C of this chapter.
6. Identify Enablers and Transformations
New technology, human resources and organizational structures are discussed
above as potential tools to aid in the redesign of SEMP. The team also studies successful
process-oriented organizations such as IBM, American Express, PeopleSoft, and Levi-
Strauss to gain insight into enabling technologies and organizational structures that these
organizations use. Leading edge research on various technologies such as intelligent
agents, decision support systems, expert systems, and Intranets are also considered for
their potential to dramatically improve performance of the SEMP baseline process. We
endeavor to think inductively about the potential of these technologies to aid the SEMP in
solving problems not yet identified, or at the very least to effect dramatic performance
gains.
Leading organizational culture/structural theories are also explored to develop
insight into process pathologies and possible innovations, particularly socio-technical
research (discussed in Chapter VI). The format of these theory-exploration sessions is
that of semi-guided brainstorming sessions conducted by members of the research team,
professors, and fellow students whose creativity and subject matter expertise in
organizational structure and technology provide enormous insight.
The outcome of this phase produces a set of enabling technologies and structures
that appear to offer good potential for performance enhancement while maintaining
acceptable levels of risk and ease of implementation. The spectrum of technologies and
organizational structures explored, which range from leading-edge to mainstream, are
used to generate three promising redesign alternatives in the subsequent step. Designs
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range from easily implemented (mainstream yet capable of potentially producing results)
to most difficult to implement (i.e., leading edge technology and infrastructure).
7. Generate Redesign Alternatives
To generate and articulate these redesign alternatives the research team utilizes the
visioning processes described by Davenport (Figure 3.7) to identify "new process
objective and attributes." Transformation enablers from above are identified and
"plugged-into" the process visioning methodology. Members of the research team
accomplish this generation of redesign alternatives through several intense workshops
over a period of three weeks. Multiple versions and iterations of the same process are
generated and reworked several times before deciding as a group on the three redesign
alternatives presented in this chapter. Details of these three process redesigns are
described in Section D. Additionally, best practices from the Boots and Coots case study
are incorporated as a "seed kernel" for the visioning process to aid in the development of
the redesign alternatives.
8. Prototype and Test Redesigns
The final phase of the hybrid methodology, prototyping and testing, is not within
the scope of this research due to time and resource constraints. Nonetheless, this remains
an important step in determining the feasibility of implementing redesign alternatives and
represents a logical next step for future research along these lines. Chapter III discusses a
basic prototyping methodology that can be utilized for this step. This phase also serves to
identify the risks involved with each redesign. By pinpointing hidden issues that might
not be discovered during the planning phases described above, innovation implementers
can more reliably anticipate and rectify potential problems with redesigns and their
implementation prior to the actual rollout of the new process.
C. BASELINE PROCESS
1. Baseline Process Description
The baseline SEMP process is delineated in Figure 5.2. In this schema, the level-
1 process activities are listed as a sequence of boxes at the top of the figure. Lower level
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sub-process flows are shown below the level- 1 process activities they support. For
instance, the SRCOM Mission Tasking activity, which is shown at level- 1, has two level-
2 sub-processes: 1) Aviation Mission Tasking, and 2) Ground Mission Tasking. The
level- 1 Mission Completion activity is similarly comprised of three, lower level sub-
process steps: Demobilization, Feedback, and Plan Revision. We use this same
convention for diagramming all process flows in this section.
The SEMP process begins with mission validation. This activity is initiated when
the CAC receives a mission tasking number from OES via one of two methods. The first
is through the use of the RIMS. As previously mentioned in Chapter II, RIMS is the
statewide workflow, messaging, emergency response tracking and reporting database
system. The RIMS tasking order arrives over the Internet to the CAC where it is tracked,
and based on the experience of the watch officer, it is assigned to the appropriate units.
The second method works in conjunction with RIMS and has been known to provide
advance warning of an impending emergency to the CAC before the RIMS tasking
number arrives in some cases. This simple, but effective method is the use of a phone
call. Based on the severity of the season (flood or fire), the Guard may have Liaison
Officers (LNOs) stationed at the OES to provide advance warning to the CAC of an
impeding emergency before the tasking number arrives. Although these phone calls
precede the tasking number by only a few minutes on average, this is valuable time that
the watch officer can use to validate whether the mission is legal, ethical, and if other
agencies have been contacted prior to the Guard. These decisions are based on the watch
officer's experience and upon procedure manuals that delineate guidance for providing
military support to civilian authorities (MSCA). MSCA is used only as a last resort, or if
the emergency is too great for existing assets to handle. If the mission meets the legal
requirements, the watch officer can utilize this added time in formulating a preliminary
plan of action, verifying the location and condition of assets, or validating his plan with
other personnel in the vicinity of the CAC and gain mutual consensus.
Information needs of the Guard for this activity are similar to those described in
conjunction with Chapter IV. They consist of location and nature of event, time and type
of emergency, and a point of contact with phone number. Guard-specific information
includes the legality of the mission, the mission parameters, the incident commander,
OES mission tasking number, and whether or not other state or federal agencies have
been contacted. This is a "Guard particular" activity which represents the critical "go/no-
go" step (i.e., it must be done). Recall the process examined in the B&C/IWC
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benchmarking study does not have a specific activity for this. RIMS facilitates
information technology communication and support in this step. Office tools are also
employed for information technology support. This process step concludes with a
handoff of information for the customer validation step.
The second activity in the SEMP baseline process is customer validation. Unlike
the B&C/IWC process activity by the same name, this is a process where the initial
information received by OES is validated by the customer. The Guard performs this
process because they are mandated to do so by their standard operating procedures (SOP).
This process is accomplished by a watch officer contacting the Incident Commander (IC)
to verify the request. This is usually done by phone or radio. The same information
collected in the mission validation step is used here. The CAC watch officer verifies this
information with the incident commander. Verification serves several purposes such as
to 1) ensure the information is correct, 2) receive updates by someone who is onsite, and
3) establish positive contact with an official at the emergency scene. However, this
activity appears to be a redundant step in obtaining and using information, and it is not
without faults, such as the lack of rich and timely information received through RIMS.
The Guard understands that more information, provided in a more timely fashion, could
reduce response time and possibly eliminate the customer validation step.
Additionally, having fewer points of contact with the customer could reduce the
chance of receiving conflicting information. Such information can cause confusion, and
thereby increase cycle time while the watch officer is sorting out conflicts. Cycle time is
a process measurement designed to identify how long it takes from input to output.
Alternatives such as these are examined in greater detail below. Customer validation is
also information-technology supported through the use of office tools such as word
processing programs to maintain a log. This process concludes with a handoff of the
information to the SRCOM step.
Senior Command Mission Tasking (SRCOM) is next in the line of process
activities and consists of using the established military hierarchy and protocols to task
units — senior to subordinate. The CAC watch officer calls and tasks the senior command
to perform a certain task. The mission related information is once again passed here,
resulting in one or more handoffs. Once this has been done, what happens next is
transparent to the CAC. The senior command now begins the process of determining
where and what assets are needed, and how to effectively mobilize them for this
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particular emergency. The emergency can now effectively go two different routes:
aviation tasking and ground tasking.
The first of the sub-processes residing within the SRCOM Mission Tasking
process is Aviation Mission Tasking. Once the emergency is determined to be a search
and rescue (SAR) or some other emergency where air assets are needed (e.g., such as the
decision to move people across impassable terrain), aviation assets are tasked. For
emergencies where fewer than five aviation assets are needed, State Aviation is the
primary agency tasked. If more than five aviation assets are needed for an emergency,
then the 40 th Aviation Brigade is called upon.
If the mission is not aviation related, or if the use of aviation assets is not
required, the 40th ID is called upon. This is basically the default tasking for a majority of
the state-related emergencies. In a few cases, the use of both aviation and ground assets
is required. In this scenario, both would be tasked according to mission requirements as
described above.
Organization and deployment is the fifth process activity in the Guard's SEMP.
Although this process is similar to the one used by B&C/IWC, the CAC is not really the
director for tasking the individual units. Instead, as mentioned above, the CAC tasks the
senior command, which subsequently tasks its subordinate units. Thus, this is another
transparent process to the CAC. For example, if the 149th Armor Battalion is needed, the
CAC would not directly task this unit. Instead, the tasking would come through the third
battalion, via the 40th ID. As a result, instead of having one handoff, there are now three,
resulting in increased cycle time.
In the case of the Operational Area Team (OAT) concept, which was recently
introduced this past winter season, the CAC tasks the OAT commander, who is provided
with the same mission critical information as above. Subsequently, the OAT commander
takes this information and prepares for the mission. The assets he uses to mitigate the
emergency are left to his discretion and are custom tailored to each emergency. OAT
units are designed for meeting current crisis needs, yet are inherently scaleable to meet
expanding mission requirements.
OATs consist of a Guard commander with enough assets and authority to provide
civilian officials with a solution to their mission-based needs. Assets are staged by
location and are ready to respond to missions when needed. Should these assets be
needed, they are able to respond more quickly than those that have not be pre-assigned
and that might otherwise need to be tasked through conventional military channels.
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Figure 5.2 - CA-ARNG SEMP Baseline Process
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In either variation of the tasking by the CAC, direct (OAT) or indirect
(hierarchical), the mission critical information is passed via telephone which consumes
precious time. The Guard is mandated to respond to emergencies in less than 24 hours,
and usually is able to respond in much less time. Due to the sheer size of this
organization and the dynamics of mobilizing such a large group, they are unable to
respond as fast as, for example, the Boots and Coots team (discussed in Chapter IV) to a
local emergency.
Mission execution, the most important step, is yet another transparent process to
the CAC. Once the individual units have been assigned by their respective SRCOMs,
they execute the mission according to the SOP relating to the particular type of mission.
At this stage, the soldiers have their "marching orders" and do not have to be told how to
accomplish their mission, only what that mission entails. Executing units report to the
SRCOM who relays the information to the CAC. The reporting relationship during the
mission execution was not entirely clear during the course of our research. For example,
we observed reports being filtered up through the chain of command from the executing
unit, to SRCOM, and then to CAC. This represents additional information handoffs that
might be eliminated through the use of technology (discussed in the Redesign Alternative
section below).
Mission completion, the last in the process, is very similar to the process used by
Boots and Coots which utilizes information technology support and communication
through word processing, spreadsheets, and email. It also consists of three sub-processes:
demobilization, feedback, and plan revision. Once a mission has been completed by the
units on scene, contact is made with the CAC who then signs-off the mission tasking
number as complete. The completion sign-off is sent via RIMS to the OES. If the unit is
no longer required for an emergency, demobilization takes place immediately following
task completion. It consists of cleaning and repairing assets and taking care of
administrative issues such as pay. Feedback is the second of the sub-processes. This is
basically a lessons learned session attended by officers involved in the operation being
examined. After action reports (AARs) are derived from an operation and designed to
highlight successes and problems. Feedback reports (AARs) are created by the use of
word processor programs and e-mail for submission from subordinate commands to their
seniors. Procedures identified as "working well" are then incorporated into the plan
revision sub-process. Plan revision, using office tools, is the culmination of the AARs
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and lessons learned, which is incorporated into existing operational plans to be used for
similar emergencies in the future.
Feedback and plan revision sub-processes are areas that require a closer
examination. Although the three sub-process sequence has been described by soldiers at
the Headquarters as very sequential, this team believes that many opportunities to obtain
feedback are missed. Demobilization is a matter of SOP and occurs after every operation.
However, it is unclear how feedback is received from the demobilization phase on an
ongoing basis. Furthermore, the feedback sub-process appears to be very limited in
scope, with an after action report (AAR) as its output. It is also unclear how plan revision
actually incorporates the output of feedback to develop an updated plan. Feedback and
plan revision will be discussed further in the Redesign Analysis section of this chapter.
2. Baseline Measurements and Analysis
Measurements of the CA-ARNG SEMP configuration are summarized in Table
5.1. Also noted in the table are the corresponding process pathologies. Using the above
mentioned KOPeR tool and the process diagram in Figure 5.2, the measurements suggest
that the CA-ARNG SEMP Baseline process suffers from four serious pathologies: 1)
sequential process flow, 2) excessive process friction, 3) inadequate IT communication
usage, and 4) absence of IT automation.
Measure Value Pathology
Parallelism 1.1 Sequential Process
Handoffs Fraction 0.455 Process Friction
Feedback Fraction 0.0 Satisfactory
IT Support Fraction 0.545 Satisfactory
IT Communication Fraction 0.273 Inadequate
IT Automation Fraction 0.0 Requires IT-S, IT-C first
Table 5.1 - Baseline KOPeR Analysis
Each of these measurements and pathologies suggests serious performance
implications. First, KOPeR has evaluated the SEMP baseline process as a sequential or
linear process. Sequential processes, by nature, take more time to complete than parallel
ones because each step is dependent on the one preceding it. A redesign transformation
128
called de-linearization involves rearranging a sequence of process activities to be
performed in a more parallel or concurrent manner. Process parallelism or concurrency
has positive performance effects in terms of cycle time and costs, when performed in
parallel as opposed to sequentially. This de-linearization redesign transformation affects
the sequence and flow of process activities, but not how or by whom they are performed.
De-linearization can significantly reduce process cycle time, particularly when high-level
process activities are delinearized. However, if two process activities are sequentially-
dependent, they cannot be performed concurrently. Instead, they must continue to be
performed in series. One test for sequential-independence is to analyze the inputs and
outputs from each process activity. Where the inputs to an activity are not produced by
the preceding activity, the two activities offer good opportunity to be performed in
parallel. [Ref. 27]
Process friction is deemed excessive because of the number of frequent handoffs
associated with this process. Reducing the number of handoffs would make this a
smoother, more fluid process, thus reducing the cycle time and friction. Alternatively,
KOPeR deems the baseline process "satisfactory" with regard to the number of feedback
loops and information technology support. Feedback loops are notorious for increasing
the number of handoffs because the process activity node initiating each feedback loop
must be revisited. Thus, by having a low number of feedback loops, unnecessary
information transfer is reduced, curtailing having to validate the information before it can
be passed through the process.
Information technology support involves the application of information
technology to support process activities. This powerful redesign transformation (i.e.,
enabler or change lever) can have positive performance effects in terms of cost and cycle
time, as computer-based tools can augment human performance in terms of memory,
speed, thoroughness and other attributes. For example, in the baseline process, the RIMS
program and use of desktop office tools such as word processing programs are used in
conjunction with human labor.
Information technology communication utilizes RIMS and is judged inadequate
by KOPeR due to shortcomings in distributing information. This is due to the infrequent
use of email or other means of electronic communication vice paper or voice
communication. By encouraging more communications through information technology,
it would help to transform the baseline process to one where cycle time and cost could be
reduced.
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The lack of information technology to automate this process is also a shortcoming
in the Guard. Automation saves time and money by replacing human labor, but it
requires substantial IT infrastructure. This powerful redesign transformation can have
positive performance effects in terms of cost and cycle time. Many of these benefits are
discussed in connection with the process redesign alternatives presented later in this
chapter.
3. Recommendations for Redesign Analysis
Based on the KOPeR redesign analysis, we recommend that the following be
considered: 1) De-linearize process activities to increase parallelism, 2) Look to
information technology to increase support to process communications, and 3) Look to
information technology to automate process activities.
As mentioned above, such process inputs must be sequentially independent before
de-linearizing them. Case managers or empowered case teams (discussed in the Redesign
Alternatives section of this chapter) could decrease friction and otherwise help to speed
up the process by decreasing the number of handoffs. The Guard could use these teams
as a source of expertise to task assets instead of having one person handle the situation.
Alternatively, and more importantly, the Guard needs to use information
technology to a greater extent. A partial infrastructure is already in place, but before
expanding this to a wider audience, the use of information technology to support and
facilitate process activities must be made a priority. E-mail and shared databases through
local and wide area networks are deemed essential. Workflow systems provide an
opportunity to share information based on the natural process flow.
Eventually, when the use of information technology for communications and
support is well established, automation tools that reduce or eliminate human activity in
the process provide the next opportunity for significant process improvement. These
tools generally require a substantial investment as well as an IT architecture that can
capitalize on its benefits. Automation tools, if implemented properly, can provide




Now that a general description of the baseline process has been presented, we
move on to the redesign process. Our "castle in the clouds" concept for the SEMP
process consists of envisioning an "ideal" process of the future. There are two generic
approaches available for this. The first is the baseline transformation (i.e., analyzing the
existing baseline process for pathologies and faults as described above); the second is
called the "greenfield" approach or "blank sheet of paper". This team has chosen a mix
of the two approaches. The greenfield approach lends itself to imagining a "castle in the
clouds" [Ref. 28]; a notional idea of how the new process will work. While these same
ideas may not even be attainable due to technological constraints, it provides an ideal
process that the organization might aim to develop and implement.
We envision that the SEMP will behave somewhat similar to a recent TV
advertisement statement that said, "we make large organizations move effortlessly like
small ones." In other words, how can we make the SEMP move more effortlessly like a
smaller process? The answer comes from the case study of the Boots and Coots
organization referred to in Chapter IV. By all accounts, this organization is able to
respond quickly due to its size. A smaller company can disseminate information quickly
to the "worker bees" effectively reducing the number of handoffs and time to respond to
the emergency. This represents a common theme driving the greenfield process
development.
Our objective is to make the Guard act like a smaller organization. In order to do
so, we must examine a high level view of the envisioned SEMP process. The next few
diagrams are provided as a cursory glance of the redesign process before the actual
details, enablers, and workflow methodology is described later in this section. Although
the process map for the SEMP baseline looks the same as those for each of the redesign
alternatives, the redesigns are actually much different, principally because the associated
enablers and their use through technology make them powerful agents of change. The
end result is a process map that looks the same, but performs far better that the baseline
SEMP. In Section 2 that follows, three basic redesign alternatives are presented in detail.
The process maps corresponding to these alternatives may be seen in full in Appendix C.
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Figure 5.3 below illustrates the Level diagram for our redesign alternatives. This
diagram represents the system's major processes and data flows. The input data flow of
this new redesign alternative is still the same as it was in the baseline process: a customer
request. By obtaining the input, the wheels are put in motion for the process of "solution
production and facilitation" to appropriately deal with the tasked emergency. From a
customer's perspective, this is what the mobilization process of the Guard is. The output
is customer satisfaction, or, more appropriately, a satisfied customer. This high level
thinking is analogous of a "black box." A single input is transformed into an output by








Figure 5.3 - Redesign Alternative Level
Many people may not be as concerned with what the output of the box is as much
as how the output is created. It is here where a drill-down methodology will facilitate our
discussion on this redesign alternative and its use of enablers such as technology, human
resources, organizational dynamics, and information.
Figure 5.4 illustrates Levels 1 and 2 for the SEMP. The decrease in the level of
abstraction (i.e., increase in the level of detail) provides the reader with an in-depth view
of the process structure as envisioned by the redesign team. Here we see that there are
really two processes: 1) validation and assignment of a solution, and 2) coordinate and
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facilitate services. Both are essential elements of the overall process of solution
production and facilitation. These two processes can be further subdivided or
decomposed into a level 2 diagram where we see that Mission Validation and Unit
Assignment are contained within the Validate and Assign Solution Process. Furthermore,
the Coordinate and Facilitate Services step in turn has three sub-processes occurring in
parallel. This greatly reduces the time spent waiting on a serial process. These sub-
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Figure 5.5 - Redesign Alternative Levels 2 and 3
In Figure 5.5 the lowest level of abstraction for this process is presented as
Mission Completion is displayed. It consists of three sub-processes: 1) Demobilization,
2) Feedback, and 3) Plan Revision.
2. Redesign Alternatives by Transformation Enablers
Three redesign alternatives are described in detail in this section. It is important
that the reader understand several assumptions concerning these alternatives. First, the
CA-ARNG role in general with regard to the SEMP is that of "solution provider." The
organization exists solely to solve problems and generate solutions to crisis situations.
The "solution" might be in the form of equipment and personnel augmentation, but
ultimately, everyone involved in SEMP must view themselves as knowledge workers
who produce a product: providing a solution to the current mission at hand.
Second, we find the majority of the work performed in the CAC relates to
identifying and validating mission numbers, identifying and tasking units (often through
SRCOMS), tracking (units, assets, crisis), reporting (watch officer, key personnel,
adjacent units, subordinate units, on-scene Guard commander), and coordinating the
overall emergency response effort. Additionally, mission quality, customer satisfaction
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and the success of the process improvement and feedback activities are also part of the
CAC's responsibility during the SEMP.
The redesign alternatives developed are based on the primary functions and
responsibilities of the CAC and its role in the SEMP. While they acknowledge the
current situation, these alternatives also look ahead to the future. The three redesign
alternatives are summarized at a high level in Figures 5.6 and 5.7.
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Figure 5.6 - The Redesign Matrix (continued)
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The figures depict three redesign alternatives generated through the hybrid
method from above with visioning process descriptions (e.g., attributes, objectives,
measurements, critical success factors, and potential barriers to implementation) derived
from Figure 3.8. The use of Davenport's visioning process was primarily responsible for
aiding us in developing process redesign alternatives. Although process components
identified through visioning (the greenfield approach) are critical to developing the
redesign alternatives, an understanding of the baseline pathologies and faults (the baseline
transformation approach) helps provide more specific direction in making these redesigns
capable of order-of-magnitude performance improvements.
The figures depict a progression of three redesign alternatives, from the least
dramatic to the most radical redesign options, as read from left to right (see top row in
table). Thus, the first or leftmost redesign represents the least radical combination of
change levers and is expected to be the easiest (i.e., least painful in terms of cost, risk and
organizational change) to implement. The "radical" and "most radical" redesign
alternatives combine more powerful transformation enablers to achieve greater
performance.
Each redesign alternative is discussed in the following paragraphs by defining the
specific classes of enablers (e.g., technology, human resources, de-linearization,
organization structure, and information). To minimize repetition and redundancy, we
highlight and focus on the differences between the three redesigns, both when compared
to the baseline and each other.
a. Technology
Technology enablers described in Alternative One (Least Radical) offer an
expanded use of current technology and the introduction of new technology. In the
baseline configuration, RIMS, a Lotus Notes workflow application, delivers OES
emergency mission requests to the CA ARNG CAC. Based upon these requests, the
CAC watch officer either tasks the SRCOM or State Aviation based upon mission type
(SAR, flood, fire, civil disorder, other). RIMS does not presently provide any decision
support or ability to access unit, personnel or equipment status of the CA ARNG. In
Redesign One, RIMS would be modified to capture and represent specific information
designed to provide the watch officer an at-a-glance view of a current emergency
response mission. Although RIMS presently provides information relating to SITREPs
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and logistics requests, it does not yet provide (according to our baseline observation)
specific views and information based upon the watch officer's information requirements
when monitoring and facilitating the Guard crisis response.
The development of integrated databases, which provide access to specific
information (e.g., personnel, vehicles, aircraft, unit, supply, etc.), is a powerful enabler of
this least radical redesign. The baseline configuration presently does not use databases to
aid in the emergency mobilization process. Although stand-alone databases exist
throughout the Guard to support functional areas, none are integrated to provide support
of the mobilization process. It is envisioned that databases would be developed to
support all Guard processes by storing information requirements common to these
processes. Specifically, the integrated database would be populated with current and
accurate information such as personnel availability, supply stocks, and the number and
location of operational vehicles, all easily obtained by CAC personnel. Database access
would aid CAC personnel in quickly making asset tasking decisions (among many other
types of decisions where soldier and other asset information is required), thereby
ultimately contributing to the reduction in response time.
Another manner in which technology has precipitated the development of
Redesign One is through the introduction of communication and information system
access at the incident level. In the baseline process, information from the incident scene
is communicated primarily by telephone. This limits the richness of the information that
can be provided. The communication and information system "package" is envisioned as
a suite of equipment made available to the Guard emergency response commander that
ultimately provides a bi-directional flow of information. The package would contain a
laptop or palmtop computer, voice recognition software, digital camera and a wireless
data transmission capability with statewide access to the Guard's network. The
commander would be able to provide digital SITREPs generated with voice recognition
software, capture the incident scene with digital pictures or streaming video, and request
assets via digital asset request forms.
The flow of information from the incident scene and the CAC would be
conducted through a SEMP Intranet designed to display tactical and strategic information
for the emergency response commander and SEMP support personnel. Logistics request
status (e.g., a system similar to the Internet based FedEx tracking system), intelligence
(e.g., weather, civilian authority reports, external agency reports, Guard generated
intelligence reports, etc.), and other information would be displayed on the Intranet. In
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essence, the SEMP Intranet provides seamless access to all Guard information technology
systems. No such system presently exists in the baseline SEMP configuration.
The technology enablers in Redesign Two (Radical) incorporate the same
technology described in Redesign One, along with the addition of: 1) an expert system
and 2) a near real-time crisis tracking system. In Redesign Two, an expert system would
generate unit tasking alternatives based upon mission type (SAR, flood, fire, civil
disorder, other), unit and asset availability, and proximity to emergency. Mission
requirements processed by the expert system are presented to watch officers as decision
alternatives. In this configuration, the watch officer directly tasks the units themselves
(discussed in greater detail below).
Expert system decisions are based upon custom designed decision-making
algorithms that model human decision making criteria. The expert system is fed by
Guard-wide integrated databases that maintain accurate information on unit availability,
equipment and personnel status. The system also maintains detailed information on
standard issues that accompany any mobilization, thereby providing not only decision-
making alternatives but also important information captured from logistics, operations
and intelligence experts. With the unit tasking alternatives presented, the CAC watch
officer would decide which of the tasking alternatives to choose. Once selected, the
system would automatically notify the tasked unit via pager (auto-notification to key
personnel pagers), a telephone call to the unit, and remote system notification alarms (a
capability soon to be made possible by RCAS data connectivity).
Once the tasked unit has deployed, the CAC coordinates and monitors the
progress of the mission. This is accomplished through a near real-time crisis tracking and
reporting system that monitors mission progress and tracks logistics support requests.
Through the use of an advanced near real-time tracking and reporting system, CAC
personnel and other senior officers can graphically track mission progress. The system
would display position location of mobile assets (e.g., via a Global Positioning System
(GPS) application similar to the type used by United Parcel Service to track vehicle
location), mission epicenter, and a snapshot of the critical mission related information.
The near real-time system is a tool that displays, in rich graphics, an at-a-glance picture
of the "battlefield" with "drill-down" capability for more refined information.
The expert system and near real-time tracking system are two new
technologies that are dramatic departures from both the baseline process and Redesign
Alternative One. The baseline does not utilize any technologies of a decision support tool
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like the expert system nor does it employ the use of an advanced crisis tracking and
reporting system. Although RIMS in the baseline provides views that present unit
assignment, SITREPs, and other crisis operations related information, it does not present
it in the manner the new crisis tracking and reporting system proposes.
Redesign Alternative Three (Most Radical) introduces three new enabling
technologies differentiating it from the baseline process and both Redesign Alternatives
One and Two: 1) an intelligent agent-based decision support system, 2) a real-time crisis
tracking and feedback system, and 3) a decision modeling system. In this conceptual
design, decision making for basic unit tasking and logistics request processing would be
fully automated through the use of a Decision Support System (DSS), utilizing
intelligence gathering agents—software entities that assist people and act on their behalf.
CA-ARNG units would be automatically tasked by the Guard DSS based on mission
request and relevant CA-ARNG parameters (i.e., human decision making criteria, ICS
Policy, MSCA Policy, unit, personnel, and equipment availability, proximity to
emergency, etc.). The DSS would therefore task the appropriate assets and personnel
from locations it chooses. The DSS would also automate mundane tasks such as
processing logistics requests for additional assets, people, equipment, and aircraft and
updating database repositories. Notice the DSS is making tasking decisions in this
redesign alternative.
Additionally, the DSS would update the intelligent agent-based real-time
crisis management system and vice versa Although similar to the application of the
crisis management system of Redesign Alternative Two, Redesign Alternative Three
employs intelligent agents and a real-time crisis feedback system (as opposed to the near-
real time system and no intelligent agents described in Redesign Two). This real-time
system would instantaneously display, to management, feedback of the crisis operation,
such as real-time tracks of airborne and ground assets, weather reports, and other
intelligence information. Additionally, the technology utilized for a real-time versus the
near-real time system is inherently more complex. In essence, the envisioned DSS would
provide centralized tasking, coordination, and monitoring of emergency response
operations.
Through the use of advanced decision modeling software (Redesign
Three), decisions could be optimized through repeated trial and experimentation, thereby
actually testing decisions based on a variety of scenarios. Stochastic modeling tools are
now being utilized to train decision makers, test decisions prior to implementation, and
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notify leaders of potential situation developments based on complex mathematical
algorithms. A stochastic model application built for the CA-ARNG and fed by real-time
intelligence information could present leaders with "advanced warnings" of events based
on their probability of occurrence. This type of tool could be invaluable in defeating
emergencies or at least minimizing their impact. Imagine a tool that would notify the
CAC when the probability of a major fire or flood occurrence based upon predetermined
probability threshold alarms (e.g., when the probability of an event occurring reaches
80%, notify CAC with a threshold alarm). Civilian agencies could be notified and a
mobilization warning order could be issued. Optimized decisions or advanced warning
would help to produce Guard asset packages designed to provide the incident commander
the exact "solution" required for the emergency as well as drastically decrease the cycle
and response time to the emergency.
b. Human Resource Enablers
Redesign Alternative One introduces the notion of two new human
resource positions: empowered solution providers and information specialists. The
empowered solution provider is essentially a Guard commander with appropriate assets
and autonomy to provide civilian authorities solutions to their mission requirements.
This concept is similar to the baseline process Operation Area Team (OAT) concept, in
which assets are pre-staged and ready for use (discussed in Section 2 of this chapter).
However, the empowered solution providers have the power and available assets to make
broad-based decisions relating to crisis resolution. New technology described in
Redesign Alternative One enables the empowered solution provider to do this by
satisfying critical informational needs (e.g., timely and accurate intelligence, timely
resolution to resource requests) at the incident scene. By focusing on the information
requirements of the empowered solution providers, the CAC enables the onsite
commander to make quick decisions and provides supply requests as well. The
empowered solution provider would attain new levels of operational independence, to
include access to all Guard resources at his or her discretion.
To aid in the acquisition, synthesis, storage, and presentation of
information, an information specialist role is also introduced in Redesign Alternative
One. The information specialist would focus on processing information requirements
(discussed below in Information Enabler section). Specifically, the information specialist
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would synthesize information related to the operation such as telephone conversations,
radio reports, think-tank discussions, external agency reports, and situation reports from
the field according to specific criteria. By having specialists trained in extracting relevant
meaning from raw information and producing targeted knowledge, decision makers (e.g.,
CAC watch officer, empowered solution providers, CAC staff) could devote more
attention on the operation itself, thereby allowing the CAC watch officer to focus on the
mission accomplishment issues.
Redesign Two incorporates the two aforementioned human resource
enablers with the addition of a crisis generalist role. The generalist would be responsible
for overall coordination of a particular mission. The generalist is someone who is
experienced in all aspects of the SEMP process and perhaps even a functional specialist
in one or more of the functional categories (combat arms, logistics). The position is
designed to reduce the need for numerous logistics, intelligence, administration, and
combat arms and other functional area specialists through the use of an expert system
built to capture knowledge from functional experts. Crisis generalists make decisions and
recommendations in support of the solution provider and/or watch commander. This
could reduce the personnel required to be physically present in the CAC during
operations and provide a central, empowered authority on all matters pertaining to a
single operation. Crisis generalists could then focus solely on the success of the mission
by meeting solution providers requests, delivering updated information, and making top-
level decisions relating to the specific operation.
As discussed in Alternative One, an information specialist would also be employed to
synthesize all sources of information directly related to the process's information
requirements. Information ready for consumption by decision makers will allow the
crisis generalist to focus on broad mission accomplishment issues. The crisis generalists
have no equivalent in the baseline process or Redesign Alternative One. The generalist
position is analogous to a case manager role designed to collapse multiple human
functions into a single, all encompassing role, enabled through the use of an expert
system. The expert system would provide detail-level access to specific areas of the case
(i.e., emergency) as well as procedures to resolve common case-related issues.
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c. Organizational Transformation Enablers
Organizational enablers contribute significantly to redesign alternatives
generation. Redesign Alternative One introduces several organizational change enablers
not present in the baseline process: 1) elimination of the chain-of-command tasking, 2)
reshaped traditional reporting relationships, 3) alignment of the SEMP to solution
development and facilitation, 4) shifting of the CAC role from manager to coordinator
and facilitator, and 5) continual organizational feedback. Redesign Alternative One
introduces the elimination of SRCOM tasking in emergency response missions. This
represents a significant departure from the baseline process. In this redesign, tasking
takes place centrally, from CAC directly to the system-identified unit. Direct tasking
significantly reduces unnecessary handoffs among various departments and commands
within the CA-ARNG. Handoffs relating to unit tasking are deemed non-value-added
because they do not significantly contribute to the process output of mission completion
and customer (where the customer is defined as citizens impacted by the emergency,
civilian authorities, and soldiers) satisfaction.
Due to the elimination of SRCOM tasking, traditional reporting
relationships must be redesigned. Redesign One implies that traditional reporting
relationships between tasked units and senior organizations are significantly reduced as a
means to reduce redundant information and eliminate non-value added relationships
during crisis response.
Distilled to its core function, Redesign Alternative One indicates that the
SEMP would direct all its people, technology and organizational structure to focus on
ensuring the success of the Guard commander conducting emergency operations. In other
words, all activities are designed to achieve SEMP alignment to the output of customer
satisfaction (i.e., mission resolution). The mindset of the SEMP personnel would become
more akin to that of a corporate service process designed to produce a value-added
service product to its customer. The SEMP is, in essence, a service process, designed to
develop a solution in the form of a customer tailored Guard emergency response team and
then apply all resources as needed to ensure customer satisfaction. This would be
accomplished by providing the solution provider (Guard commander at the incident
scene) with accurate and timely information, equipment assets, and general support. This
will allow the commander to focus on producing the outputs of the process: mission
completion and exceeding customer expectations.
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The CAC's primary role in the SEMP now becomes that of facilitator and
coordinator. CAC is the "eyes and ears" of the Adjutant General (TAG); as such, it is
concerned with coordinating the accomplishment of the mission without producing non-
value added overhead. Facilitating information and asset requests from the empowered
solution provider while coordinating (when required) the delivery of these requests is the
primary CAC responsibility aside from unit tasking. The facilitation and coordination
role also implies a "think-tank" function, where potential mission developments can be
postulated and notional solutions developed.
The continuous feedback identified in Redesign One is considered an
organization enabler. Feedback on the operation would be continuous. With the
availability of communication technology and information systems, solution providers
and information specialists would receive feedback on internal and external customers
needs. For example, during the demobilization phase, structured feedback sessions would
be conducted with representation from all key stakeholders and an emphasis on the
external customer. The goal of these sessions is to develop action plans to correct agreed-
upon process faults. Feedback sessions would create an empowered team, whereby the
team has the authority to take corrective action through policy and plan modification.
Feedback might also be gained through on-line forms filled-out by internal and external
customers. This highly dynamic process is designed to review all known process
activities, measurements (discussed below) and customer feedback. It uses this feedback
to produce meaningful information, which allows team members to make educated,
performance-driven decisions to improve the overall health of the process. The lack of
feedback in the baseline SEMP is viewed as a critical deficiency; increasing this valuable
enabler will shift the focus towards customer satisfaction.
Redesign Alternative Two incorporates each of the organizational enablers
described earlier with the addition of: 1) the reduction of functional-based staff (Jl, J2,
J3) positions in CAC, 2) the decreased human role in formulating routine decision
alternatives, and 3) shifting the organizational mindset to from crisis response to crisis
prevention. With the introduction of the crisis generalist, the need for a large functional
staff decreases. This would potentially allow a CAC staff reduction during crisis
operations. The generalist position also allows end-to-end oversight and feedback from a
specific operation. Functional experts would focus on information accuracy,
administrative process activities that aid the SEMP, the execution of specific mission
areas, and support the generalist when issues are beyond their ability to solve it.
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The second redesign also implies a decreased role in human decision
generation. With the use of the expert system, decision alternatives are generated.
Generalists or watch officers task units based on one of the decision alternatives.
Humans would no longer be required to gather the information needed to formulate
decision alternatives. This represents a dramatic departure from both the baseline process
and Redesign One.
Finally, Redesign Two introduces a cultural paradigm shift that impacts
organizational behavior and structure. Shifting the mindset from reaction to prevention
produces creative initiatives designed to prevent or minimize crisis impact. A suggested
manifestation of the new mindset is the creation ofjoint-agency prevention teams. These
teams would be designed to develop action plans and acquire funding for projects and
other initiatives designed specifically to reduce the impact of future crises (fires, floods,
civil disorder, weapons of mass destruction). It is envisioned that this team would
assemble innovative members of participating joint-agencies (i.e., CA-ARNG, CDF,
OES, Highway Patrol, FEMA, etc.) with the goal of ultimately preventing a crisis from
beginning in the first place. For example, by quantifying the total loss of property and
the cost of solving a crisis, funding for dam shoring, forest clearing, fire breaks,
additional rangers, advanced technology, and perhaps increasing use of civil air patrols
over potential fire and flood areas, the Guard could proactively work to prevent many
emergencies. Prevention teams would also foster a closer working relationship among
key agencies often required to work together in combating an emergency situation. In
short, the prevention teams would be proactive rather than responsive. Prevention is
ultimately the best defense against a emergency situation.
Redesign Alternative Three incorporates the organizational enablers
described in Redesigns One and Two. However, it makes the most radical departure from
the baseline process in that it proposes elimination of the human role in routine decision
making altogether. Redesign Three proposes the implementation of an advanced decision
support system with intelligent agents. The full use of this system would completely
eliminate the need for human decision making on routine matters such as unit tasking and
supply request processing. The elimination of human decision making will produce
enormous changes in the SEMP process; based upon factors such as ownership, trust in
the decisions themselves and organizational culture. The salient issues surrounding the
ramifications of the DSS are discussed in subsequently in greater detail.
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(L Information Enablers
Redesign Alternative One introduces the concept of information
requirements. By defining the specific information required by the SEMP at all levels of
the process, this information can be acquired, stored and presented in a variety of systems
and formats. This supports the redesign of the SEMP by distilling the vast amount of
information communicated in a crisis into a set of key information requirements. We
view an information management process like that described above as a critical success
factor that would negatively impact the SEMP if not addressed. Redesign Alternatives
Two and Three both view defining information requirements as an essential element in
SEMP process performance. Compared to the baseline process, no known work has been
done to define information requirements at any part of the SEMP.
e. KOPeR Comparisons ofthe Redesign Alternatives
This section provides quantitative support for the redesign alternatives
presented in the aforementioned paragraphs. Beginning with the baseline process
mentioned in Section C of this chapter, the KOPeR measurement techniques have been
applied to the redesign alternatives to provide measurable tracking of the power of
redesign technology and organizational enablers. Below are the KOPeR measurements of
the least radical redesign alternative.
Measure Value Pathology
Parallelism 1.2 Sequential Process
Handoffs Fraction 0.167 Satisfactory
Feedback Fraction 0.0 Satisfactory
IT Support Fraction 0.75 Satisfactory
IT Communication Fraction 0.75 Satisfactory
IT Automation Fraction 0.0 Inadequate
Table 5.2 - Redesign Alternative 1 KOPe I Analysis
When comparing the SEMP baseline with the information provided above
for Redesign Alternative One, the parallelism of this redesign has increased over the
baseline from 1.1 to 1.2 resulting in a gain of 9%. While this may seem like an
insignificant amount, it does offer marginal improvement over the baseline process. The
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redesigned process performs more steps in parallel than that of the baseline, thus reducing
the number of handoffs and effectively reduces the cycle time required to respond to an
emergency. The real benefits of this redesign are in using information technology as an
enabler. The use of this enabler helps to make the organization more efficient by
allowing direct access to data vice "trickle down" dissemination, which often results in
delays and the loss of meaning. Workflow has decreased the number of handoffs and
resulted in a 63% decrease over the baseline. As evidenced by the KOPeR measurements
above, the use of information technology support and communication have each
increased to 0.75 resulting in gains of 37% and 75% over the baseline, respectively. This
is due in large part to the deployment of the RIMS system to the unit level, and the
increased functionality described in Redesign One. By doing so, valuable time is not
wasted on trying to access this information.
Recall that in Redesign Alternative Two, the use of information
technology automation is introduced. Although automation is present only to a minimal
degree (i.e., through expert system), it does provide improvement over Redesign One and
offers substantial performance enhancements over the baseline process. The
corresponding KOPeR measurements are presented below.
Measure Value Pathology
Parallelism 1.2 Sequential Process
Handoffs Fraction 0.167 Satisfactory
Feedback Fraction 0.0 Satisfactory
IT Support Fraction 0.917 Satisfactory
IT Communication Fraction 0.917 Satisfactory
IT Automation Fraction 0.25 Satisfactory
Table 5.3 - Redesign Alternative 2 KOPei^ Analysis
Automation requires substantial information technology support
(capabilities) and a robust communication infrastructure. As such, the measurements in
the information technology support and communication categories, when compared to
Redesign One, have increased by roughly 22% while automation has dramatically
increased from zero to 25%. Additionally, all of the pathologies are now deemed
satisfactory by the KOPeR analysis tool. This essentially represents a "clean bill of
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health" by KOPeR. Should the Guard opt to implement this radical redesign alternative
from the start (i.e., skip Redesign Alternative One), they could realize substantial gains.
When compared directly to the baseline process, Redesign Alternative Two yields an IT
automation with a 174% increase. Other areas of significant improvement are the 63%
decrease in handoffs, and the 68% and 174% increases in information technology support
and communication, respectively.
In the Third Redesign Alternative, automation is given a top priority. The
measurements are depicted below.
Measure Value Pathology
Parallelism 1~2 Sequential Process
Handoffs Fraction 0.083 Satisfactory
Feedback Fraction 0.0 Satisfactory
IT Support Fraction 0.917 Satisfactory
IT Communication Fraction 0.917 Satisfactory
IT Automation Fraction 0.583 Satisfactory
Table 5.4 - Redesign Alternative 3 KOPe I Analysis
The measurements from this table represent the last of our three redesign
alternatives and offers further improvement over the other two redesign alternatives.
While it is difficult to improve much on the dramatic gains made possible through the
other redesign alternatives, we believe this third redesign to represent the future end state
the Guard should strive to achieve. Although it still remains impossible to predict with
certainty the nature and time of a crisis, it is possible to reduce the amount of time
required responding to an event. Evidence confirming this is presented in the above chart
where the number of handoffs is decreased by 50% to .083 percent from .167 percent.
This effectively results in a corresponding decrease in cycle time. Information
technology automation has increased with the introduction of a decision support system
utilizing intelligent agents realizing a net gain of 133%.
3. Performance Objectives
The performance objectives described for each of the redesign alternatives are
developed during process visioning sessions like those depicted in Figure 3.8. These
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objectives answer the question, "How well will it work?" Generic categories such as cost
reduction, customer satisfaction, information quality, and cycle time are derived from
Davenport and recommendations are shown in Figure 3.8. In order to be meaningful,
performance objectives must be assigned quantitative targets like those described in the
three redesign alternatives. Quantitative targets are developed based upon what we
believe would produce order-of-magnitude process improvements (i.e., generally
objectives that target over 50% increase in performance).
Each redesign alternative identifies five generic performance objective categories:
1) cost analysis or reduction, 2) customer satisfaction, 3) information quality, 4) cycle
time, and 5) response time. In the following paragraphs, each objective category is
described with quantifiable targets for the three redesign alternatives.
a. Cost Analysis or Reduction
The first performance objective targets the identification and reduction of
process costs. This includes analyzing not only the cost of equipment and soldier
deployment such as fuel costs, maintenance cost, material expenditures, and soldier pay
but also the cost of the process activities expended in coordinating the emergency
operation. Redesign Alternatives One and Two target the implementation of a new cost
analysis system within one year. This objective recognizes the effort required to capture
and quantify process costs to include training and actual deployment of the costing
procedure. This is reflected in the objective to increase awareness the importance of
process costs and make the actual costs understandable (referred to above as "cost
visibility") to decision makers. Once this has been accomplished, key process executives
and managers can begin to pinpoint areas for improvement based on the total cost of
"doing business."
Redesign Three is more ambitious due its targeting of actual cost
reduction. Specifically, it proposes a reduction of emergency response costs by 25% in
two years. This target is selected due to the radical design of the process (i.e.,
combination of change levers) and the potential for cost saving. The recommended
methodology is Activity Based Costing (ABC), a Department of Defense endorsed
methodology used to capture and quantify process oriented costs.
150
b. Customer Satisfaction
The next performance objective focuses on the achieving greater levels of
customer satisfaction. Redesign Alternatives One, Two and Three have the same
customer satisfaction targets. Specifically, considering that there is no data on actual
levels, we feel customer satisfaction should first be measured and can then be increased
through process innovation by 90% in two years for each of the redesigns. The 90%
target represents the kind of performance improvement targets required for process
innovation and serves as an aggressive target against which redesign teams can assess
future improvements.
This target could be reached by 1) engaging customers in meaningful
dialogue and quantifiable feedback measurements, and 2) delivering flexible solutions, on
time, to customers. Customer satisfaction could be measured by surveys to target
performance improvement opportunities. Feedback forms could be provided to
customers on a web-site with weighted categories to quantify qualitative input (e.g.,
outstanding equals a point score of 5). More dynamic input should be obtained through
formal feedback sessions where participants (internal and external customers) focus on
quality and performance issues.
c. Information Quality
Information quality represents a performance category designed to focus
the organization on the critical role information quality plays in process performance.
Redesign Alternatives One and Two target an increase in information quality by 80% in
two years. No information is provided in the Baseline process regarding information
quality. However, once it is assessed, 80% represents a bold target designed to push
SEMP process workers toward the notion that information quality begins with the
individual worker. This target could be reached by first defining information
requirements, and then acquiring, synthesizing, storing, and presenting rich information
in an accurate, timely and easily accessible manner.
Information quality measurement represents a new area of measurement
research. Many new metrics are being developed and represent an area for future thesis
research and implementation. However, survey forms similar to the type mentioned
above might be employed to develop a baseline understanding of how customers feel
about the quality of information they receive. Responses in the area of information
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quality may produce extremely useful data for analysis and information to help IT
executives plan for increased utilization of their respective resources.
d. Cycle Time
Cycle time is a process measurement designed to identify the elapsed time
between process input and output. One definition of cycle time for the SEMP begins with
mission order number receipt and ends when the tasked unit actually deploys to the crisis.
Redesign Alternative One targets a reduction in process cycle time by 50% in one and a
half years. This number reflects the possible cycle time reduction commensurate with the
enablers described in Redesign Alternative One. Further, based on more significant
change enablers, Redesign Two targets a 75% cycle time reduction in one and a half
years, while Redesign Alternative Three targets an 80% reduction in two years.
These targets could be achieved by significantly reducing or eliminating
non-value-added processes and handoffs. In Redesign Alternatives Two and Three, for
instance, crisis generalists and advanced technology (expert system and decision support
system) would assist in reducing non value-added activities and processes. Additionally,
the introduction of parallelism in normally sequential processes can play a major role in
reducing cycle time.
e. Response Time
Reducing crisis response time can produce significant performance
improvements for the Guard. We define this measure beginning from the time the
assigned unit is tasked until the main-relief effort arrives on scene. The response time
improvement targets vary with the degree of change enabler severity (i.e., the number and
type of change enablers applied). Redesign Alternative One targets a 40% reduction in 1
year, Redesign Two a 50% reduction in 1 year, and Redesign Three a reduction of 60% in
1 year. We believe these targets represent moderately aggressive targets that could be
realized when the process is fully implemented. Reducing response time provides one of
the most significant tangible impacts on external customers.
4. Critical Success Factors
Critical success factors (CSF) are also developed during process visioning
sessions like those depicted in Figure 3.8. CSFs answer the question, "What things have
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to go right?" This is an important element in a process innovation plan, as it identifies
the issues most central to the success of the process. Generic critical success factors,
derived from Davenport's recommendations described in Figure 3.8, are applied to three
categories: 1) people, 2) technology, and 3) product. These factors are also developed
through brainstorming sessions and represent a best effort approach to identify the key
issues.
a. People
Of the many critical success factors relating to people identified in the
three redesign alternatives, the two most salient are: 1) understanding human roles in the
process, and 2) the need for qualified people to develop, implement, and manage the
process and technology. The roles of people in the process must be clearly identified.
This implies that like other enablers, people must know how their performance impacts
the process as whole. They must see themselves as critical element in the system and
identify with their responsibilities. Individual and group performance objectives, tied to
credible and tangible incentives, will significantly increase the productivity and
satisfaction of people in the process.
Related to understanding the roles of humans in the process is the need to
have qualified people to perform process work. In essence, training and hiring of
qualified people based upon clearly defined skill sets (i.e., the types of skills workers
must possess in order to be successful) for process workers is deemed essential to the
success of the process.
b. Technology
Technology critical success factors are also numerous, each defining
issues that must be addressed in order to realize performance objectives. Three CSFs that
apply to all three redesign alternatives are particularly important: 1) new technology must
utilize existing infrastructure, 2) data must be accessible at all levels of the organization,
and 3) databases must be integrated and information kept current.
The use of the existing infrastructure is central to the success of any
technology implementation in the SEMP. The Guard has invested heavily in recent
years to develop a robust communications infrastructure. All systems that are targeted for
implementation must be capable of utilizing the infrastructure. Additional investment to
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increase the capabilities of the infrastructure is viewed as financially and technically
impractical, however.
The implementation of this new infrastructure makes it possible to provide
communication and information services at the lowest unit level. In the new process, all
process workers must have access to information technology in order to perform their
roles. This is particularly critical at the incident scene, but more technically challenging
as well. However, by not providing access to all process workers and the crisis solution
provider in particular, the process will be incapable of reaching its performance
objectives while leaving many critical workers "out of the loop". This perpetuates the
state of information "haves" and "have-nots", ultimately impacting worker satisfaction
and product output.
The critical of importance of integrated databases and information
maintenance cannot be overstated. If the information is to be of value to the process, it
must be accurate and easily accessible for all who require the information. Databases
must be built with technology that is scalable and capable of storing and accessing a wide
variety of data formats. Furthermore, identifying information requirements and building
robust databases that support the storage of this information is essential to process
success.
Redesign Alternatives Two and Three must also have the correct system
decision-making parameters. Both the expert and decision support systems require
algorithms that model human decision making criteria in order to produce accurate
decisions that take into account human factors. Redesign Alternative Three must also
have intelligent agents that can search, process, and deliver information required by the
system users. Without the proper technology embedded in these tools, they serve no
purpose and therefore significantly decrease the likelihood that their stated performance
objective can be reached.
c. Product
Two critical product success factors common to all three redesigns account
for the most significant impact: 1) empowered solution provider, and 2) well trained
soldiers. The output of the SEMP, mission accomplishment, should exceed customers'
expectations of service. As stated in all redesign alternatives, SEMP is essentially a
process designed to produce a service. That service is packaged in the form of a solution
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provider, tailored to satisfy customer requirements. Critical to satisfying customer
requirements is to empower the solution provider with broad access to resources and the
authority to make on-the-scene decisions. We view establishment of the empowered
solution provider role, along with resources and authority, as essential to the success of
all redesign alternatives. Nothing short of full autonomy within the mission requirement
parameters will allow the Guard commander (solution provider) and his or her soldiers to
achieve their full potential.
Closely related to the success of the empowered solution provider is the
requirement to field only well trained soldiers. A force of qualified, professional soldiers,
skilled in their respective military occupation specialty (MOS), is how the Guard truly
impacts the citizens of California. This is perhaps the most critical among all success
factors. Without qualified, competent, and professional soldiers, the Guard has far more
serious problems than non-optimized processes.
5. Potential Barriers to Implementation
The potential barriers to implementation of the three redesign alternatives are
developed during process visioning sessions depicted in Figure 3.8. These objectives
answer the question, "Why might they not go right?" Generic potential barrier categories
are derived from Davenport's recommendations shown in Figure 3.8. Each redesign
alternative identifies six generic potential barriers to implementation categories: 1)
resource allocation, 2) organizational, cultural, 3) technical, 4) product factors, 5)
environment, and 6) information. In the following paragraphs, each objective category is
described with targets that vary by redesign alternative.
a. Resource Allocation
Resource allocation barriers encompass a wide range of issues. However,
two issues emerge as the most critical: time and money. All three redesign alternatives
can be equally affected by these constraints. Lack of time to implement any of these
redesigns could be a product of poor planning or operational commitments taking priority
over the process implementation. And funding is nearly always a constrained resource.
A successfully redesigned SEMP implementation requires funding for training,
technology, infrastructure, and personnel. The critical nature of these two resources and
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their inherent volatility (i.e., propensity to rapidly change) make these two resources
potential barriers to implementation.
b. Organizational, Cultural
Cultural and organizational barriers preclude any change from happening
smoothly. Whenever there is change, cultural resistance is never far behind. This is a
universal reality common to all redesign alternatives. Furthermore, those intimately
familiar with the current process may not perceive the need for change or may not be
willing to share their responsibility and power with the new culture of the empowered
solution provider.
Redesign Alternative Two could meet additional resistance beyond that
described above with regard to the creation of the generalist role vice the traditional
functional roles prevalent in the CAC. The generalist position allows for a reduction in
human labor, which might upset the balance of power within the organization. Further,
redesign Alternative Three fosters a reliance on technology for decision making and in
some routine decisions, eliminates humans entirely. This may seem too radical to most
people, especially those who have risen through the ranks who may not want to allow
technology to make decisions formerly done by unit commanders.
c. Technical
Technical barriers to implementation are characterized by an ever-
increasing need for more bandwidth, the difficulty in building and implementing a
technological infrastructure, and the interoperability among software applications
(databases in particular). These barriers can appear in any of the redesign alternatives and
can impede progress. In Redesign Alternative Two, for example, the feasibility of
implementing leading edge technology becomes an issue. As with any implementation of
new technology, adequate time may not have been allotted to properly test and verify the
new technology. The possibility exists that the technology may not yet even be
demonstrated, as is the case of Redesign Alternative Three. Intelligent agents exist, but




Potential barriers to implementing the product can be distilled to two
primary factors that potentially impact all three redesigns: 1) inaccurate information,
which leads to a poor solution and unsatisfied customer, and 2) soldiers not having the
proper military skills. Quality information has been described in the aforementioned
paragraphs as being directly tied to a quality product. The product can be considered as
both the development of the Guard response and the process output of a satisfied
customer. In either respect, inaccurate information would lead to both a poor Guard
response and ultimately an unsatisfied customer.
e. Environment
Environmental barriers to implementation may be defined as those issues
outside the actual SEMP, yet that would negatively impact the process if not
accomplished. No environmental barriers were identified in connection with Redesign
One. However, alternatives two and three share 2 potential barriers: 1) unwillingness of
external agencies to share information, and 2) prevention initiatives may be viewed as
unfeasible. Alternatives two and three require information from external agencies such as
weather, intelligence reports and other information important to a successful product. If
these agencies are unwilling to provide access to their information, or allow Guard
systems developers to create links to their information, the entire SEMP process could be
deprived of its required external information.
The notion of developing initiatives that target crisis prevention may be
deemed as too "far fetched" to obtain needed executive support for team establishment
and funding. The idea of being able to prevent crises or take action based upon
probabilistic occurrence represents a foreign concept in the minds of most veterans within
the Guard culture. Because the prevention concept is unusual, it faces a significant
barrier in the form of resistance by those who deem it infeasible.
/ Information
Information barriers to implementation describe issues that impact the
ability of information to support the SEMP. Two barriers common to all redesigns
represent the most significant issues: 1) improper identification of SEMP information
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requirements and 2) timely flow of accurate information. In order for SEMP workers to
perform functions as knowledge workers (i.e., workers who are empowered with
information and knowledge about their role in the process), information requirements
must be identified throughout the process. This requires a thorough analysis of the kinds
of information people need to perform their jobs. Information requirements identification
is also critical to constructing robust information systems that can capture data based on
the requirements of the process. This in not a simple endeavor and is therefore deemed a
potential barrier to a successful process implementation.
Tightly coupled with the identification of information requirements is the
ability to communicate timely and accurate information throughout the organization.
Inaccurate information negatively affects the process. Accurate information that is not
communicated in a timely manner adds no value to the process if it cannot be utilized at
the decision point. Accuracy is ultimately the responsibility of each process worker (to
include executives). The timeliness of the information is related to the ability of the
information to be synthesized, stored, and made available to the user. The difficult nature
of training process workers to be information managers as well as the technical (e.g.,
performance of the system and network) and human issues (e.g., information synthesis)
related to timeliness and speed of information delivery make these issues potential
barriers to process implementation.
E. SUMMARY
This redesign phase of the thesis culminates six months of process analysis of the
California Army National Guard. We discussed our use of a hybrid methodology based
upon Davenport's high-level approach to process innovation as a means for conducting
the CA-AJRNG process analysis and redesign. A thorough examination of the baseline
process was undertaken to discover existing process pathologies and faults. Utilizing
KOPeR, the baseline was measured and redesign recommendations were presented.
During our examination of the State Emergency Response Process (SEMP) we
made several assumptions regarding the role of the CAC. The SEMP is essentially a
service production process. Specifically, the CAC develops a solution (Guard's
emergency response package), and coordinates the delivery of the tailor made solution
based on external customer needs. The majority of the work performed by CAC relates
to the tasking, tracking, reporting, and coordinating Guard emergency mobilization. The
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performance and quality of the solution package and ultimately the output of the SEMP,
customer satisfaction, fall under the responsibility of the SEMP owner, the Director of
Plans and Operations. Based on these assumptions, the thesis team developed three
redesign alternatives that address these roles and responsibilities.
Redesign One represents the least radical redesign alternative, but it still offers
good potential for performance improvement. It utilizes RIMS in an innovative way to
assist in the tracking of the crisis. In addition, the redesign describes how the SEMP
Intranet could be used to harness other applications and information and make it available
to SEMP solution providers and process workers. Unit tasking is direct from CAC to an
available unit. Empowered solution providers deploy with custom tailored solution
packages organized by region, all of whom posses the basic capabilities needed for the
most common types of emergencies. Guard "solution providers" are aided by a
communications and information package that facilitates the collection and dissemination
of information to include intelligence information and logistics requests. Information
specialists assist information collection and disseminating activities by fusing structured
and unstructured information into a usable product based on mission needs and generic
information requirements. The performance objectives focus on increasing the
availability of cost information, dramatically reducing cycle and response time while
increasing information quality.
Alternative Two is a considered a radical redesign based on its use of cutting edge
technology to automate many routine processes (tasking, tracking) and reduce the
personnel requirements of the CAC. An expert system was introduced as a tool to
generate tasking decision alternatives for the watch officer's approval. A near real-time
crisis information system coordinates and facilitates the command and control functions
of emergency mobilization. Near real-time feedback displayed in a graphically rich
manner would help crisis generalists and watch officers track the progress of the
operation. The system's primary focus is to ensure that the solution provider is supported
with accurate information and timely resolution to logistics requests. The notion of
agency prevention teams is discussed in this design. Prevention teams are based on a
proactive approach to prevent crises before they are able to develop. Cost reduction and
dramatic reductions in cycle and response are the objectives driving process performance.
The third alternative is the most radical redesign, primarily due to use of leading-
edge technology and the complete elimination of routine decision making related to unit
tasking and logistics requests. The decision support system automatically selects a course
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of action based on mission requirements then seamlessly tasks a solution provider. It is
envisioned that additional assets would be processed in a similar manner to goods ordered
on the Internet, where requests for goods are submitted by customers who are also
provided an expected delivery time and a tracking number. CAC personnel would be
released from traditional functions to focus on managing information quality and
supporting the empowered solution provider. Alternative Three also prescribes the use of
advanced probabilistic modeling tools to examine potential decisions and provide
advanced warning of possible emergencies based on their probability of occurrence.
All three redesign alternatives are designed to introduce innovative practices and
approaches to the SEMP. These recommendations reflect over a year's worth of contact
and with and study of the CA-ARNG, and reflect the assumptions and relatively unbiased
viewpoints of the thesis team as well. The ideas explored in this chapter are inherently
provocative since most of the redesigned process characteristics are based on an external
perspective. As such, recommendations are not limited to traditional notions of
organizational structure, reporting relationships, and cultural boundaries. The three
redesign alternatives are compared, in detailed chart form, in Appendix C to provide the
reader another view of how the alternatives are similar in many respects and yet different
in their application of technology, human resources, organizational structure, and
information management enablers of process innovation.
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VI. CHANGE MANAGEMENT PLAN
With the three recommendations for process redesign provided in Chapter V, the
primary research questions posed by the thesis have been answered. However, for any of
these redesign alternatives to be successfully executed, more will be required than just the
blueprint for the new process. A means for introducing, organizing, administering and
monitoring the change inherent in the redesigned process is needed - in short, a change
management program.
Without a doubt, the need to effectively manage and facilitate organizational
change is critical to the success of any new program. Business process innovation
requires organizations to leave behind the comfortable, known ways of doing business; it
requires management and individuals to think as process owners, to think about intra- and
inter-organizational boundaries in new ways. Repeatedly, it has been found that the main
barriers to process innovation are organizational, not technical. Making things even more
difficult is the fact that there are as many reasons for organizational change, and
particular methods of implementing change management programs, as there are
organizations performing these programs. Even so, certain basic fundamentals are found
in all change management programs. This chapter examines two central models of
change, highlighting the essential characteristics as well as advantages and disadvantages
of each. It then presents some of the factors that typically affect organizational change,
including critical success factors necessary for any change program to succeed. Finally,
characteristics of an information-age organization, based on socio-technical systems
design principles, are addressed. We follow this discussion by incorporating these design
principles into a change management plan through the use of parallel learning structures,
a method especially well-suited for the implementation of reengineered processes. We
conclude this chapter by describing a high-level framework for utilizing a parallel
learning structure within the CA-ARNG. Team composition, organizational change
roles, and possible resources needed in order to implement the redesign alternatives
proposed are discussed.
A. CHANGE MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
As leaders of many types of organizations today have discovered, guiding an
organization - whether a corporation or a brigade - requires new kinds of thinking and
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new ways of doing business. One major trend is the reduced reliance placed on
management authority and formal rules and procedures. Top-heavy, bureaucratically
choked organizations are struggling to streamline their structures, decision processes, and
work processes in order to become more agile in the extremely competitive markets of
the information age. These companies are examining the narrow definitions of work
created during the industrial age, and finding them lacking compared to the requirements
of work in the information age, as discussed in Chapter III. Emerging from this analysis
is the concept of teams organized around work processes, as opposed to isolated
individuals working in very narrowly-defined jobs in an assembly-line type structure.
Teams offer significant advantages over the old way of doing work. They share
information more effectively, manage themselves internally, cross-train and educate their
members independently according to the specific demands of the process they own, and
generally feel tremendously more significant to the overall organization. As a result,
responsibility and authority are being delegated farther down into the organization's
hierarchy than ever before. Organizations are becoming "process-driven", where the
requirements of the business drive inter-relationships and reporting roles. However, these
changes are not happening overnight, nor are they occurring without significant effort. In
order to be truly successful it also requires one other crucial ingredient - a change
management program. [Ref. 31, p. 158]
Depending on their fundamental approach, most change management programs
will fall into one of two broad categories. These are top-down or management driven
change, and bottom-up, or participative change. The defining difference between these
two extremes lies in the manner in which they initiate and propagate change, as opposed
to the ultimate goals of the change programs used by each. The sub-sections below
highlight the central principles of each approach, beginning with top-down change.
1. Top-Down Change
Top-down or programmatic change programs fundamentally begin with the
attitudes and beliefs of individuals. Changes in attitudes produce changes in behavior.
Changes in individual behavior repeated by many individuals will result in organizational
change [Ref. 31, p. 159]. In order to effectively lead change and revitalize an
organization, the impetus, vision, and overall stewardship must come from the senior
management/leadership of that organization. Although many of the activities performed
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and roles assigned during this type of program are identical to those in a bottom-up
change effort, the primary difference is ownership of the overall change process. In a
top-down strategy, these functions belong to the top management of the organization.
Change management here is treated as a directed process, with the Commanding
Officer/Chief Executive Officer and other senior leaders in the organization orchestrating
it through a sequence of planned steps in order to bring about the desired end-state. In a
model suggested by Kotter [Ref. 32, pp. 59-67], there are eight primary phases during a
transformation process, each critical to the success of the overall effort. A brief
description of this model follows.
a. Establish a Sense of Urgency
The leader or a small group of senior management individuals within an
organization begins this step by becoming aware of issues negatively affecting the
organization's performance. These issues may arise out of the organization's competitive
situation, trends in technology, market position, or financial performance. Although
these measures address commercial business, corresponding factors for military
organizations include changes in operating environment, missions, threat profiles, new
weapons systems technologies, new training methods and procedures, changes in
readiness status due to manpower fluctuations, decreased budgets, and others. An
unflinching examination of the organization and it's overall vital signs is crucial at this
stage in order to demonstrate a need for change.
Next, this need must be communicated in the strongest possible terms to
the entire organization. Everyone must be made aware of the absolute necessity of
achieving significant improvement; the status quo must be made to seem more dangerous
in comparison. Organizations which falter at this stage often fail to generate a sufficient
sense of urgency, and therefore lack the inertia to move people out of their "comfort
zones" [Ref. 32, p. 60]. Based on his observation of various change efforts over a period
of some years, Kotter estimates that successful change efforts were those in which at least
75% or more of middle management were convinced that the status quo had become
untenable. [Ref. 32, p. 62]
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b. Form a Powerful Guiding Coalition
The role of a guiding coalition is to guide the overall transformation
process. Specifically, it should maintain the impetus behind the process, remove
obstacles, monitor results, ensure that progress and decisions made during the effort are
communicated to the rest of the organization, and plan the organization's new strategies.
In large organizations, this body needs between 20-50 members in order to achieve
critical mass [Ref. 32, p. 62]. For an organization such as the CA-ARNG, that number
would certainly be larger. As the guiding coalition tends to operate outside the normal
hierarchy of the organization, it is capable of accomplishing acts the normal bureaucracy
cannot produce. The difficulty in this stage is developing a powerful enough coalition to
overcome the inevitable resistance any serious change effort will encounter. Also, it is
crucial to place a line officer/manager in charge of this effort. Programs lead by a staff
division (such as human resources, information systems, etc.) will never achieve the
power required to truly institutionalize the changes. [Ref. 32, p. 62]
c. Create a Vision
At the heart of a successful change effort is a strong guiding vision, one
that inspires customers, employees, and management alike. The vision must be clearly
defined, easily communicated, and must completely incorporate the desired direction for
the organization. Without the right vision, a program can disintegrate into unrelated and
ineffectual improvement programs.
a\ Communicate the Vision
Kotter states that unsuccessful change programs typically under-
communicate the vision by factors of 100 to 1000 [Ref. 32, p. 63]. Every single available
channel must be maximized in order to really get the message across effectively.
Newsletters, meetings, and speeches are not enough. The vision must be incorporated
into the hour-by-hour work of everyone in the organization. Individual and unit
performance reviews, strategy planning sessions, routine meetings, and question and
answer sessions should all tie into the vision. The actions of senior management,
especially, must reflect adherence to the common vision. This step should be continuous
throughout the life of the transformation. [Ref. 32, pp. 63-64]
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e. Remove Obstacles to the New Vision
Obstacles may come in a variety of forms, from narrow definitions of
work, outdated compensation or performance review methods, or personnel who simply
refuse to support the change effort. Individuals causing problems need to be treated fairly
and in keeping with the vision; they also need to be given a chance to accept changes.
Those not responding to the new vision and change effort will serve as counterpoint to
the types of performance, capabilities, and attitudes expected in the new organization.
Removing them will send the organization a powerful message - top management is truly
committed to the change effort.
/ Planfor and Create Short-Term Wins
Motivation is a serious concern for a change effort and can be a significant
boost or impediment, depending on how the program is handled. The identification and
successful realization of short term goals are critical to maintaining a high level of morale
over the long haul faced by real change efforts (anywhere from 12-24 months or perhaps
longer). While the long-term focus must be maintained, proving positive results that can
be achieved through the selected course of action is necessary to keep members interested
and motivated to continue. The level of urgency must still be maintained. Therefore, the
"low-hanging fruit" of the change program should be used as signposts of the successful
beginning of the change effort. [Ref. 32, p. 65]
g. Consolidate Improvements and Produce Still More Change
The basic task in this phase is to continue to execute the program, and not
celebrate victory too soon. Many organizations fail during this phase, citing short-term
wins as evidence of victory and reason to resume normal activities. Instead, what should
occur here is ajump forward into the next level of difficulty. The confidence gained from
short-term wins should be used as a springboard to attack more difficult goals. How
personnel are promoted, hired, and developed professionally should be examined for
alignment with the vision. Other formal structures or systems which may be inconsistent
with the vision and have not been dealt with yet should also be addressed. Overall, it is
important to understand that successful change efforts take years, not months, to effect.
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Organizations should allow from five to ten years for changes to become part of the
organizational culture. [Ref. 32, pp. 66-67]
//. Institutionalize New Approaches - Anchor Changes in Corporate
Culture
The importance of this stage cannot be overemphasized; for changes to truly be
effective in the long term, they must become rooted in the social norms and shared values
of the organization. Two actions must be taken to help this process along. First, the true
link between the change efforts and results achieved must be communicated to the
organization very strongly. A very visible attempt must be made to demonstrate how the
new behaviors, approaches, and attitudes have helped effect the transformation. Next,
sufficient time and effort must be put into educating future senior leadership in the
philosophy of change so that the organization will not become static in the future. [Ref.
32, p. 67]. Many elements of the top-down model are echoed in the overall list of critical
success factors for change management, addressed in a following sub-section. An
obvious advantage to this model is its compatibility with the military organizational
hierarchy. However, the military paradigm is significantly different than that of
commercial industry, and other factors specific to DoD must be considered (personnel
rotation, reporting relationships, etc). Also, while the approach may work for some
organizations, it clearly relies heavily on the ability to direct a challenging process such
as organization-wide transformation. The bottom-up change model, on the other hand,
relies on grass-roots action by employees to advance change throughout the organization.
2. Bottom-Up Change
Bottom-up or "participative" change management programs take the diametrically
opposite approach from top-down programs; that is, instead of seeking to first change
attitudes and beliefs, the participative approach endeavors to change the organizational
roles that people play as a way to shape individual behavior. The most effective way to
change behavior is to put people in a new organizational context, where new roles,
responsibilities, and relationships are thrust upon them [Ref. 31, p. 159].
The existence of bottom-up change is perhaps in response to several assumptions
of the top-down model which do not prove to be true in every circumstance, or for every
organization. The first is that organization-wide programs, such as mission statement
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development, "corporate culture" programs, and training courses will actually transform
the organization in some basic way. The second is that an employee's behavior can be
changed by altering the organization's formal structure and management systems.
According to the model proposed by Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector [Ref. 31], the exact
opposite is true - the greatest obstacle to true revitalization is the flawed idea that it will
come from these company-wide change programs (particularly when sponsored by the
human resources or similar department). In other words, formal organizational structures
and systems cannot lead the charge in a corporate renewal process. [Ref. 3 1 ]
Instead, according to Beer et al, successful changes actually begin at the periphery
of an organization, usually in some unit or division of a larger company which has the
need (and enough autonomy) to experiment with new methods of doing things in order to
solve real business problems. They begin not with formal structures but with ad hoc
bodies created to deal with specific issues. Redesigned business processes may evolve
out of these working structures, as middle managers try to achieve "task alignment,"
wherein employee roles, relationships and responsibilities may be changed in order to
support the primary business process of the unit. The focus in these nascent change
efforts, unlike some top-down change programs, is on the work itself - not on abstract
concepts. [Ref. 3 1 , p. 159]
In a military organization like the CA-ARNG, the "unit" analogy is a fitting one.
The size, ingrained bureaucratic hierarchy, and geographically dispersed nature of its
forces translates well into the model for peripheral change. However, in order for such
change to ever cross the boundaries of a few successful units and become officially
adopted by the entire organization, the support of the Guard's senior leadership will be
essential. The defining element of this support will be the leadership's ability to assume
the role of enablers of grass-roots change, not directors of programmatic change.
The temptation to flush out successful policies and methods developed by one
unit and make them mandatory for the entire organization is ever-present, and indeed a
standard means of striving for small, continual improvement. However, the crucial role
that top management must assume is that of facilitators to change efforts. Attempting to
grab the reins and direct what started out as a non-directive process will derail the effort
before it can become successful. How can senior management facilitate the change effort
begun by operators and middle managers? By creating a "climate for change", and then
spreading the lessons learned from various successes and failures to the rest of the
organization. Instead of specifying specific solutions or steps to be taken, top
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management indicates the general direction in which the organization should move.
Eventually, as this grass-roots change reaches critical mass, the senior leadership must
transform itself into the management structure required for the new organization. Formal
structures, systems, and policies must now also be aligned with the new practices of the
organization. [Ref. 31, p. 159]
As a means for bringing about the "task-alignment" required for successful
bottom-up change, Beers et al. describe six steps which should be taken by organizations
as they begin the change process. Task alignment is accomplished first in small units
within the organization, where work processes are central to the unit's operation. The
challenge for senior management later becomes spreading the change to the rest of the
organization. The steps outlined here are designed to move an organization through that
process.
a. Mobilize Commitment to Change Through Joint Diagnosis of
Business Problems
A clearly defined problem is the launching point for any change effort. In
order for the necessary participants to be behind such an effort, there must be a consensus
on the nature of the problem. Candid discussion among process owners may elicit
surprising differences in opinion on both the nature of the problem(s), as well as on the
manner in which it should be solved. It is tremendously important to hash out these
differences up front and honestly, and build a shared prognosis of the organizational ills.
There are a variety of ways in which to accomplish this task; many involve removing the
management team from the normal organizational setting and focusing solely on the
nature of the problem at hand. Visits to other sites are useful, especially to successful
organizations which have undergone similar change. Benchmarking, as discussed in
Chapter IV, provides an opportunity to evaluate successful methods used by other
businesses or organizations. It can provide insight into the successful adoption of new
management roles and functions and employee-manager relationships in regards to team-
oriented definitions of work. Outside consultants may be useful in this area, especially
those specializing in organizational development, in order to help develop managers'
inter-personal communication skills. They may also help shape positive group dynamics
and constructive means of dealing with conflict, assist in developing various helpful
communications skills and exercises, and provide the expertise and perspective needed to
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help management achieve the close interaction necessary for the change effort to succeed
in the unit. [Ref. 31, pp. 161-162]
b. Develop a Shared Vision ofHow to Organize and Managefor
Competitiveness
This step is virtually identical to the third step outlined in the top-down
model developed by Kotter, in which the vision defining the change effort is culled from
the initiators of the change effort. This step is heavily linked to the process of developing
a consensus on the business problem. It extends this understanding to the next step,
which is creating the vision to inspire and guide the members of the organization in the
change effort [Ref. 31, p. 162].
c. Foster Consensusfor the New Vision, Competence to Enact It, and
Cohesion to Move it Along
Merely allowing employees, even middle management, to participate in
the development of a joint vision will not overcome resistance to the change effort or
magically cultivate the skills needed to make it work. Strong leadership from the person
in charge of the business/military unit, in the form of staunch commitment to change, is
an absolute necessity. It is at this juncture that those who refuse to support the change
effort must be addressed. Members of the unit (and later, the entire organization) need to
witness the kinds of skills, attitudes and behaviors needed in the new organization
through the successes and failures of others to adapt to the new environment. As Beers
relates, one general manager offered support to those who wanted to help him with the
change effort, and offered outplacement and counseling to those who didn't. It is
possible that personnel restructuring at this delicate stage could be somewhat detrimental
to morale. However, it may also have the opposite effect - motivating members of the
organization in a positive way by signaling that the commitment to change is strong
enough to make success possible. [Ref. 31, pp. 162-163]
d. Spread Revitalization to All Departments Without Pushing It From
the Top
The organization's senior leadership must not succumb to the lure of
forcing the new insights produced from a unit or division undergoing the change process
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onto the rest of the organization. In order for the rest of the organization to embrace the
change, and internalize it successfully, they must more or less come to it on their own.
As Beer puts it, it's better to let each unit "reinvent the wheel", and thus experience the
need for the change and its benefits firsthand, than to simply force the issue on them
because it seems to work elsewhere. That approach resembles the top-down change
management style, and short-circuits the necessary change process. Instead, top
management should endeavor to create the atmosphere for change in the rest of the
organization, fostering a good balance between creativity/experimentation and
accountability. The pressure to succeed can be a positive motivator, if utilized
constructively. [Ref. 31, pp. 163-164]
e. Institutionalize Revitalization Through Formal Policies, Systems,
and Structures
Referring to the generic 'unfreeze-change-freeze' model of change
management, this step would be analogous to the 'freeze' stage, in which the changes
implemented successfully throughout the organization must now be locked in as part of
the formal structure. Trying to accomplish this too soon will yield counterproductive
results. The new approach must be firmly in place, with management and employee
structures solidified and functioning successfully, before attempting to bond the new
changes with the organization's formal structures. In order for these changes to sink in,
members of the organization must be given the chance to work out the difficulties
themselves. Decisions made by senior leadership during this phase must not attempt to
rush or smooth out the change process artificially. It must be allowed to proceed through
the final steps with the same hands-off approach used throughout the entire change effort.
[Ref. 31, p. 164]
/ Monitor and Adjust Strategies in Response to Problems in
Revitalization Process
The stakeholders in the organization need to have a means for monitoring
the renewal effort in order to provide feedback to the change owners. The organization
not only has to learn how to change successfully, it must also learn how to learn. The
change process will surely be repeated in the future under different environmental and
organizational conditions. If anything of value is to be taken from the organization's
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previous experiences, it must be ingrained into the overall process. The subject of
learning organizations is much broader than can be addressed here. However, the reader
is directed towards appropriate sources on the subject, most notably The Fifth Discipline
by Peter Senge. Overall, mechanisms must be created to develop ongoing learning and
adaptation skills. [Ref. 31, pp. 164-165]
3. Characteristics of Organizational Change
While every change management program implementation is unique, even within
the same organization, a number of common trends occurring in most transformations
have been documented. For instance, during change programs, there is a definite
transition process that members of the organization experience as they come to terms
with the effects of the change. Understanding the dynamics occurring during the
transition process, and how to identify where people are in the process assists change
agents in dealing with possible resistance. However, resistance to change is inevitable in
every instance, even though the particular dynamics of each situation may change.
Understanding and dealing with this resistance from the beginning of any change effort
will aid in reducing and overcoming it. Similarly, there are a number of common success
factors which are found in almost all top-down or bottom-up change programs. Ensuring
that your change management program takes these into consideration adds to its chances
of success.
a. Transition State Dynamics
During the evolution of a change management program, an organization
functions in what has been described as a "transition state". Characteristics of this state
are high levels of uncertainty, energy, perceived inconsistency, emotional stress, and
conflict with overall stability fairly low. These are natural by-products of the change
process, and should be managed carefully in order to assure success. There are several
distinct stages of the transition state, and personnel should be managed differently
depending on where they are in the process (see Table 6.1). For instance, those not yet in
the transition have not accepted the possibility of being affected by the change. Those
further along in the "neutral zone" (the midway point in the overall process) may feel lost
and overwhelmed. They have let go of the old organization but not yet accepted the new
one, and are struggling to find a foothold. These people may be experiencing completely
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different feelings from those still dealing with the ending of the old order as well as from
those who have begun to perceive how the new organization will function. Finally, when
people are finished with the transition, there are issues of loss to be dealt with through
renewing morale and employee motivation. Change agents must recognize that while
organizational change may bring significant gains, transition always begins with loss.
[Ref. 33]






belief that Anger, Lost, Creative Acknowledgi
change will uncertainty directionless suggestions ng loss
not affect Shock, feeling feelings forthcoming Forgetting old
them, or is of betrayal Continued Beginnings of way, pain
insignificant Surprise uncertainty acceptance, associated
scorn/categori Grief; feelings about willingness to with change
zation of of loss, low direction of see Acceptance of
change effort morale change, possibilities new system
as passing fad overall Returning Return to
organization signs of hope normal
Forebodings business
of disaster
Table 6.1 - Identifying Where People Are in the Transition Process
b. Overall Success Factorsfor Organizational Change Management
Programs
In nearly all successful change management programs, whether
programmatic or participative, common themes have been identified that contribute
significantly towards the program's overall success. Taking these factors into
consideration should be part of the plan for every change management effort (but does
not necessarily guarantee victory). First, the need for a powerful vision to unite the
organization and guide it through the rocky shoals of change is an absolute must.
Without it, change efforts can disintegrate into isolated programs which do not succeed in
transforming the organization. Second, the vision developed must be effectively
communicated to the entire organization through every possible channel, over and over
again. It must become a part of every day, normal hour-to-hour operations if it is to be
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internalized. It should be linked to every aspect of the organization's operations,
including performance reviews, strategy planning, question and answer sessions, and
monthly department meetings, until it is a part of the organization as a whole.
Third, short-term wins must be planned for and accomplished within a
reasonable time frame in order to demonstrate the viability of the transformation effort.
Twenty-four months is the maximum time limit a program should wait before reaching
some sort of realistic, significant goal of the program. It should then be highly
publicized, and used as a means to motivate people on to bigger and better things, and not
as a sign that the effort has worked (signaling for a return to business-as-usual). Fourth, it
is absolutely critical that change programs be led by line managers and not by staff
departments such as human resources or information systems. Without the visible
support and participation of top management, change efforts are doomed to failure. The
senior leadership must set the example by "walking the walk" if the rest of the
organization is expected to follow suit.
Fifth, pressure can be a useful tool in driving change. Change agents must
create a relentless discontent with the status quo, sufficient enough to drive people from
their comfort zones and get them interested in participating in the change effort. Sixth, the
need for an intimate understanding of the business, its customers, and requirements in
order to drive the impetus for change forward is critical. Additionally, employees must
have a sense of contribution towards and an understanding of where the business is
headed in order to achieve true buy-in from all levels of the organization. Lastly, all
members of an organization must realize that change takes years, not months. Even after
the change effort is finished, it takes still more time for the change to become a lasting
part of the organization's culture. Top management must ensure good turnover when the
time comes or risk losing the effects of the change by not maintaining the organization's
forward momentum over time.
B. IMPLEMENTING PROCESS INNOVATION-ORIENTED CHANGE
MANAGEMENT
The models described above, although generic, provide a general recipe for
implementing change management plans or programs. The actual shape a change effort
takes is unique to the organization and its particular circumstances. However, change
management methods specifically oriented towards process innovation initiatives will
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enable the CA-ARNG to move forward with a more customized roadmap than a general
model can provide. The participative change model developed by Beer, Eisenstat and
Spector, the socio-technical framework developed by Pasmore, and the related parallel
learning structures described by Bushe and Shani for managing organizational change
each have certain aspects applicable to the types of organizational change produced by
process innovation. For an organization such as the CA-ARNG, a fusion of these
frameworks combining the most relevant principles of each provides the process
innovation orientation needed to implement the redesign alternatives presented in Chapter
V.
Typically, process innovation tends toward a top-down approach to change, where
the change champion or advocate driving the initiative is an executive or senior manager.
Sponsorship for the idea, necessary to realize legitimacy in the organization, comes from
even higher up. Frequently, a senior line executive (or in the military paradigm, a senior
officer sufficiently high in the rank and power structure) with enough political support
and positional strength to influence others and promote change assumes this role. [Ref. 1,
pp. 179-180]
However, the change process is not totally programmatic, especially as it moves
past the planning stages. Socio-technical principles, such as those incorporated in parallel
learning structures, emphasize the participative nature of process innovation through the
use of study groups (labeled process innovation teams by Davenport). These process
innovation teams perform the actual detailed work of process innovation. They research
business requirements and gather information on key business processes, customers, and
suppliers; they identify businesses with recognized "best practices" to use as benchmarks,
and enablers (such as information technology) to support the alternatives for process
redesign; they map process flows, create redesign alternatives, and develop plans for
transitioning to the new processes. [Ref. 1, p. 183]
Based on this assessment, a discussion of the primary change roles (and the
responsibilities associated with them) required for process innovation-induced
organizational change is provided. These roles outline team compositions which are
described in more detail by parallel learning structures. Such mechanisms can also be
used as transitional vehicles for implementing process-oriented change, in addition to
helping define and develop redesigned processes.
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1. Roles and Responsibilities for Process Innovation-Oriented Change
Although in many cases a single person may be the driving force behind a change
effort, there are several different leadership positions which emerge over the course of a
change program. The breadth and depth of leadership, organizational position,
commitment, and conceptual understanding of detailed business operations necessary to
conduct a successful change cannot be fulfilled by one person. Instead, a structure which
often evolves utilizes the strengths and capabilities of several of the senior leadership, as
well as many more in middle management positions. These roles develop during the
three general stages of a change program: originating the process innovation initiative,
making it acceptable and necessary among all members of the organization, and then
managing it through to completion.
a. Advocate
The advocate becomes the member of the organization who initially
proposes and subsequently pushes for change. According to Davenport, in many
organizations this role is often played by the Information Systems department or its
equivalent. A senior IS executive/staff officer will frequently have the experience,
process understanding, and commitment necessary to alert the organization to the danger
in the status quo and corresponding need for change. However, he or she needs the
weight of an executive of significant influence and standing in the organization to help
get the program started. Sponsorship is one of the pivotal roles in the leadership
structure, and must not be taken lightly. One of the most common mistakes made by
organizations beginning process innovation is choosing the wrong sponsor. [Ref. 1, p.
179]
b. Sponsor
The sponsor is an extremely important part of a successful process
innovation effort, one who legitimizes the change proposed by the advocate. The sponsor
sells the idea to the rest of top management and wins the buy-in and acceptance necessary
to launch the effort. Also referred to as the "transformational leader", a sponsor must
understand the intimate details of the organization's key processes and excel at
articulating the new vision for these processes. Transformational leaders are charismatic,
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driven, and impatient for results but still capable of dealing with the "softer" personnel
issues of change in a caring, sensible way. The sponsor's level of commitment to the
process innovation must be very strong, in order to weather the inevitable doubts,
criticism and duration such efforts face.
The sponsor should never be an IS or other staff executive. Key
ingredients for the sponsorship role include strong, visible top management
representation and support. In actuality, sponsorship must be broader than a single
individual, even the transformational leader. A consolidated front of the organization's
senior leadership is necessary for the change effort to be taken seriously. One of the most
difficult tasks the sponsor may face is creating and maintaining the strong commitment
and consensus required among executive team members. This is particularly difficult in
the face of the inevitable power restructuring which takes place during process
innovation. Determining the receptiveness of the organization's key stakeholders prior to
beginning the planning process helps to identify resistance. If strong leaders in the
company are seen to ignore the effort, people will suspect that management lacks the
necessary commitment to it. Such efforts will never reach the critical mass needed to
affect the entire organization. [Ref. 1, pp. 179-180]
c. Change Target
The change target is the functional unit, group or part of the organization
which must undergo the change. In the normal reporting hierarchy of the organization,
these people should report to the change sponsor. This is an important point. The
sponsor must have direct influence and control over the group in order to exert the kind of
"good pain" or positive pressure needed to get results. Such pressure sometimes includes
removing managers and other key individuals who are not adapting to the change
program. This is one of the strongest statements a sponsor can make to the organization.
It signals a serious commitment to the change effort, enforcing the message that the
sponsor and advocate are willing to put the good of the organization ahead of individuals
who will not be able to contribute to the new way of doing things. It is, without a doubt,




The change agent is the individual or group which will implement the
change on the change target. The types of teams and groups which can be used for this
all-important position are described in the following sub-section, which addresses the
parallel learning structure model and it's adaptability to military organizations.
2. Teams - Using a Parallel Learning Structure to Implement Process
Innovation
Parallel learning structures incorporate not only the mechanisms used to diagnose
and provide solutions for organizational ills, but also a transitional vehicle for
accomplishing these changes within a socio-technical systems design framework. In a
case written by Bushe and Shani, an Army data processing unit (DPU) undergoing
significant organizational change was able to successfully implement and maintain new
methods of work through a parallel learning structure approach. Although it is clear that
the CA-ARNG has unique differences and requirements from other military organizations
(indeed every instance of organizational change is different, even for very similar
organizations), an analysis of the Army DPU case strongly suggests the feasibility of the
parallel learning structure approach for any military organization. Before discussing the
pros and cons of the parallel learning structure, a short summation of its primary elements
according to the model presented by Bushe and Shani is beneficial.
a. Overview ofthe Parallel Learning Structures Model
The "parallel" in the title refers to the existence of at least two separate
learning groups involved in the change effort - a steering committee and a study group (or
groups). If needed, an outside consultant group may also be a part of the process. The
steering committee is composed of a cross-section of the top level management in the
formal organization, and may also include the Commanding Officer if he or she so
desires. Cross-functional representation is essential to ensure that the full scope of
operational perspectives are heard during the planning and later guiding phases. It is a
good idea to perform a stakeholder analysis at this stage, and identify all the key
individuals who will be affected by the process innovation [Ref. 1, p. 182]. Key
individuals such as influential decision makers and those reluctant to accept changes
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should be a part of the steering committee. Having these individuals as close to
understanding the change effort as possible will aid the project proposal and approval
process.
The steering committee selects the initial set of activities for the groups to
work on. First, it develops consensus on the problem areas to be examined, as well as a
shared vision of the purpose for the parallel learning structure itself. The steering
committee also decides what the appropriate measures will be for assessing the progress
and success of the parallel learning structure's activities. Later, as part of the
implementation plan, top management accountability for the results and progress of the
learning structure is assigned by the steering committee as well [Ref. 1, p. 182]. The
steering committee also creates the procedures and criteria for selecting the members of
the study group(s), and considers how they should be constituted and what rewards there
will be, if any, for participation. The help of outside consultants with knowledge of and
experience in parallel learning structures and organizational development may be
necessary in order to accomplish all of this. The steering committee must make that
determination [Ref. 34, pp. 126-128].
The study groups, some members of which may also be part of the
steering committee, are composed of a cross section of the organization as a whole, and
should accurately represent the functional composition and personnel strength makeup of
the organization. While Davenport recommends that middle to upper management
should form these groups, in reference to the military organization, Bushe and Shani
argue for a good cross-section of all personnel, including operational-level members. The
study group(s) conducts the "Inquiry Phase" of the process, in which the organizational
problems are researched and quantified, if necessary. They then analyze the data and
recommend solutions to the steering committee. The manner in which study groups
interact with each other, with the steering committee, and with the functional groups
within the organizations they represent must be decided by the steering committee [Ref.
34, p. 128].
After proposals are approved by the steering committee, they must be
approved by the formal top management in order to be implemented. At this point, the
parallel learning structure may shift to a transitional vehicle for implementing the changes
it recommended. Throughout its existence, it is important that the organization as a
whole be kept informed of its purpose and progress in order to enable the change
implementation to go forth. [Ref. 34, pp. 128-129]
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b. Advantages ofthe Parallel Learning Structures Model
An obvious discontinuity exists between the principles of socio-technical
design espoused by parallel learning structures and the traditional military organizational
design. Typical military organizational design is characteristic of a highly mechanistic,
rigid machine bureaucracy with hierarchical levels of management. However, this does
not preclude the possibility of morphing a military organization towards a socio-technical
system. Historically, the military has not effectively handled the impact that work design
and other technical considerations have on social subsystems, nor has it been especially
adept at effectively designing the work systems themselves. However, the primary
elements of socio-technical system design are quite applicable to certain military
organizations.
The importance placed on establishing small teams of operating personnel
is well suited to the military environment, particularly since it resembles the typical unit
structure. Task organization is a familiar concept operationally, and can be used in
administrative settings to help create "whole jobs" and engender more satisfaction and
commitment from workers towards their jobs. The need for social interaction is met
more fully, and timely feedback from group members can add to the accelerated learning
experience. In keeping with the improved capacity for feedback, a new method of peer
evaluations could be formed from the group working structure, in addition to the current
performance reporting system which only derives input from supervisors. Skill variety
would also become more readily assimilated into the work design, such that it could be
accomplished with less downtime and distraction from the normal working routine. For
example, the workgroup could continue to perform its overall task while intra-member
rotation and training took place. "Task identity", another by-product of a workgroup
design, also results in increased commitment and job satisfaction on the part of the
members of the group [Ref. 34, p. 118]. Process ownership can be a powerful motivator,
both in terms of morale and the desire to do well in the eyes of other groups and the
organization as a whole. The same feeling exists on a larger level between units: a
friendly rivalry and desire to be the best.
Closely related to the autonomy afforded to the workgroup is the principle
of minimum critical specification, or allowing the workers in the group to develop their
own methods of accomplishing the group's task based on the minimum advance planning
needed to become operational. In addition, "controlling variance at the source" (solving
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problems at the lowest level by empowering workers with the decision-making capability
to correct them without management supervision) allows workgroups to realize their
effectiveness and capabilities without the need for constant, close supervision and allows
management to shift into the role of coach and facilitator vice controller. [Ref. 34, p. 117]
Part of the strength of this model is its ability to transform from a vehicle
for diagnosis into a vehicle for implementing change. Bushe and Shani describe the
parallel learning structure as a "'real-time' training experience in STS [socio-technical
systems] design", citing the elements of STS design that it represents [Ref. 34, p. 1 16]. It
is ideally suited to managing complex change for the same reasons that make it successful
for diagnosing deficiencies. Parallel learning structures offer flexibility, cross-functional
composition, a role in the organization as an agent of change, and deep understanding of
the organizational problems with recommended solutions. Especially valuable is the
atmosphere of a learning organization which exists within its groups; transferring this
ethos to the rest of the organization is one of the underlying tasks during the change
management process.
c. Disadvantages ofthe Parallel Learning Structures Model
The dampening effect of authority can be a serious inhibitor to achieving
the necessary synergy in the groups comprising the parallel learning structure [Ref. 34, p.
115]. The rigid rank structure ingrained in military members from the day they enter the
service can be a difficult force to overcome. For example, when the commanding officer
(CO) of a unit decides to be part of the steering committee, it significantly shifts the
power base and may cause a tilt in the opinions and outputs of the group towards the CO's
own opinions and beliefs. This same principle also applies to the study groups, which
may have members of top management in them for coordination purposes. Enforced
participation on study groups, which will most likely be the case in a military unit, may
not be the best way to elicit enthusiasm and dedication to the process. Another dynamic
often present is the inherent distrust for outsiders displayed by many members of the
military. This poses a threat to the success of the endeavor. Outsiders could be civilian
consultants or civil service workers, depending on the culture of the particular
organization and the climate established by the CO and others in positions of power or
influence.
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Another constraint imposed by the military bureaucracy is the inability to
change reward systems (aside from small changes, like extra liberty, etc), rank, promotion
systems, or affect other organizations except through dialogue and by example. With
three-year tours standard for most active duty members (civil service may be in place
permanently) and command billets assigned in eighteen month cycles, the relatively rapid
turnover of personnel in military organizations is a considerable problem. Effecting real
organizational change can be quite a serious challenge by itself, especially when nearly
everyone in a unit rotates every three years. Resistance often arises from permanent
employees who may be willing to wait out a program until its champions have been
transferred out, and the changes begin to disappear.
3. Recommended Change Management Approach
The fundamental principles of change management programs described in the
previous subsections discuss parallel learning structures as a potential change
management vehicle for the California National Guard. Based on the nature of the
redesign recommendations made in Chapter V, proposals for the creation and
organization of a parallel learning structure within the Guard in order to implement the
redesigned emergency mobilization process is provided here.
These suggestions do not identify specific individuals for the parallel learning
structures teams, nor do they provide a detailed plan for execution of the change
management process. Instead, what they offer are guidelines for steering committee and
study group organization with respect to the CA ARNG hierarchy. The change
management roles identified in subsection one - change advocate, sponsor, target, and
agent - are also discussed in the context of these Headquarters staff sections. Finally,
suggestions are given for using organizational consultant and change management groups
as additional enablers to the transition process.
Following these proposals are descriptions and examples of the many change
management resources available to the Guard. We feel very strongly that active
intervention from outside professionals will most likely be required for the full
implementation of the redesigned process and concurrent change management program.
This assistance could be obtained from individual consultants specializing in process
innovation and/or change management, or from consultant firms like Andersen
Consulting, Ernst & Young LLP, or Price Waterhouse Coopers LLC which provide a full
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spectrum of consultant services in the BPI and change management domains. Another
key ingredient for success is the education of senior management and parallel learning
structures teams in a variety of organizational development and group interaction
disciplines. Courses, seminars, and certificate programs, as well as websites, books and
other reference materials addressing these subjects are listed in Appendix E.
a. Organizing the Parallel Learning Structure
The composition of the steering committee is the most crucial aspect of
the initial phase of the parallel learning structure process. Senior leaders from each of the
functional staff sections in the CA ARNG Headquarters should be on the committee, as
well as chiefs of staff for either or even both of the top echelons of the Guard - the
California Army National Guard and the California National Guard. It may also be
beneficial to have California Air National Guard representation on the steering
committee. Outside of the Headquarters command, representatives from each of the
major commands (40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), etc.) headquarters should also
actively participate in the steering committee.
For the parallel learning structure to work effectively, it will have to
become a full-time occupation for the members of both the steering committee and study
group(s). This is representative of the type of commitment required in order to see the
process through to completion. Understandably, it may be extremely difficult to commit
the head of each staff section to such an effort, especially when the effort may take
several months or even much longer before the groups can stand down as permanent
entities and shift to a more periodic meeting schedule. The temptation is to make the
second-in-command of each staff section responsible for full-time steering committee
participation, ostensibly reporting back to and receiving guidance from the staff officer he
or she represents. However, it is crucial that the organization see the appropriate level of
commitment from its leadership; if section heads and others in command billets are seen
as too important to have time for such an effort, it will fail. Why should small unit
leaders commit their time and the time of their best and brightest workers to study group
participation and other requirements, they will reason, if the headquarters doesn't? The
bottom line is that only the organization's nominal leaders can inspire the necessary level
of dedication to a change effort in the rest of the organization's members. With this level
of commitment evident at the key levels in the organization's hierarchy, it is acceptable
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for the head of the entire organization (i.e., the Commanding General) to remain as
overall head of the steering committee while not actively participating in its daily
functions. Even though the process innovation effort being managed should be
recognized as wide-reaching in its scope and extremely important to the organization, it
may not require the presence of the Guard's senior-most official to lead it full-time. The
state emergency mobilization process was selected for redesign because of its overall
importance to the Guard and its role as the central process among all of the Guard's key
processes. However, the redesign suggestions are by far not the most radical changes the
organization could possible undergo. While the changes will have far-reaching impacts
on the rest of the organization, they are mainly concentrated at the headquarters level, and
on its relationships with lower level units and state organizations. Given these
characteristics, the acting head of the steering committee should be selected from among
the CG's (Commanding General) chiefs of staff, or similar level of command. This
person and in effect the entire steering committee fulfill the 'sponsor' role discussed
above.
As the second element of the parallel learning structure, study groups are
the next item of major importance to consider. These people will be the 'change agents'
for the organization, acting on the 'change target' identified by the sponsor through the
steering committee. Accurate representation of the overall organization is a fundamental
requirement for successful study groups. This prerequisite arises from the tasks which
the study group or groups are designed to perform: make recommendations to the steering
committee on the problems faced by the organization, provide several potential solutions
to these problems, and then go forth with the steering committee's decision and
implement it. In order for this to actually work, each of the various factions, functional
areas, units, etc. of the organization must be well represented in the study group(s). The
person acting as the 'change advocate' (i.e., someone with the drive, energy, intimate
operational knowledge of the organization's processes, and unwavering commitment to
the process) should be involved at this level. Within the study group medium, this
individual can act as the primary facilitator and direct link to the sponsor on the steering
committee and can help keep the change agents on track. The energy, enthusiasm,
charisma and dedication of this individual can propel the change effort forward
immeasurably; it is essential that the right person fill this position.
The representatives of each unit within the organization help initiate the
buy-in within these units necessary for the parallel learning structure's recommendations
183
to become reality. Just as importantly, they bring with them the diagnosis of
organizational ills from the [company] unit level, where the actual day-to-day work of the
organization is being performed. This degree of granularity is a necessity in order for the
study group(s) to make realistic surveys of what problems exist and recommend sound
solutions to these problems. Groups which should be represented include all company-
level units and higher from each of the major commands (i.e., the 40th ID (mechanized),
100 th Troop Command, etc.), as well as the appropriate headquarters representatives from
each of the major commands (most likely soldiers whose immediate superiors are on the
steering committee).
These two groups fulfill the basic requirements described in the parallel
learning structure model, but are not the only types of teams that may be of use to the
organization. Another entity that may be useful to the California National Guard is an
integrated product team- or IPT-oriented group which advises the steering committee
directly. This group represents the outside organizations the Guard interfaces with during
the execution of its emergency mobilization mission. For example, the State Office of
Emergency Services (OES) could provide personnel from its headquarters element as
well as from each of the Regional Emergency Operations Centers (REOCs) in the state.
County emergency services organizations from each county in California could provide
representatives from EMT, fire, police, and other services interacting regularly with the
Guard during emergencies. Other organizations within the state such as the California
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, State Fire Marshal, U.S. Coast Guard,
weather services, earthquake tracking services, Environmental Protection Agency, and a
host of others could also add value to this group. Although most likely not a full-time
team, the IPT group could provide timely information and responses from sponsoring
organizations on relevant issues before the steering committee. Such coordination exists
currently, but is more decentralized and sporadic; bringing these entities together as
liaisons to Guard leaders would create a more open line of communication between these
organizations.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, outside consultants may be able to
provide invaluable assistance during the creation and implementation of the parallel
learning structure. Whether individual consultants providing guidance on change
management issues or firms with teams of consultants managing the entire process, a
separate group advising the steering committee and actively guiding the whole process
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could prove essential to such an effort. More information on this is provided in the
following sub-section.
b. Recommended Change Management Resources
Throughout the process innovation and corresponding change
management program phases, the members of the organization will undergo a series of
transitions in organizational roles, personal interaction and conflict resolution dynamics,
all of which challenge the overall context of their normal behavior and attitudes. The
members assigned to participate in the parallel learning structures will help shepherd
everyone else in the new ways of doing business, as well as the new skills, behaviors and
attitudes required. These team members themselves will require skills in such areas as
group dynamics, conflict resolution, group problem solving, decision making, team
building, and other fields of personal and group communications. Not all members of the
groups must receive this much training; certain team members designated as "facilitators"
can help educate their teammates in these skills. They should also receive training in
parallel learning structures, action research, and organizational development. Through
the intensive training they receive in these subjects, these facilitators will lead the charge
in helping prepare and develop the organization for what lies ahead.
There are several avenues available to organizations seeking this type of
training and knowledge. Active intervention, through the use of consultants or firms
specializing in these disciplines, should be used during at least the early stages of the
parallel learning structure process. They can provide timely, knowledgeable, and
extremely helpful experience in forming and training groups in the necessary areas.
Firms such as Andersen Consulting and most of the big-five accounting firms including
Price Waterhouse Coopers and Ernst & Young LLP provide these types of services.
While fairly expensive compared to other options discussed here, the level of assistance
rendered by such firms is very advanced. They can either lead an initiative through from
"cradle to grave" or simply provide the advice and training necessary for organizations
desiring a more involved role in their own change program.
A closely related but less expensive option is the use of individual
consultants specializing in particular areas, like change management, process innovation,
or both. Many resources are available in this field. For instance, an online storefront
called the "Consultants Mall" offers a variety of general and targeted consultant services
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to businesses and government offices as well. Within the Naval Postgraduate School are
a number of change management and process innovation specialists available for
consulting services. See Appendix E for specific references.
Next in terms degree of training and assistance provided are course and
seminars aimed at executives and senior managers. These courses deal with process
innovation, information technology management, change management, and other
subjects. Some, such as the Organization Development and Change Leadership
Certificate Program offered by Georgetown University, are full-fledged curricula
involving multiple courses and certification for participants. Others, such as the Chief
Information Officer Course taught at the Center for Executive Education at the Naval
Postgraduate School, specifically target leaders faced with information technology
management, business process reengineering/innovation, and other high-level issues (this
course is offered to 0-8 and 0-9 grade officers in DoD). Finally, some are more broad in
nature and offer seminar-style presentations on relevant issues, such as the seminars
offered by Miller Howard Consulting and others.
Lastly, there are a large number of helpful resources to be found on the
World Wide Web, as well as in books in print. See Appendix E for lists of these
resources.
C. SUMMARY
No change management program can guarantee success. However, following
general guidelines like those presented above, in concert with a program specifically
tailored to the organization and its strategic objectives, can be the beginning of a
successful change effort. Transformational leaders signal the need for change to the top
management, then sell it to the rest of the organization. Many times, this is how the
kernel of change begins to grow within an organization. Even though visionary leaders
can push an organization a long way towards successful process innovation, in the end no
one person is enough. It requires the skill and total dedication of many individuals in the
organization, working toward a shared vision, to bring a change program to fruition.
Every attempt to bring about process innovation and the concomitant change associated
with it has its own unique circumstances, which only those directly involved in the effort
can truly appreciate. Hence the lack of a single model for change which can be used for
every organization in every instance.
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In order to accommodate this phenomenon, parallel learning structures are
designed to be flexible, adapting to the particular requirements of each circumstance.
They incorporate important elements of socio-technical systems design into a change
management framework, one that is well-suited for the specific attributes of change as a
result of process innovation. In order to use them effectively, they must be mapped to the
organization's hierarchical structure. Even though they operate outside of the normal
structure, in effect accomplishing what existing management systems could not, the
formation of these teams must nonetheless take this structure into consideration or risk





The CA-ARNG is renowned around the world for the efficiency, effectiveness,
and flexibility of the State Emergency Mobilization Process. While the focus of this
thesis is on using process innovation in order to improve SEMP performance, it should be
reiterated that this process currently works quite well. However, through complementary
application of process innovation and benchmarking techniques, we feel that it could
become even better.
Through the hybrid process innovation methodology, we identified and analyzed
several SEMP process pathologies and identified redesign transformations that offer good
potential for dramatic performance improvement. We determined methods by which the
shortcomings we diagnosed could be eliminated or mitigated through better process
design and the use of powerful transformational enablers. In order to provide the Guard
with a range of choices in the level of difficulty, risk, and organizational change required,
we developed three redesign alternatives, which embraced varying degrees of
technological advancement and process redesign. These alternatives present the Guard
with a great opportunity to dramatically improve the performance of the process central
to all of its other operations.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The true value of the process redesign alternatives presented in Chapter V may
not be apparent when comparing these alternatives with each other. Rather, the real
benefit to the CA-ARNG stems from the selection and use of all three alternatives in
succession, as stepping stones to reach progressively greater levels of change and
innovation. Although each offers advantages when viewed independently, their
combined effects over time will create a synergistic effect enabling the Guard to make
great strides over the long term. Additionally, as the alternatives are implemented, these
gradual changes will transition into institutional doctrine and make more difficult
challenges attainable.
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Enacting Redesign Alternative One is the first step in this metamorphosis. As the
alternative incorporating the lowest degree of new technology and organizational change,
it is the best way to gradually build up to the more drastic changes called for in Redesign
Alternatives Two and Three. By utilizing the RIMS more effectively in crisis monitoring
and coordination, and employing an intranet to provide other knowledge-sharing
applications as well, this alternative represents a significant improvement in process
performance. Empowered solution providers are provided with regionally customized
packages and given the authority to deploy them accordingly whenever emergencies
arise. As with the more aggressive alternatives, information specialists also provide
added value to the process. However, Redesign Alternative One does not attempt to
apply the more advanced technological solutions proposed in the other alternatives,
dramatically lessening the difficulty of the organizational change associated with its
implementation.
After achieving significant short-term gains through the implementation of
Redesign Alternative One, the Guard should consolidate its successes and prepare to
launch itself into the next phase of redesigning the SEMP - Redesign Alternative Two.
This alternative represents a process constructed to achieve order-of-magnitude
performance improvements when compared to the baseline analysis. It employs a diverse
set of change enablers designed to dramatically reduce cycle time and cost while
improving response time. These performance objectives translate into value for
Californians in the form of a quick disaster response and cost savings based upon the total
cost of the business process. The use of technology change enablers (e.g., expert system,
Intranet, integrated databases, workflow application, mobile communication) can
dramatically improve the speed and accuracy of information delivery throughout the
entire organization anywhere in the State. Again, citizens would benefit from having
properly equipped soldiers, knowledgeable of the situation, who can quickly adapt to a
rapidly changing crisis environment. Well organized, motivated and informed, the Guard
relief effort would arrive at a disaster scene bringing with it leading edge technology able
to provide a clearer picture of the crisis and how to solve it.
After the concepts and technologies contained in Redesign Alternatives One and
Two have been implemented, the cut-over to highly advanced technologies can be
achieved more easily. Redesign Alternative Three requires significantly more cultural
change than the first two alternatives in order to fully utilize the capabilities of the
decision support system and other technologies proposed. These technologies eliminate
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the need for a person to make routine tasking and logistics requests decisions, improving
the efficiency and cycle time of the SEMP to an even greater degree. With each
successive redesign, the focus of the CAC increasingly shifts towards managing
information quality and timeliness in order to support the empowered solution providers.
As the Guard ushers in these process innovation initiatives, it should also strive to
increase the organizational awareness of the pathologies and faults of the SEMP to
demonstrate the need for change. Achieving the level of buy-in and commitment needed
from members of the organization requires significant effort and education in change
management and process innovation. Training in these two disciplines should begin as
soon as possible, concurrent with development of an organizational structure to carry out
change management functions. The suggestions provided in Chapter VI serve as a
transition plan through which to begin this process.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The thrust of this thesis, which is primarily concerned with process innovation,
also serves to identify a number of other areas for potential research and exploration in
the CA-ARNG. Certain areas addressed in this thesis in broad terms are not explored in
detail (e.g., leading change management produced by process innovation). While the
background provided is a necessary first step in the overall process, a more detailed,
exhaustive change management plan will be required by the Guard in order to enact some
of the recommendations for process redesign presented in this thesis. Unless this area
receives outside intervention (i.e., from -a consulting firm), it remains an excellent topic
for further academic inquiry. Several such critical topics are discussed below.
1. Further Top-level Process Analysis/Redesign
During the top-level process analysis conducted at the CA-ARNG State
Headquarters during the initial stages of the thesis, several principal business processes
were identified as possible targets for process innovation. The State Emergency
Mobilization Process represents the most compelling but not the only process that could
benefit from a thorough analysis and possible subsequent redesign.
Although similar to the SEMP, the federal mobilization process is oriented toward
deployment to and extended operations in tactical environments. It mobilizes assets
unique to the Guard's federal mission for transport to international locations using DoD
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joint airlift and sealift capabilities, as opposed to the more localized operations performed
under the SEMP. These two high-level processes encapsulate nearly every other process
performed within the Guard. In order to effect further process innovation, across the
entire organizational front, the federal mobilization process should be the next target of
redesign analysis.
2. Change Management Implementation Plan
As mentioned above, the Guard organization will require a detailed change
management implementation plan in order to move forward with the parallel learning
structure process. The change management information presented within this thesis is
intended to introduce the subject, and make the readers aware of its importance to the
implementation of the suggested process redesign alternative. Although many other
models and methods for addressing this need exist, it is the feeling of the authors that the
parallel learning structure design will best suit the particular requirements of process
innovation-induced change faced by CA-ARNG. In particular, the eight-phased generic
model for intervention suggested by Bushe and Shani can be custom tailored, even
further, to the specifications of the Guard and its current situation as part of further
research [Ref. 33, p. 123].
Researchers can assist in this process even more by acting as inside consultants to
the steering committee and providing valuable insight into the overall procedure.
Additionally, they could hold workshops designed to elaborate on the communications
skills needed by group members, parallel learning structure training targeted at steering
committee or study group members, and any other organizational development-oriented
training not received elsewhere. If external consultants are used, thesis researchers could
act as Guard representatives and interface directly with the consultants in implementing
process redesign initiatives.
3. Three-Tiered Architecture Development
Another area for further research lies in the network infrastructure of the CA-
ARNG, specifically the network enterprise software architecture. This subject falls under
the broader issue of the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) II Program.
Designed and developed by the Boeing Corporation under the guidance and financial
backing of the National Guard Bureau (NGB, the parent organization for all National
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Guard Units & part of the Department of the Army), RCAS II is intended to provide all
National Guard units around the country with a common hardware, software and network
infrastructure platform. The driving goal is to bring these units to an adequate level of
information technology capability immediately, on a common platform, in order to help
improve overall mission capability and effectiveness. Each state's National Guard forces
can decide exactly how to implement the assets provided, while certain broad functions
like life-cycle management and software upgrades are handled at the NGB level as
necessary. Boeing contractors provide the network wiring and hardware components, but
the management of these resources falls to the Guard itself. Network operations,
customer service functions, e-mail deployment and maintenance, network operating
system architecture and other enterprise software architecture and maintenance along
with a host of other issues are all responsibilities of the appropriate National Guard body
within each state.
Research presented by Lewis on a three-tiered architecture for DTIC (Defense
Technical Information Center) suggests that an organization like the CA-ARNG would
benefit enormously from an integrated approach to enterprise architecture [Ref. 34]. The
three tiers refer to software and hardware assets organized such that tier-two application
servers connect tier-one clients to tier-three database systems. Web servers, transaction
servers, client systems, database servers and all other enterprise software assets can be
arranged in a three tiered architecture to provide the maximum flexibility and scalability.
Product lock-in and obsolescence impacts are reduced or eliminated. [Ref. 34, p. 14]
While RCAS II addresses a host of related issues, it does not specify an enterprise
software architecture for the management of applications such as web and database
servers specific to an organization like the CA-ARNG. As their information resource
requirements continue to increase in number and complexity, the need for such a plan
will become even more critical. See Appendix F for a more detailed description of the
three-tiered architecture approach.
4. Process Innovation as a Core Competency
Conditions necessitating change will always continue to arise, and the Guard must
continue to evolve as well in order to maintain its effectiveness. This evolution becomes
the hardest task for an organization to accomplish - in effect it must learn how to learn.
The subject of learning organizations, although related to socio-technical design and the
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change management principles discussed in earlier chapters, is a unique subject deserving
further attention within the Guard. The reader is directed to one of the defining texts on
the subject, The Fifth Discipline by Peter Senge. Senge presents the necessary
characteristics of a successful learning organization, and provides excellent guidance on
how to develop these attributes. Through a strategic viewpoint, deep level of
commitment, and multiple stages of growth over time, an organization can follow this
guidance to become a true "learning organization."
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APPENDIX A. RECOMMENDED IT STRATEGY: SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT TEAM
In an enterprise as large and distributed as the CA-ARNG, it is difficult to
maintain common software standards across the entire organization. Even as the RCAS
II Program is being deployed throughout the Guard, individual units of major commands
and staff sections within the State Headquarters itself are developing software in-house to
meet immediate needs. Unfortunately, even though these separate software applications
may satisfy these needs, they are not typically applicable throughout the rest of the
organization. Requirements determination is not performed beyond the level of intended
local use, rendering such applications as helpful in the short term but ultimately isolated
and redundant.
For instance, an application being developed within the Logistics section
addresses the location and status of Guard equipment, pulling information from several
existing "stovepipe" applications which do not share data and making it available via a
web server. Simultaneously, a separate unit within the 40th ID is developing a similar
application in order to track personnel and equipment status (specifically, related to
OATs - Operational Action Teams) during and after mobilization for state emergencies.
The two applications were both developed with the Access database and perform similar
functions, providing similar informational views to different end users. These two
applications could have been developed together as a complete, unified program able to
share information to both the unit and Headquarters levels without the duplication of
effort which occurred. It is also possible that RCAS II may provide software addressing
part if not all of these requirements. This could sound the death knell for both
applications, relegating them to isolated, redundant systems which do not interoperate at
the required level.
This example, multiplied across the entire array of organizational functions and
depth of the hierarchy, results in wasted resources - time, manpower, money, computer
equipment, and the eventual product itself. But as long as units have the ready ability to
develop their own applications using easily available database, web server, and authoring
software tools, feel that immediate mission needs are not being met through standard
systems, and ensuing software development is allowed to continue unmanaged, then this
problem will continue .
195
However, the software provided as part of RCAS II is not the whole solution,
even if it contained everything currently needed; requirements will continue to evolve
faster than subsequent versions can be introduced. In fact, the solution will never be just
a newer, better, more integrated application; today's hottest thing will be tomorrow's
minimum acceptable standard. To prohibit the development of software for the CA-
ARNG and rely solely on software provided by RCAS II is not a desirable solution.
On the contrary, the ability to quickly develop customized software applications
in-house in order to meet mission needs is tremendously useful. But this capability must
be more effectively harnessed. Individual efforts should not be halted; commands
developing software for their own use know their requirements better than anyone else.
However, the process must be more effectively managed in order to minimize scarce
resources. And most importantly, it must be coordinated to create more powerful,
accessible, and integrated applications benefiting the entire organization. The answer is
to consolidate the development of all new software under a centrally managed
development team lead by the DOIM.
This software development team would have a small number of permanent
members, each assigned to various projects at any given time in a matrix type structure.
The members would be composed of experts in a few critical software development
skills, such as fourth generation language programming (Visual Basic/Java/C++), web
authoring, database programming, and any other abilities deemed necessary for typical
projects. Other team members would be temporarily assigned from units sponsoring
software development projects. By supplying personnel who are able to assist in the
development effort and have an intimate knowledge of their requirements, units will
directly benefit from the software team's existence. Several distinct advantages gained
are: 1) broader range, more software experience available through team than units can
muster in-house; 2) development efforts are centrally coordinated, ensuring compliance
with Guard directives, compatibility with other projects, and therefore much greater
chance for success and full implementation; and 3) reduced development overhead at unit
level.
Significant DOIM oversight will be required for the software development team
concept to work effectively. A project development and selection board must be created
as part of the management infrastructure of the software development team. This board's
purpose would be to review all potential IT projects within the organization and rank
them. Projects would then be chosen according to factors such as value to the
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organization/need for the project, cost, technical difficulty, scheduling, and a host of other
relevant project management considerations. Hoffer et al provide helpful selection
criteria and other points to consider in developing potential IT projects [Ref. 36, pp. 195-
225] . Final project approval should be made according to guidance from the Director,
DOIM in support of key CA-APING business processes and in keeping with the Guard's
strategic business plan.
Through these efforts, the CA-ARNG can realize a significant improvement in the
quality, scheduling and cost performance, risk management, and overall success rate of
all software applications developed in-house.
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APPENDIX C. REDESIGN PROCESS MAPS AND SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTATION
The following chronicles this team's understanding of the baseline process of the
CA-ARNG SEMP. Each step is listed with its associated activities, information needs,
personnel, technology, and pathologies and faults.
1. MISSION RECEIPT/VALIDATION-BASELINE
Describe Process-How is Mission Validation Accomplished i.e., how is work
done?
Mission tasking received from OES via phone call followed by an official mission
number with basic mission related information. Decision made by Watch Officer in CAC
as to the missions scope in compliance with CA-ARNG directives. Mission details are
obtained directly from the customer contacted by the Watch Officer. Purpose is to
validate/update requirements for assistance i.e., nature of emergency, time, location,
priority, POCs, current status and next action on the part of the Guard.
1. Activities
D Receive Mission number/tasking from OES
How? Either by RIMS or phone call
D Decide on mission legality
How? Knowledge of Watch Officer or consulting the official guidance
2. Information needs
D OES mission number
D Points of contact at emergency site
Location of event
D Nature of event
Time event occurred
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D Who/what is already onscene
D Who is incident commander
D Is this legal/fits mission parameters
D Have other agencies been contacted
3. Personnel
CAC Watch Officer
D CAC Support Staff
Incident Commander





D RIMS (Regional Information Management System) Lotus Notes
D Word processor, spreadsheets (MS Office)
Pager
5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
Lack of rich and timely info received through RIMS.
More info, more timely, could reduce response time, possibly eliminate
customer validation step. Notion of fewer points of contact with customer
decreases chance of conflicting information and confusion.
Possible increase in cycle time due to off-duty notification procedures (pagers
and cellular phone only)
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2. CUSTOMER VALIDATION-BASELINE
D Describe Process How is Customer Validation accomplished i.e., how is work
done?
CAC watch officer contacts the incident commander (normally by phone) to
verity the request i.e., nature of emergency, time, location, priority, POCs, current status
and next action on the part of the Guard. This is done primarily to ensure info is current
and positive contact is established.
1. Activities
D Contact Incident Commander and verify mission information
How- Phone conversation
2. Information Needs
Point of contact at emergency site
D Location of event
D Nature of event
Time event occurred
D Who/what is already on-scene
D Who is incident commander
Have other agencies been contacted
3. Personnel
D CAC Watch Officer
Incident commander




5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
Redundant information already received in mission receipt/validation
Viewed as unnecessary step
3. SRCOM MISSION TASKING - BASELINE
D Describe Process-How is Mission tasking accomplished i.e., how is work
done?
Assign mission task to appropriate CA ARNG command (determined by nature of
emergency) to satisfy mission requirements for assets. Normally accomplished by phone
call to SRCOM operations (40th ID (Ground), 40 th AVBE (Aviation), under 5 helicopters
to State Aviation).
1. Activities
Determine appropriate response to mission tasking from OES
How? Assess request
Determine asset availability
Decide who and what to task (by unit, by command)
D Contact Senior command
How? Phone call to tasked entity/Pager
D Provide mission order to tasked entity (information including requested assets)
How? Phone call




Formal Mission tasking by CAC - What response is needed
D What is being requested




D Who/what is already onscene
Who is incident commander
Other agencies responding
D Estimated Duration
D Identify unit/assets for most timely response (SRCOM to subordinate unit)
3. Personnel
CAC Watch Officer/Authorized Personnel
D Operations Officer, 40,h ID
Operations Officer, State Aviation
D Tasked Guard unit commander
4. Technology
D Telephone (POTS Line)
Cellular
E-mail
RIMS (Regional Information Management System) Lotus Notes
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Word processor, spreadsheets (MS Office)
5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
Military chain of command tasking incurs non-value added handoffs
Poor asset avail. Info both on Air/Ground makes tasking difficult
Phone conversation limits quality of information- more information able to be
passed electronically.
4. ORGANIZE AND DEPLOY - BASELINE
Describes the process which units recall personnel, organize equipment and
people and deploy to the emergency site.
1. Activities
Units Receive mission orders
How? SRCOM or CAC tasking by phone
D Units mobilize for mission
How? Recall key personnel and others required for mission. By phone.
Manually check equipment status reports to determine equipment
availability
Units deploy for mission
How?
2. Information needs
Points of contact at emergency site
Location of event
D Shortest functional route to arrive at event site
D Nature of event
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Time event occurred
D Who/what is already onscene
D Who is incident commander
D Have other agencies been contacted
D Target on time
Required equipment and personnel
Estimated mobilization time (how long will they be mobilized?)
D Equipment status and location
D Soldier readiness info
D Pay system access
3. Personnel
D CAC Watch Officer
CAC Support Staff
D In full operations: G-l, G-3, G-2, Aviation
D Incident Commander
D Guard field commander
D Guard unit personnel
4. Technology
D Telephone (POTS Line)
Cellular
E-mail
D RIMS (Regional Information Management System) Lotus Notes
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D Word processor, spreadsheets (MS Office)
D Tactical phone, sat, radio
5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
Increased cycle times due to military chain-of-command handoffs.
D Lack of rich and timely info received through RIMS. More info, more timely,
could reduce response time, possibly eliminate customer validation step.
D Notion of fewer points of contact with customer decreases chance of
conflicting information and confusion.
D Unit/asset status visibility is uncertain.
D **CAC Level of control based on scope of mission. Watch officer decision
determines level ofCAC control.
5. MISSION EXECUTION - BASELINE
Describes the process which units perform their role as Guardsmen accomplish




D Updated mission information
Status of crisis resolution
D How long will they be there?
D Anticipate further tasking?
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3. Personnel







D Tactical phone, sat, radio
5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
Increased cycle times due to military chain-of-command handoffs.
D Unit/asset status visibility is uncertain to CAC
**CAC Level of control based
6. MISSION COMPLETION - BASELINE
D Describe Process
Describes the process which units receive word that the mission has been
successfully completed. Units then stand by awaiting further tasking from CAC or
SRCOM. If none exists, then Guard personnel begin to stand-down and then this process
moves into the demobilization process.
1. Activities
CAC Notified by unit commander that mission requirements are satisfied.
How? Phone
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D CAC verifies that no further operations are required
How? OES coordination
2. Information needs
D Updated mission information
D Status of crisis resolution
D Anticipate further tasking?
D Incident commander feedback
3. Personnel
Guard field commander
D Guard unit personnel
D Incident commander
4. Technology
D Telephone (POTS Line)
Cellular
Tactical phone, sat, radio
5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
Unit/asset status visibility may be uncertain to CAC
Units are not always proactive to let CAC know of mission completion and
availability of assets.
D ** CAC Level of control based on scope of emergency
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7. DEMOBILIZATION - BASELINE
Describes the process which units stand-down from the operation. The mission is
completed satisfactorily. Guardsmen inventory/repair equipment and handle
administrative matters. Soldiers return home
1. Activities
D Units officially order to stand-down
How? CAC issues verbal order to SRCOM or individual unit commander
D Units return to armories and out process soldiers




Soldier personal information updates
3. Personnel
Guard field commander
D Guard unit personnel




Tactical phone, sat, radio
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5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
D None
8. FEEDBACK - BASELINE
Information is collected from unit commanders and CAC personnel on the Guards
performance during an operation. The pro's and con's are rolled up into an after action
report to be staffed up the chain.
1. Activities
D Key Guard personnel provide input to AAR
How? E-mail, phone call, informal meetings
Facts are collected
How? Basic info such as prop loss, life loss etc is obtained. Duration of
emergency and number of soldiers assets
D Recommendations are proposed
How? From input of key Guard personnel
2. Information needs
D Facts from crisis
D Opinions from unit commanders and CAC staff
3. Personnel
D Guard field commanders
D CAC Watch Officer
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4. Technology
D Telephone (POTS Line)
Word Processor
5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
D Too little involvement from customers (incident commander/victims?)
D Feedback session organization is critical to achieving maximum returns
9. PLAN REVISION - BASELINE
D Describe Process
After action report recommendations validated by senior officers. Plan revised
based on after action input.
1. Activities
AAR recommendations are staffed to get "approval" for seniors
How? Admin paper chain and informal meetings
D AAR recommendations are incorporated into Operations Plan
How? Staff action officer writes plan revision which is incorporated in
next revision of plan then promulgated.
2. Information needs
D After action report
D Current Op Plan
Impact of changes
3. Personnel
Dir. Of Plans and Ops
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5. Diagnose Pathologies and Faults
D Too little involvement from customers (incident commander/victims?)
Could be organized into feedback process.
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APPENDIX D. GLOSSARY OF TERMS
D Activity
A series of transactions that translates inputs into outputs using resources in
response to a business requirement; sequences of activities in logical
combinations form processes.
D Benchmark
A measured, "best-in-class" achievement; a reference or measurement
standard for comparison; this performance level is recognized as the standard
of excellence for a specific business process.
D Benchmarking
A systematic and continuous measurement process; a process of continually
comparing and measuring an organization's business processes against
business leaders anywhere in the world to gain information that will help the
organization take action to improve its performance.
D Benchmarking gap
The difference in performance between the benchmark for a particular activity
and other companies in the comparison; the measured leadership advantage of
the benchmark organization over other organizations.
D Best-in-class
Outstanding process performance within an industry; words used as synonyms
are best practice and best-of-breed.
Best-of-breed
Outstanding process performance within an industry; words used as synonyms
are best practice and best-in-class.
D Best practices
Superior performance within a function independent of industry, leadership,
management, or operational methods or approaches that lead to exceptional
performance; best practice is a relative term and usually indicates innovative
or interesting business practices that have been identified as contributing to
improved performance at leading companies.
Capability mapping
The analysis of the business infrastructure of an organization to determine
unique abilities and potential.
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D Case Manager
The case manager transformation involves replacing specialized employees in
a process (often from different functional departments) with a generalist case
manager who performs all process activities from start to finish. A case
manager can have positive performance effects in terms of cycle time (and
often cost), as a single case manager obviates the need for handoffs and inter-
departmental coordination. A case team involves the same concept extended
to a dedicated team of people. In the DoD, these are referred to as 'integrated
product teams' (IPTs).
D Code of conduct
A behavioral convention that describes the protocol of behaviors— the set of
conventions prescribing correct etiquette and procedures to be used in a
common activity.
Common interest group
A network of individuals who share a mutual interest in a specific subject and
have agreed to share their own experiences.
Competitive analysis
Analyzing the magnitude and rationale for the gap between one's own
organizational performance measures and the performance measures of
competing organizations.
D Competitive
A measure of organizational performance compared against benchmarking
competing organizations.
Continuous process
Ongoing improvement of business processes in terms of quality, improvement
cost, or cycle time.
D Core competencies
Strategic business capabilities that provide a company with a marketplace
advantage.
Critical success factors
Quantitative measures for effectiveness, economy, and efficiency; those few
areas where satisfactory performance is essential in order for a business to
succeed; characteristics, conditions, or variables that have a direct influence
on a customer's satisfaction with a specific business process; the set of things
that must be done right if a vision is to be achieved.
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Customer advocate
The role played by a member of some teams where that individual pleads the
case of the customer and calls the team's attention to issues that would concern
the customer.
Customer analysis
The evaluation of a customer's conditions and trends relative to a particular
product or service of a business— tools include customer focus groups, field
trial testing, customer satisfaction measurement, customer feedback systems,
and the use of various types of questionnaires and survey instruments.
Decision Support System
Computer-based systems composed of a language system, presentation
system, knowledge system, and problem-processing system whose collective
purpose is the support of decision making activities.
D De-Linearize
De-linearization involves rearranging a sequence of process activities to be
performed in a more parallel or concurrent manner. Process parallelism or
concurrency has positive performance effects in terms of cycle time (and often
cost), as activities are performed in parallel as opposed to sequentially. This
redesign transformation affects the sequence and flow of process activities,
but not how or by whom they are performed.
D Empowerment
Empowerment involves delegating responsibility to front-line employees and
authorizing the people doing process work to ensure the quality of their work.
Empowerment can have positive performance effects in terms of cost and
cycle time, as quality 'checking' steps can be avoided and empowered
employees often produce superior work products at lower cost. Empowerment
entails some job enlargement.
Enabler
Those processes, practices, or methods that facilitate the implementation of a
best practice and help to meet a critical success factor; enablers help to explain
the reasons behind the performance indicated by a benchmark.
Entitlement
The best that can be achieved in process performance using current resources
to eliminate waste and improve cycle time; obvious improvements that are




The conduct or procedure required to be observed in social or official life.
D Exchange
The act of giving or taking one thing in return for another.
D Executive champion
An executive supporter who serves as a "militant defender" or advocate of a
particular civil right or activity.
D Functional
Process benchmarking that compares a particular business benchmarking
function at two or more companies.
Generic benchmarking
Process benchmarking that compares a particular business function or process
at two or more companies independent of their industries.
D Global benchmarking
The extension of strategic benchmarking to a global scale.
Goals
The numerical target value or observed performance that indicates the
strategic direction of an organization.
D Implementation
Specific tasks that will make a strategy into a reality.
Internal benchmarking
Process benchmarking that is performed within an organization by comparing
similar business units or business processes.
Internal benchmarking
Process benchmarking that is performed within an organization by comparing
similar business units or business processes.
D IT Automation
IT-Automation involves the application of information technology (IT) to
automate process activities. This powerful redesign transformation can have
positive performance effects in terms of cost and cycle time, as computer-
based tools can replace and improve human performance. As a 'automation'




IT-Communication involves the application of information technology (IT) to
support process communications. This powerful redesign transformation can
have positive performance effects in terms of cost and cycle time, as
computer-based tools can replace slow paper-based communications.
D IT Support
IT-Support involves the application of information technology (IT) to support
process activities. This powerful redesign transformation can have positive
performance effects in terms of cost and cycle time, as computer-based tools
can augment human performance in terms of memory, speed, thoroughness
and other attributes. As a 'support' enabler, IT in this class is used in
conjunction with human labor (i.e., in contrast to IT-Automation).
Joint Reviews
IT-Support involves the application of information technology (IT) to support
process activities. This powerful redesign transformation can have positive
performance effects in terms of cost and cycle time, as computer-based tools
can augment human performance in terms of memory, speed, thoroughness
and other attributes. As a 'support' enabler, IT in this class is used in
conjunction with human labor (i.e., in contrast to IT-Automation).
Key business process
Those processes that influence the customer's perception of your business.
D Leadership goal
A goal whose achievement will place an organization in a leadership position
among similar organizations.
Long-term goal
A goal that may be accomplished in a longer term, usually one to five years.
Milestone
A mark of a significant point in development.
D Model
A description, representation, or analogy that is used to help visualize
something that cannot be directly understood.
D Networking
A decentralized organization of independent participants who develop a
degree of interdependence and share a coherent set of values and interests.
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D Objective
The set of results to be achieved that will deploy a vision into reality.
D Parity goal
A goal whose achievement will place an organization at an equal position
among similar organizations.
D Partner
To form relationship between two parties who are associates or colleagues
involving close cooperation and implying joint rights and responsibilities.
Performance
Measurement of the performance of one company's product benchmarking
against that of another company.
D Process
A series of interrelated activities that convert inputs into results (outputs);
processes consume resources and require standards for repeatable
performance; processes respond to control systems that direct the quality, rate,
and cost of performance.
D Process benchmarking
The measurement of discrete process performance and functionality against
organizations that are excellent in those processes.
D Process owner
The individual who exercises the possession or control over a process.
Process stakeholder
An individual who has an interest in the conduct of a particular process.
D Project facilitator
The individual who focuses on the process of benchmarking and makes that
process easier for the team.
D Project sponsor
The individual who provides the financial support for a benchmarking project;
an individual who plans and carries out a project or activity; one who assumes
the responsibility for a project.
Protocol
A set of conventions governing the actions of individuals, organizations, or




A set of questions for obtaining statistically useful process or personal
information.
Recalibration
To readjust the calibration of a measure; to standardize by determining the
deviation from a measure against a standard.
Recycling
To reprocess in order to gain additional information; to return to an earlier
condition so that the operation can begin again.
D Reengineering
The radical redesign of business processes, organizational structures,
management systems, and values of an organization to achieve breakthroughs
in business performance.
Reverse engineering
A comparison of the product characteristics, functionality, and performance
with similar products made by competitors.
D Root cause
The fundamental causal reason for a particular observation.
D Secondary research
The practice of searching for information about a particular subject area from
indirect sources.
Short-term goal
Goal that may be accomplished within a short time frame, usually less than
one year.
Strategy
The plans and means to achieve the goal for a particular objective.
D Strategic alliance
A strategic bond or connection between organizations with common interests;
an association to further the common interests of its participants.
Strategic benchmarking
A systematic business process for evaluating alternatives, implementing
strategies, and improving performance by understanding and adapting




A statement of the persistent ambitions of a company that helps to guide its
decisions for resource allocation and goal setting.
Strategic planning
A road map to gain competitive advantage by achieving goals that define
business objectives for critical success factors.
D Subject matter expert
An individual whose knowledge of the content of a particular subject is
considered to be exceptional.
D Survey
To query individuals in order to collect data for the purpose of analyzing some
group or sample of a population.
D Target
A mark to shoot for; a goal to be achieved.
D Team leader
An individual who participates on a team and takes on the leadership role for
that team.
D Team member
An individual who participates on a team and may take on one or more roles
with respect to that team.
Thesaurus
A book of words and their synonyms.
D Total quality
A customer-focused management philosophy and strategy management that
seeks continuous improvement in business processes using analytical tools
and teamwork that encompasses the participation of all employees.
Vision
The achievable dream of what an organization wants to do and where it wants
to go.
World-class
Leading performance in a process independent of industry, function, or
location.
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APPENDIX F. THREE TIERED ARCHITECTURE
This appendix discusses the concept of the three-tiered architecture and provides a
brief synopsis of its component elements. For the sake of brevity and clarity, the
information below is taken from web pages provided by the Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University. Further reading on three-tiered
architectures should include at a minimum research by Lewis on a three-tiered
architecture plan for the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) [Ref. 35].
The three tier software architecture emerged in the 1 990s to overcome the
limitations of the two tier architecture (see Two Tier Software Architectures) . The
third tier (middle tier server) is between the user interface (client) and the data
management (server) components. This middle tier provides process management
where business logic and rules are executed and can accommodate hundreds of
users (as compared to only 1 00 users with the two tier architecture) by providing
functions such as queuing, application execution, and database staging. The three
tier architecture is used when an effective distributed client/server design is
needed that provides (when compared to the two tier) increased performance,
flexibility, maintainability , reusability, and scalability , while hiding the
complexity of distributed processing from the user. For detailed information on
three tier architectures see Schussel and Eckerson. Schussel provides a graphical
history of the evolution of client/server architectures [Schussel 96 , Eckerson 95 ]
.
Technical Detail
A three tier distributed client/server architecture (as shown in Figure 28) includes
a user system interface top tier where user services (such as session, text input,





Three tier distributed client/server architecture depiction [Louis 95 ]
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The middle tier provides process management services (such as process
development, process enactment, process monitoring, and process resourcing) that
are shared by multiple applications. The third tier provides database management
functionality and is dedicated to data and file services that can be optimized
without using any proprietary database management system languages. The data
management component ensures that the data is consistent throughout the
distributed environment through the use of features such as data locking,
consistency, and replication. It should be noted that connectivity between tiers can
be dynamically changed depending upon the user's request for data and services.
The middle tier server (also referred to as the application server) improves
performance, flexibility, maintainability, reusability, and scalability by
centralizing process logic. Centralized process logic makes administration and
change management easier by localizing system functionality so that changes
must only be written once and placed on the middle tier server to be available
throughout the systems. With other architectural designs, a change to a function
(service) would need to be written into every application [Eckerson 95] .
In addition, the middle process management tier controls transactions and
asynchronous queuing to ensure reliable completion of transactions [Schussel 96 ]
.
The middle tier manages distributed database integrity by the two phase commit
process (see Database Two Phase Commit) . It provides access to resources based
on names instead of locations, and thereby improves scalability and flexibility as
system components are added or moved [Edelstein 95 ],
It should be noted that recently, mainframes have been combined as servers in
distributed architectures to provide massive storage and improve security (see
Distributed/Collaborative Enterprise Architectures) .
Usage Considerations
Three tier architectures are used in commercial and military distributed
client/server environments in which shared resources, such as heterogeneous
databases and processing rules, are required [Edelstein 95 ]. The three tier
architecture will support hundreds of users, making it more scalable than the two
tier architecture (see Two Tier Software Architectures) [Schussel 961.
Three tier architectures facilitate software development because each tier can be
built and executed on a separate platform, thus making it easier to organize the
implementation. Also, three tier architectures readily allow different tiers to be
developed in different languages, such as a graphical user interface language for
the top tier; C, C++, SmallTalk, Basic, Ada 83 , or Ada 95 for the middle tier; and
SQL for much of the database tier [Edelstein 95 ].
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Migrating a legacy system to a three tier architecture can be done in a manner that
is low-risk and cost-effective. This is done by maintaining the old database and
process management rules so that the old and new systems will run side by side
until each application and data element or object is moved to the new design. This
migration might require rebuilding legacy applications with new sets of tools and
purchasing additional server platforms and service tools, such as transaction
monitors (see Transaction Processing Monitor Technology) and Message-
Oriented Middleware . The benefit is that three tier architectures hide the
complexity of deploying and supporting underlying services and network
communications.
Maturity
Three tier architectures have been used successfully since the early 1 990s on
thousands of systems of various types throughout the Department of Defense
(DoD) and in commercial industry, where distributed information computing in a
heterogeneous environment is required. An Air Force system that is evolving
from a legacy architecture to a three tier architecture is Theater Battle
Management Core System (TBMCS).
Costs and Limitations
Building three tier architectures is complex work. Programming tools that support
the design and deployment of three tier architectures do not yet provide all of the
desired services needed to support a distributed computing environment.
A potential problem in designing three tier architectures is that separation of user
interface logic, process management logic, and data logic is not always obvious.
Some process management logic may appear on all three tiers. The placement of a
particular function on a tier should be based on criteria such as the following
rEdelstein95 1:
ease of development and testing
ease of administration
scalability of servers
performance (including both processing and network load)
Dependencies
Database management systems must conform to X/Open systems standards and
XA Transaction protocols to ensure distributed database integrity when
implementing a heterogeneous database two phase commit.
235
Alternatives
Two tier client server architectures (see Two Tier Software Architectures) are
appropriate alternatives to the three tier architectures under the following
circumstances:
when the number of users is expect to be less than 100
for non-real-time information processing in non-complex systems that requires
minimal operator intervention
Distributed/collaborative enterprise computing (see Distributed/Collaborative
Enterprise Architectures) is seen as a viable alternative, particularly if object-
oriented technology on an enterprise-wide scale is desired. An enterprise-wide
design is comprised of numerous smaller systems or subsystems.
Complementary Technologies
Complementary technologies to three tier architectures are Object-Oriented
Design (to implement decomposable applications), three tier client/server
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